There are certain steps for discovering truth through scientific method. But their number is not fixed.
George A. Lundberg has mentioned four stages:
(i) Formulation of working hypothesis;
(ii) Observation and recording of data;
(iii) Classification and organisation of the data collected; and
(iv) Generalisation.
Pauline V. Young has described them as six:
(i) Precise formulation of the problem in question;
(ii) Formulation of working or exploratory hypothesis;
(iii) Observation and exploration of the problem by a variety of scientific techniques;
(iv) Uniform recording of the data so obtained;
(v) Classification of the data into series or sequences; and
(vi) Scientific generalisation.
Arnold Brecht has enumerated them into eleven steps:
1. Observation:
Events, things, and facts are observed through senses. That observation is tentatively accepted or not accepted till final confirmation. Sometimes many observations prove false. Hence a scientist always remains ready to change his ideas, experience or findings.
2. Description:
Observed events and things are described, and that description is accepted or not-accepted till confirmation or availability of new evidence.
3. Measurement:
It gives exactness and precision to observation and description. Measurable things and events should be put under measurement.
4. Acceptance or non-acceptance:
After completion of the first three steps, we accept or not-accept the facts, things or events as a tentative reality. If later on, it proves otherwise, we have to reject it.
5. Inductive generalisation:
Here the tentative acceptance or non-acceptance of reality (No. 4) is offered as a ‘factual hypothesis’. A set of facts and events are associated with another set on the basis of similar properties. After making observation, description, and measurement of the election events, one could, on the basis of Lok Sabha Election of March 1977 in northern India, advance the factual hypothesis that ‘where there were emergency excesses, the ruling party met with total defeat’.
6. Explanation:
At this stage, either the tentative individual facts (No. 4) or inductively reached factual generalisation (No. 5) are advanced in the form of causal relations. They are offered as a ‘theoretical hypothesis’ which is used, till proved false, as a basis of explanation of related facts. In the above illustration, one can explain the loss or gain of a seat to the ruling party.
7. Logical deductive reasoning:
Here we use the findings available to us either as factual generalisation (No. 5) or as hypothetical explanation (No. 6) as argument or basis of explanation to other observations, factual generalisations, or hypothetical explanations (No. 1, 5 and 6). We apply it as a mathematical formula in explaining similar facts or events not yet happened. For example, if any ruling political party of a developing country, in power for the last 25-30 years, is badly defeated, the logical deductive reasoning (No. 7) can be advanced in this or any case that it must have perpetuated excesses during emergency rule.
8. Testing:
We apply inductive generalisation (No. 5) or logical deductive reasoning to newer facts and events of similar nature, and revise the steps from 1 to 4 if it comes out true, we treat them as tentatively proved expectations. In the aforesaid example, if our inductive generalisation (No. 5) or deductive logical reasoning (No. 7) is applied in similar cases of heavy defeat of a ruling political party, and testing (No. 8) proves it to be true, we can use our finding as valid in other cases also.
9. Correcting:
Whenever there appear observations etc. from No. 1 to 4, or inductive generalisations (No. 5), or hypothetical explanations (No. 6) as incompatible or contradictory to our accepted findings, even at step No. 8, we have to correct them. In the above example, if there appears to be the cases, when even after indulging in emergency excesses, the ruling party is not defeated, we have to modify our finding in the light of newer facts, i.e., the lack of unity among opposition political parties to the extent of merging into one party under a common leadership and programme.
10. Predicting:
Prediction about events and conditions can be made on the basis of a finding, (i) if there is identity between (No. 5 and No. 6) factual hypothesis and explanation, and (No. 7 and No. 8) logical deductive reasoning, and testing; or, (ii) it makes a scientific contribution by enabling to choose between several possible alternatives of action. The finding has to prove its validity on the anvil of practical experience.
11. Non-acceptance:
All statements not obtained or confirmed in the manner described above, such as, a priori propositions, have to be separated from the collection of scientifically acceptable propositions. This is culmination of Brecht’s scientific procedure. The factual hypothesis (No. 5) is further advanced as theoretical hypothesis, and sharpened as logical deductive reasoning (No. 7). This deductive reasoning or theoretical thrust is tested again (No. 8) and correction (No. 9) made. In the illustration mentioned above, for example, one fact of ‘fear of establishment of dictatorship by a dynasty’ was previously overlooked.
As such, the finding would fail to make a proper prediction. It would also fail if the fact of ‘unity among the opposition parties’ is neglected, and, even after making the correction (No. 10), one would not accept the finding. Therefore, the last, step of ‘Non-acceptance’ is also a necessary part of the whole procedure. Like Brecht, other scientists have also regarded ‘falsifiability’ (Karl Popper) as an essential part of the scientific venture. In view of the nature of subject matter of social sciences, Brecht has not included experiment and comparison as part of his scientific operations.
Brecht has tried to develop a theory of ‘scientific method’, and regards it as the only one, using its first letters in capital form. It is not necessary that a researcher should formally start from first to last step. Instead, he can begin with a tentative working hypothesis.
Brecht accepts the role of genius, goals of research, relevance of problem, etc., independent of the dimensions of scientific method. His goal is to enable the scholar to communicate his knowledge to another scholar, through standardised words, signs or symbols. Such transmissible knowledge has to be based on testimony and evidence.
Under those given situations, everyone would be able to acquire that knowledge. Still that particular knowledge is not last or beyond refutation, if facts prove otherwise. However, he does not put emphasis on verifiability as on transmissibility. The basis of science is communicability, and not systematisation or testability.
A proper use of other historical, anthropological, and psychological methods is permissible. He accepts importance of human inspiration and purposes, and does not disregard the role of religion or philosophy. He is not against those who take up ‘science’ in a broader sense if it is not used as a mask for real knowledge. As his scientific method goes beyond the verified facts and inten
ds to explain them, Brecht regards it as a ‘theory of theories’. As it is based on empirical observation, it is ‘scientific’, and is more than a method of approach.