Category: Political Science Notes

Often influence and authority are wrongly construed as identical.Political leaders constantly endeavor to magnify their influence but they know well that it is highly flexible, fluid, dynamic, indefinite and uncertain, though at times more effective than power itself. It is personal, relational and relative, depending much upon the nature of influences themselves.

Therefore, they remain in search of stabilizing their influence by way of transforming it into authority or acquire a hold over institutions and structures of authority like state, law, presidency, judiciary and others. Apart from political actors, society and its various segments too desires stabilized, accepted, known, and described or formalized patterns of power and influence. Such patterns usually are conducive to individual liberty as well as efficiency and effectivity of political systems. However, it takes years and decades to carve out recognizable authority structures.

Concept, Nature and Process:

It must be remembered that neither force nor influence is authority. But all the three are manifestations or express forms of power. Power, in a sense, is the predisposition or prior capacity which makes application of force, influence and authority possible. Power is the ability to employ force or sanctions, but not its actual employment. Authority is ‘the institutionalised right to employ power’.

Authority has been conceptualised in various ways, such as,

1. A property of a person or office;

2. A relationship between two offices, one superior and the other subor­dinate;

3. A quality of a communication by virtue of which it is accepted; and

4. An interdependence between two segments of authority – one issuing orders, and, others receiving and complying with orders.

There is a lack of unanimity over the meaning and use of ‘authority’. Authority as a phenomenon is older than the ‘state’ itself. According to Bertrand de Jouvenel, it is an outcome of the natural ascendancy of some men over others. Michels regards it as ‘the capacity, innate or acquired, for exercising ascendancy over a group’. But Biersted disagrees with him. In his view, authority is not a capacity. It is a relationship of exercising ascen­dancy. It is a sanctioned or institutionalised power.

Authority is also regarded with deep suspicion, even open hostility. It can be a threat to an individual as it calls for unquestioning obedience. Therefore, some celebrate the decline of authority. It is also a threat to reason and critical understanding. It demands unconditional and unques­tioning compliance, and can generate a climate of deference, and abdication of responsibility, and an uncritical trust in the judgement of others.

In the field of management and public administration, authority has been regarded as ‘a right to command’. According to Simon, authority comes into existence only when the subordinates postpone or give up their own freedom to choose one of the various alternatives available to them, and take up the formal order or indication as the criterion of their choice. Beach puts it as the legitimate authority to direct or influence others’ behaviour. UNESCO report (1955) maintained it as that power which is recognised, respected, known and legitimate.

Tennanbaum finds it as interpersonal relationship between the superiors and subordinates. The subordinate grants ‘authority’ to the decision-maker and puts himself in the position of the latter’s subordinate. According to Simon, authority relations exist only when there occurs actual change in the behaviour of the subordinates.

The superior person takes decisions and communicates them to his subordinates with the expectation that their subordinates will accept them. Authority relations involve (i) expectation of obedience, and (ii) willingness to obey. This concept of authority goes against the traditional view, which regards it, a ‘top-down’ command; the boss has right to issue orders and the subordi­nates have their duty to act on them faithfully.

There are two theories regarding nature of authority:

(a) The Formal theory maintains it as right to issue commands. Authority flows from superior to subordinates, making up the organisational hierarchy,

(b) The Acceptance theory relates to behavioural and human relations schools. According to it, the former theory explains authority only from legal or formal point of view. In actual practice, successful authority depends on the acceptance of the orders by the subordinates.

In view of Chester I. Bernard, four conditions must be fulfilled:

(i) The subordinate must be able to under­stand the order or communication;

(ii) After getting it, he must have belief that it is not against the goals of the organisation;

(iii) He must consider his compliance in conformity with his own individual interests as a part of whole set-up; and,

(iv) He must be, mentally and physically capable of complying with the order.

According to the latter view, authority flows down-up. In the absence of acceptance, cooperation, willingness and ideological similarity, authority becomes nominal or formal. It is no more real authority. Under the accep­tance theory of authority, the subordinates tend to make room in their mind for receiving the orders or communication from their superiors, and comply with them without arguing and opposition.

