In scientific value relativism, the political scientist keeps his personal values separate from his study and does not permit them to influence it. He studies the problem, event, or phenomenon in a value-relative manner, or with reference to the stated values.
While conducting a research or making investigation, one has to suspend his own ultimate values. Scientific Method merely leads to description and analysis of facts of political life. It has no relation with specific values. As such, it is not helpful in studying value-laden things, events or activities. This direct helplessness of scientific method has been, to a great extent, removed by scientific value relativism.
Brecht has presented it in the form of a positive-negative formula:
(1) The question whether something is ‘valuable’ can be answered scientifically only in relation to:
(a) Some goal or purpose for the pursuit of which it is or is not useful (valuable).
(b) The ideas held by some person or group of persons regarding what is or is not valuable.
(2) It is impossible to establish scientifically what goals or purposes are valuable irrespective of:
(a) The value they have in the pursuit of other goals or purposes, or
(b) Of someone’s ideas about ulterior or ultimate goals or purposes.
In brief, analysis of values, ideas, and activities, by scientific method is possible only with reference to ultimate values or ideas expressed about those values. For example, voting for a person or party can be scientifically analysed only when a scholar knows the ultimate values or ideas about the values of the voter. Science cannot ‘prove’ the ultimate, highest, absolute, or standards of values.
The latter are a product of mind, will, faith, inhibition, instinct or ignorance which is beyond the empirical ‘eye’ of scientific method. But it can clarify their meaning, and analyse consequences and risks involved in their pursuance. Scientific value relativism is the logical implication of scientific method; they are the two sides of the same coin. But it consistently refuses to take a stand on the choice of ultimate values.
After acknowledgement of ultimate values or ideas, the value relativist can discuss, analyse, speak on adequacy or inadequacy of all secondary values, ideas, actions, events and propositions. It can empirically know the contents of ‘human nature and needs’ which make up bases or sources of so-called universal norms or values. It can enlighten us on all moral or mental attitudes of man.
Still they would be regarded, in view of the prevailing socio-economic and cultural level of development, as relative and contingent. Such analysis can point out human preferences, nature and need of man, and form of environment and social organisation required to sustain them. Knowledge thus obtained is transmissible, testable and valid.
Scientific value relativism is ‘scientific’ because it is based on scientific method. Regarding ‘values’, it adopts ‘relativism’, which means the scholar studies the values or purposes of an individual or group, keeping either the latter’s ultimate values or some other given value system in view. The scholar or researcher, except in assumptions of scientific method, does not involve his own personal values or ideas. He can, if he likes, do so, but clearly expresses his values or ideas beforehand. In that case, he appears more as an ideologue than a scholar.
Criticism of Scientific Value Relativism:
There has been a sharp reaction to scientific value relativism.
It has been criticised in two ways:
(a) One group of scholars attempt to come closer to it without repudiating it. Brecht calls them as ‘escapists’. Their view is that it is unworthy of scholars that they are unable to give any judgement or solve problems. Some of them find final solution in religion or God, or take ultimate values as general agreements, or working hypotheses. Some have favoured democratic majority or initiation as the ultimate verdict on good or evil.
(b) Another group has tried to prove that scientific value relativism is false. Scholars like Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and others misrepresent and denigrate them by saying that they do not have faith in any absolute value and regard all values as equal. Dewey and Kaufmann do not recognise the difference between fact and value stating that scientific judgement is also a value.
Other scholars like Saint Thomas, Jacques Maritain, Alfred Weber, etc., enlarge the meaning and scope of the term ‘science’. According to them, science is not the only source of knowledge. Intention, religion and imagination are also dependable sources of empirical understanding.
Some others believe in objectivity of values. Sociologists like Mannheim demand more relativity in the perspective of ‘sociology of knowledge’. They relate knowledge to socio-economic and cultural contexts along with individuals’ limited perspective and vested interests.
Brecht has refused to accept most of these objections which fail to disprove the position taken by him. His basic stand is that ultimate value cannot be scientifically validated. It does not debar anyone to have or cherish ultimate values. His simple claim is that the latter cannot be empirically proved. In order to undertake scientific study, one has to make observation in the light of its underlying assumptions or other expressed values. In the field of Political Science, he, at his own, cannot start with his own set of ultimate values.
Some scholars, in place of ‘relativism’, have proposed other terms. They like to substitute the term ‘relative’ with ‘relational’, ‘dialectic’, ‘problematic’, etc. But Brecht does not find them suitable to convey the underlying sense of relativism. Radbruch uses the term ‘perspectivism’ on the plea that values or value-laden things can be studied only with the perspective of ultimate values. But the term ‘perspective’ is ambiguous, and lacks specific meaning.
However, Brecht, has regarded ‘scientific value alternativism’ as acceptable as it connotes the value as a choice among many other values. But, for historical reasons and clarity, he opts for ‘scientific value relativism’. Scientific method is complete along with it.
It has, thus, bridged over the long-standing gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and removed the deadlock in the development of a scientific political theory. It has enabled scholars to study political facts which mostly are value-laden. In a sense, scientific value relativism pushed behaviouralism and scientific method ahead to the making of an empirical political theory.