The subordinates invariably accept orders falling within this area. Bernard calls it, ‘zone of indifference.’ For Tenanbaum, it is ‘sphere of acceptance’ whereas Simon has named it as ‘zone of acceptance’. This zone tends to increase or decrease in proportion to ideological relationship found between the superiors and the subordinates.

It would be observed, there is some exaggeration in the acceptance theory. There is a great need to bring about a synthesis between the two. The subordinates in an organisation do not have so much leeway to accept or reject orders coming from above. Authority, in order to be made effective, is organised in a de-concentrated manner, and various sanctions are attached at various points.

A chain of delimited quantum of responsibility and accountability interlinks these points in the hierarchy. Acceptance of authority by the subordinates cannot be the ultimate criterion of compliance. The general support and consent of the society propels up the authority of an organisation. Bachrach and Baratz opine that while authority is closely related to power, it is not one of its various forms. In fact, it is antithetical to it. They reject the traditional view that it is ‘formal power’, and also criticise that it is ‘institutionalised power’.

According to them, the concept of authority as a form of power is not operationally useful. If it is so, who possesses formal power, when the superior is actually helpless. It is also not useful for those who believe in limited or constitutional government. Its prescription by law does not bestow all legitimacy to it.

Friederich defines authority as a quality of communication that possesses ‘the potentiality of reasoned elaboration’. A possesses ‘authority’, because B regards A’s communication as authoritative. It means B recog­nises compliance or command as reasonable in terms of his own values. B defers to A, not because he fears severe deprivations, but because A’s decision can be rationalised. It is not essential that A’s decision is expressly supported by reasoning. It is sufficient that it has potentiality of such reasoning and is so recognised.

If B believes that A’s communication allows for reasoned elaboration when actually it does not, it is ‘false’ authority. When the source of compliance shifts from ‘genuine’ to ‘false’ authority and B realises that communication cannot be elaborated effectively, then, relationship initially involving authority has been transformed into one involving power. Co
mpliance, thus, commanded is an exercise of power.

Authority operates in terms of similarity of values. It is both a source of and a restraint upon exercise of power. It both justifies as well as limits the use of power. But authority itself has to be grounded upon reasoning that is meaningful to a majority of the people.

Authority can be transformed into power and vice versa. In human and healthy societies, it can perform the valuable function of limiting the behaviour of persons, especially those in official positions, impelling them to confine to legitimate acts. But their actions must be potentially justified by ‘reasoned elaboration’ in terms of values of the same society. If the value pattern of that society itself is pathological, authority, then, is simply a tool in furthering that state of pathology.

Unfortunately, politics itself emerges, evolves, grows, and activates on the basis of those prevailing values. But it is only politics that can put a challenge to those outworn values, and inculcate newer ones. In their own limited way, scholars, philosophers, poets, etc., also do that, though they operate only at the mental level.

Authority, to sum up, is accepted not because it has been given by superior authorities, but on the basis of the consent of the subordinates, who often accept orders considering them right and proper. Authority of the superior person is accepted only when he issues orders in the aforesaid manner. Its basis is not sanctions, but rightness – rather similarity of the goals, values, and norms existing between them. It is direct and institution­alised right to influence the behaviour of the subordinates.

Authority is exercised almost mechanically within the network of clearly defined hierarchical roles: parent-child, teacher-pupil, employer- employee. Authority-relations are institutionalised. Duties and obligations are clearly demarcated. Behaviour under them is reasonably predictable. Relations continue over time and become part of normal life. Under a system of well established authority, men of great ability are less in demand. Under authority, even mediocre persons holding positions in a regular manner can run society or an organisation.

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Legitimacy is essential for the maintenance of any system of political rule. Attention has been given not only to the machinery through which it is maintained but also upon the circumstances in which the legitimacy of a regime is called into question.

Authorities exercise rights, sanctions, and other immunities and privileges, not because ‘authority’ originates in them, but owing to people’s belief in the source of base of their rights. The base or source of these rights is called ‘legitimacy’. Alike authority, power and influence also, in order to be effective, require legitimacy.

If there is no legitimacy, power and influence both are opposed and counteracted: authority is totally disregarded. It is legitimacy, which makes them effective and operational. Individuals, organisations, and institutions cannot have power and influence without having legitimacy, though all the three mutually may be reinforcing, even oppose each other.

Dahl regards it as necessary and economical. Leaders in democracies, usually espouse a set of, more or less, persistent and integrated doctrines, popularly called as ‘ideology’. It purports to explain and justify their leadership in the system. Leaders develop ‘ideology’ to endow their leadership with legitimacy and convert their political influence into authority.

It is far more economical to rule by means of authority than by means of coercion, power, or influence. Moreover, it is legitimacy which distinguishes coercion, force, and power from influence, persuasion and leadership. But exercise of force can be ‘legitimate’ against criminals, miscreants and rebels.

Conceptual Explanation:

Legitimacy, according to Dolf Sternberger, is the foundation of govern­mental power. It is exercised both as consciousness on the part of government that it has a right to govern and with some acknowledgement by the governed that the government has a right to do so. Etymologically, ‘legit­imacy’ is from Latin ‘legitimus’ which means ‘lawful’. During medieval ages, it meant constitutional role or order, conforming to ancient customs, tradi­tions, and procedure.

Etzioni finds it as a source of satisfaction derived from participation in the organisation: the ability to justify. It is a belief that the structure, proce­dures, acts, decisions, officials and leaders of government possess the quality of ‘rightness’ property or moral goodness. They should be accepted as such irrespective of the specific contents of the particular acts, orders or communication.

The concept is as old as politics itself – from Plato down to Max Weber and Habermas. But the concept is not very much clear. It is opposite of usurpation, though all usurpers try to legitimise their usurpation as rightful occupation. Revolution or coup d’ etat may not necessarily be illegimate. If it is successful, it introduces a new principle of legitimacy superseding the older one.

Any means can be employed to acquire legitimacy. Recognition is not very necessary. Internal consolidation and acceptance by the people are, by and large, more helpful. However, even existing government may lose legitimacy by violating its principles of legitimacy. Leaders in every political system try to ensure that their decisions are widely accepted, not out of the fear of violence, punishment, or coercion but from a belief that it is morally right and proper to do so.

About obedience to the state, David Held proposed a continuum of seven types:

1. Coercion or following orders

2. Tradition

3. Apathy

4. Pragmatic acquiescence

5. Instrumental acceptance

6. Normative agreement

7. Ideal normative agreement

He likes to reserve types 6 and 7 for legitimacy. A legitimate political order is normatively sanctioned by the population. People follow rules and laws when they think they are right, correct, justified or worthy. There are some other explanations of legitimacy like ‘end of ideology’, ‘the one dimen­sional society’ and so on. By ‘end of ideology’ Lipset means a decline in the support by intellectuals, labour unions and left-wing political parties to ‘red flag waving’: end of class politics. It means ideological issues dividing the western societies are no more important.

Like Almond and Verba, Lipset affirms that there is a general consensus on political values, such as, equality, achievement and procedures of democracy, stability etc. Herbert Marcuse rejected it and propounded his thesis of ‘one dimensional society’. But both start with the appearance of political harmony in Western capitalism in the post-war era. In his book, One Dimensional Man, he finds that the cult of affluence and consumerism has created modes of behaviour that are adaptive, passive and acquiescent. All this is sustained by ideological and coercive forces. Then, political order is not based on genuine consent and legitimacy.

Differing from Weber, David Beetham in The Legitimation of Power (1991) develops a socio-scientific concept of legitimacy. Weber and others have emptied it of any objective reference and in effect acquiesced in the very manipulations of the powerful. One should go into its actual character­istics as a system of power. He highlights how legitimacy is brought about?

Accordingly, power can be legitimate if it fulfills three conditions:

(i) Power must be exercised according to established rules;

(ii) These rules must be justified in terms of the shared beliefs of the government and the governed, and

(iii) Legitimacy must be demonstrated by the expression of consent on the part of the governed.

Non-legitimate power, therefore, suffers from illegitimacy (breach of rules), absence of shared beliefs and delegitimacy or withdrawal of consent. It must not be the result of ‘ideological hegemony’. Otherwise, liberal democracy would turn into what Ralph Miliband calls a ‘capitalist democracy’. Education must not be reduced to a process of ideological indoctrination or mass media turning into a propaganda machine.

Antonio Gramsci drew attention to the degree to which the class system, as upheld by bourgeois ‘hegemony’, that is the ascendancy or domination of bourgeois ideas in every sphere of life. Thus the masses are deluded by bourgeois theories and philosophies. The proletariat remain incapable of achieving class consciousness and unable to realise its revolu­tionary potential.

As an alternative to the Marxist belief, ‘sociology of knowledge’ believes in thinking that the people can be traced back to their position in society and the social groups to which they belong. Each one of these groups has its own distinctive way of looking at the world. Ideologies are, according to Karl Mannheim (1893-1947), ‘socially determined’ and reflect the social circum­stances and aspirations of the groups they live in.

Berger and Luckmann find in The Social Construction of Reality (1971) that everything that passes for ‘knowledge’ in society is socially constructed. Not only they see the world as it is but as they think it is, or as society tells them it is. Legitimacy is always a ‘social construction’.

Legitimacy can also be manufactured. Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman in their book Manufacturing Consent (1994) have developed a ‘propaganda model’ of the mass media. They explain how news and political coverage are distorted by the structures of media itself. It operates through a series of ‘filters’ and at sources, advertisers, sponsors, agents of power, business-backed think-tank and the like. Mass media can subvert or deter democracy. They overlook the fact that the people have their own values and can resist media messages.

Legitimacy is essential for the maintenance of any system of political rule. Attention has been given not only to the machinery through which it is maintained but also upon the circumstances in which th
e legitimacy of a regime is called into question. This is popularly known as ‘crisis of the state’. There are two views: one, of ‘overloaded government’, and, two of legiti­mation crisis.

The first is held by Huntington, Nordhaus, Kind and Rose and Peters. Jurgen Habermas and Offer stand for the second. The former calls for measures of containment and control. The latter see dilemmas difficult but also look for decisive, progressive, and radical change. Habermas in his Legitimation Crisis (1975) points out that within liberal democracies there are crisis tendencies which challenge the stability of such regimes. There is tension between a private-enterprise and a democratic political system. Capitalist economy inherently makes democracy instable.

But David Held does not agree with them on three grounds:

(a) There is no empirical evidence that there is progressively worsening crisis of the state’s authority;

(b) State power is not eroding as its capabilities, resources and apparatuses remain intact; and,

(c) The state is not vulnerable to collapse or disinte­gration.

Political order is the outcome of a complex web of interdependencies between political, economic and social institutions and activities that power centres around. They create multiple pressures to comply. State power is important but is not the only key variable. State is deeply implicated in the creation and reproduction of systematic inequal­ities of power, wealth, income and opportunities. It enjoys sustained legitimation by groups other than those whom it directly privileges. However, only a political order that places the transformation of those inequalities at its centre enjoys legitimacy in the long run.

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There are certain steps for discovering truth through scientific method. But their number is not fixed.

George A. Lundberg has mentioned four stages:

(i) Formulation of working hypothesis;

(ii) Observation and recording of data;

(iii) Classification and organisation of the data collected; and

(iv) Generali­sation.

Pauline V. Young has described them as six:

(i) Precise formulation of the problem in question;

(ii) Formulation of working or exploratory hypothesis;

(iii) Observation and exploration of the problem by a variety of scientific techniques;

(iv) Uniform recording of the data so obtained;

(v) Classification of the data into series or sequences; and

(vi) Scientific gener­alisation.

Arnold Brecht has enumerated them into eleven steps:

1. Observation:

Events, things, and facts are observed through senses. That observation is tentatively accepted or not accepted till final confir­mation. Sometimes many observations prove false. Hence a scientist always remains ready to change his ideas, experience or findings.

2. Description:

Observed events and things are described, and that description is accepted or not-accepted till confirmation or availability of new evidence.

3. Measurement:

It gives exactness and precision to observation and description. Measurable things and events should be put under measurement.

4. Acceptance or non-acceptance:

After completion of the first three steps, we accept or not-accept the facts, things or events as a tentative reality. If later on, it proves otherwise, we have to reject it.

5. Inductive generalisation:

Here the tentative acceptance or non-acceptance of reality (No. 4) is offered as a ‘factual hypothesis’. A set of facts and events are associated with another set on the basis of similar properties. After making observation, description, and measurement of the election events, one could, on the basis of Lok Sabha Election of March 1977 in northern India, advance the factual hypothesis that ‘where there were emergency excesses, the ruling party met with total defeat’.

6. Explanation:

At this stage, either the tentative individual facts (No. 4) or inductively reached factual generalisation (No. 5) are advanced in the form of causal relations. They are offered as a ‘theoretical hypoth­esis’ which is used, till proved false, as a basis of explanation of related facts. In the above illustration, one can explain the loss or gain of a seat to the ruling party.

7. Logical deductive reasoning:

Here we use the findings available to us either as factual generalisation (No. 5) or as hypothetical explanation (No. 6) as argument or basis of explanation to other observations, factual generalisations, or hypothetical explanations (No. 1, 5 and 6). We apply it as a mathematical formula in explaining similar facts or events not yet happened. For example, if any ruling political party of a developing country, in power for the last 25-30 years, is badly defeated, the logical deductive reasoning (No. 7) can be advanced in this or any case that it must have perpetuated excesses during emergency rule.

8. Testing:

We apply inductive generalisation (No. 5) or logical deductive reasoning to newer facts and events of similar nature, and revise the steps from 1 to 4 if it comes out true, we treat them as tentatively proved expectations. In the aforesaid example, if our inductive gener­alisation (No. 5) or deductive logical reasoning (No. 7) is applied in similar cases of heavy defeat of a ruling political party, and testing (No. 8) proves it to be true, we can use our finding as valid in other cases also.

9. Correcting:

Whenever there appear observations etc. from No. 1 to 4, or inductive generalisations (No. 5), or hypothetical explanations (No. 6) as incompatible or contradictory to our accepted findings, even at step No. 8, we have to correct them. In the above example, if there appears to be the cases, when even after indulging in emergency excesses, the ruling party is not defeated, we have to modify our finding in the light of newer facts, i.e., the lack of unity among opposition political parties to the extent of merging into one party under a common leadership and programme.

10. Predicting:

Prediction about events and conditions can be made on the basis of a finding, (i) if there is identity between (No. 5 and No. 6) factual hypothesis and explanation, and (No. 7 and No. 8) logical deductive reasoning, and testing; or, (ii) it makes a scientific contri­bution by enabling to choose between several possible alternatives of action. The finding has to prove its validity on the anvil of practical experience.

11. Non-acceptance:

All statements not obtained or confirmed in the manner described above, such as, a priori propositions, have to be separated from the collection of scientifically acceptable propositions. This is culmination of Brecht’s scientific procedure. The factual hypothesis (No. 5) is further advanced as theoretical hypothesis, and sharpened as logical deductive reasoning (No. 7). This deductive reasoning or theoretical thrust is tested again (No. 8) and correction (No. 9) made. In the illustration mentioned above, for example, one fact of ‘fear of establishment of dictatorship by a dynasty’ was previ­ously overlooked.

As such, the finding would fail to make a proper prediction. It would also fail if the fact of ‘unity among the opposition parties’ is neglected, and, even after making the correction (No. 10), one would not accept the finding. Therefore, the last, step of ‘Non-acceptance’ is also a necessary part of the whole procedure. Like Brecht, other scientists have also regarded ‘falsifiability’ (Karl Popper) as an essential part of the scientific venture. In view of the nature of subject matter of social sciences, Brecht has not included experiment and comparison as part of his scientific operations.

Brecht has tried to develop a theory of ‘scientific method’, and regards it as the only one, using its first letters in capital form. It is not necessary that a researcher should formally start from first to last step. Instead, he can begin with a tentative working hypothesis.

Brecht accepts the role of genius, goals of research, relevance of problem, etc., independent of the dimensions of scientific method. His goal is to enable the scholar to communicate his knowledge to another scholar, through standardised words, signs or symbols. Such transmissible knowledge has to be based on testimony and evidence.

Under those given situations, everyone would be able to acquire that knowledge. Still that particular knowledge is not last or beyond refutation, if facts prove otherwise. However, he does not put emphasis on verifiability as on transmissibility. The basis of science is communicability, and not systematisation or testability.

A proper use of other historical, anthropological, and psychological methods is permissible. He accepts importance of human inspiration and purposes, and does not disregard the role of religion or philosophy. He is not against those who take up ‘science’ in a broader sense if it is not used as a mask for real knowledge. As his scientific method goes beyond the verified facts and inten
ds to explain them, Brecht regards it as a ‘theory of theories’. As it is based on empirical observation, it is ‘scientific’, and is more than a method of approach.

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Behaviouralism has had revolutionary impact on Political Science. It has caused awareness to generate a general theory locating specific units of study. Its emphasis has been to understand man in society and bring about unity in social sciences. Scholars have learnt new modes of analysis and methods of data collection. There is a tendency of cross fertilisation or exchange of knowledge among scholars belonging to various disciplines.

With a common macro theory or frame of reference, modern discipline of Political Science wants to develop a basic science of behaviour. In fact, it has given birth to many behavioural sciences, and has transformed the format of traditional disciplines. It has broadened the scope of Political Science itself.

Apart from heuristic and academic purposes, behaviouralism has a great practical utility, particularly, to bring about social change. It intends to develop modern political theory in a manner that it may be utilised for the purposes of ‘manipulation’ and ‘policy formulation’. Human organisations, human nature, and interactional processes are transforming under the stress of fast developing technology, social growth, industrial and economic progress, cultural proximity in national and international fields, and possi­bility of human control over ecology.

The transformation has taken place to such an extent that it defies all previous description, analysis, explanations, concepts, and generalisations. Simultaneously, it has to be accepted that in view of the interdisciplinary approach and mutual cooperation, progress of science and technology, capacity and competence of social scientists has also increased, so is their responsibility.

They are being called upon to play the role of change-agents. Solution of each problem is being demanded from them. They have to tell the way to implement the solutions. Behaviouralists have to direct everything about the speed, volume, content and control of change.

All such problems can be categorized for practical use of behaviouralism:

(i) Integration,

(ii) Social influence,

(iii) Collaboration,

(iv) Adaptation, and

(v) Revitalisation.

Behaviouralists have done a lot of work on the first three, but have to do much on absorption of fast coming changes as well as in growth and decline of various systems. Little has been done in bringing about planned change; changes are so fast that even available knowledge has not been properly utilised.

Revitalisation of current knowledge, systems, processes, institutions, and norms is an urgent necessity. The behaviouralist accepts his responsibility to contribute his mite and implement his findings for better use. Through him, both creator and user of knowledge have to come together. Behaviouralism, seen with this perspective would appear as a vital scientific philosophy, and the only basis of human survival.

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Gandhiji was not a dreamer. He gave practical shape to the principles and ideals, which he preached. He did not emphasise the establishment of ideal society and did not consider it proper to discuss it in detail, because it could not be achieved immediately.

Therefore, he laid emphasis on the establishment of a non-violent state. For him, Ram Rajya and Ashok Rajya were ideal states. He believed in Sarvodaya. He gave practical shape to non-violence and Satyagraha, and used these in many of his movements. His Khadi programme, Swadeshi Movement, National Education.

Hindu-Muslim Unity, Village uplift, prohibition, removal of untouchability, banning the child marriage and encouragement of widow marriage were all practical ideals. He took pains to destroy racialism. He used Satyagraha for the achievement of India’s freedom, which aroused and inspired the masses very much. His economic ideas are also very practical.

In order to ‘destroy capitalism, he was in favour of economic decentralization and state ownership of cottage industries and to certain extent big industries. In order to give real Swaraj to the people he suggested to decentralisation of authority and giving more powers to the Panchayats.

In the field of religion he suggested human region and morality. The gist of his religion was tolerance. In fact, he was world citizen. The people frightened of the world war need observance of non-violence. The U.N.O. is also laying stress on Gandhiji’s principles of equality, tolerance and non-violence.

In case, the Third World War breaks out, the humanity will perish by the use of dangerous weapons. Thus, the world needs to act on the principles of Gandhiji. According to Dr. Vishwa Nath Varma, “Gandhiji’s place in Indian history is the same as of Washington and Jefferson in the history of the U.S.A. He was a prophet like Lao-Tse, Buddha, Zoroaster and Saint Paul.”

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Decline of the 19th century individualism and emergence of Modern Individualism in the 20th century:

After the eighteenth century, there was a decline in the influence of individualism and in its place the idealism and collectivism gained importance. Joad says, “The theory of individualism or its doctrine of freedom, which is very valuable in politics, when applied in economic sphere, proved disastrous”.

According to Joad, individualism is based on three misconceptions:

(1) That each individual is equally sagacious and he has an equal capacity for knowing what he wants.

(2) That each individual possesses an equal power of obtaining what he wants and an equal freedom of choice.

(3) That the satisfaction of the wants of all individuals is identical with the well-being of the community as a whole.

Thus on the basis of the reasons mentioned above, individualism suffered a setback and idealism and socialism took its place. But when both these theories explained the functions and powers of the state in an exaggerated form, and when they did not attach any importance to individual freedom, there was a great reaction against them and individualism took birth in a refined form. Prof, Joad says, “But the reaction against individualism has produced a reaction in its turn. The wheel has turned full circle and the present dissatisfaction with the state has promoted a revival of individualist thinking akin in spirit though not in form to the individualism of nineteenth century”.

Meaning and Growth of Modern Individualism:

The distinction between modern individualism and ninetieth century individualism is that nineteenth century individualism gives more importance to individual than the state and in order to protect individual liberty, it wants to limit the functions of the state.

On the other hand, modem individualism lays more emphasis on groups and associations and considers the state an association like other associations. The common thing in both of them is that both want to place limitations on the powers of the state. In short, modern individualism is a form of pluralism.

The following are the causes of its origin:

(1) Increase in associations in human society and the acceptance of their importance as compared to state.

(2) During the First World War the European governments acquired all powers, suppressed the individual freedom and acted arbitrarily. Thus the people started thinking of imposing restrictions on the absolute and unlimited powers of state.

(3) Many people even objected to the majority rule in democracy and the states acting in an arbitrary manner. Thus, in order to protect the minority from the dictatorship of the majority, the intellectuals emphasised that a check should be imposed on the powers of the state. Moreover, these powers should be decentralized.

Exponents of Modern Individualism:

Grham Wallas, Norman Angell, Miss Follett and many other Guild socialists are the exponents of modern individualism. Garham Wallas, in his book, ‘Great Society’ exhibits a, “distrust of the power of the over-developed state”. According to him, centralised state with parliament composed on the basis of territorial representation, is hardly an effective organ for the expression of popular will.

Therefore, he recommended the organisation of the second territorial basis. He condemned the dictatorship of the majority. For the economic and educational functions, he suggested the establishment of special, elected bodies, which may also have representatives of professional organisations.

Norman Angell was a great supporter of Internationalism. He strongly opposed the enhanced powers of the state in his book, ‘The Great Illusion”. He said that people come together for their common economic interests.

Generally, man does that job which is useful from economic point of view. But different states compete with one another and they instigate the people in the name of national interest. When the people start thinking as one unit of international economic society, they will give up the modern society based on territorial limits and they will aspire for the society based on economic classes.

Miss Follett in her book, ‘The New Stage’ has thrown light on the relations between individual, association and state and has laid emphasis on the importance of associations. She has said that man can develop his personality through groups only.

Guild-socialists also lay a special emphasis on professional groups in the society. They say that on territorial basis the representation of varied interests is not possible in modern parliaments. Therefore, along with the establishment of Political democracy, they say that there should be separate institutions for industry, religion, education and other activities and the state should have minimum right to interfere in their affairs.

In this way modern individualists attach more importance to groups in society than to individuals and they recognise the separate existence of groups and associations. The function of the state is that it should create some co-ordination between their activities. State is an institution like other institutions and it should not claim any special allegiance of individuals. The state is not an indispensable institution.

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