Category: Political Science Notes

After reading this article you will learn about Fabian Society:- 1. Establishment of Fabian Society 2. Origin of Fabian Society 3. Basis.

Establishment of Fabian Society:

Only after a century of Industrial Revolution its undesirable and harmful conse­quences were so pervasive that almost all the people of the weaker sections came under these consequences. They were more or less deprived of the benefits of Industrial Revolution and began to think about a way out.

It was a type of nightmarish situation. People were deprived of bare necessities such as food, residence, health facilities etc. Specially the working class was the victim. In a word, all-round deterioration gripped the British society.

In this situation it was thought by a large number of men that the setting up of a socialist society could save men from this situation. Some of the historians conclude that in the year 1883 Thomas Davidson, an American school teacher, took the initiative of forming the Fabian Society.

But this view has been contested by many others who hold that practically the society came into being on January 4, 1884 and Frank Podmore was the founding father. Other persons who got the opportunity to celebrate the birth of the society were Edward Pease, and granddaughter of Robert Owen, Dale Owen. Subsequently Bernard Shaw, the Webb couple, H. G. Wells and Graham Wallas with their efforts and intellect graced the Fabian Society.

The term Fabian Society was coined by Frank Podmore. In ancient Rome there was a famous and brave general whose name was Quintus Fabius Maximus Vemecosus, also known as Cunctator (‘Delayer’).

There is a common and interesting story that Fabius Cunctator was an intelligent and cautious military general. Before taking any decision he thought of its various aspects of consequences and justifiability.

His advice was a man must wait for the right moment patiently. It might cause delay, but cautious and prudential methods are always fruitful. Frank Pod-more and few others who participated at the opening of the society took the advice of Fabius Cunctator to their heart.

They fully realized that in order to mitigate the sufferings of toiling masses, capitalism would be overthrown. But one must wait for the right action moment. A right action in a right moment would never go in vain.

In other words, it was thought that everyone must wait for the most opportune moment. Otherwise success would never be achieved.

Studying the various aspects of British society the Fabians came to believe that a strong action was to be taken against capitalist oppressors and exploiters. But that situation had not yet arrived.

Naturally they must wait for that situation. They must study the nature and activities of capitalists, their strength and purposes. It was necessary to bring people into confidence. So they wanted to launch an intensive propaganda against the wrongs of capitalism.

The Fabians declared that their purpose was to establish socialism and it was not an overnight job. Lichtheim has said that the Fabians whole-heartedly supported the advice and technique of Fabius Cunctator and that is why they paid maximum emphasis upon caution. Because of this cautiousness the Fabian approach was evolutionary, gradual and moderate. There is no place of revolutionary tactics in their approach.

Origin of Fabian Society:

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, particularly during the seventies and eighties, on the one hand, Herbert Spencer, with all his intelligence and enthusiasm, was advocating the non-intervention of state for the sake of individual’s liberty.

On the other hand, a vast section of the British populace was fighting tooth and nail to save themselves from growing miseries and sufferings created by the Industrial Revolution. During the fag end of his life John Stuart Mill gave, to some extent reluctantly, permission to state interferences. Then appeared the renowned Oxford idealist and professor of Moral Philosophy—T. H. Green.

He unequivocally an­nounced that the rapid moral degradation and miseries suffered by the people were chiefly due to the economic poverty and deterioration of all sorts of values and principles. So resuscitation of all values and ideals was of primary importance. The state must intervene in favour of the untaught and underfed denizens of London city.

It is the moral responsibility of the state to consider whether the opening of wine shops was necessary at all. Green and his fellow idealists reached a firm conclusion that politics, morality and economics were not elements of watertight compartments.

The prevailing objective social, economic, political and other con­ditions inspired some intellectuals to search for a new ideology on the basis of which a new society could be built up whose sole purpose would be to free common people from all sorts of miseries.

Fabian society circulated its brand of socialism which is known to us as Fabian Socialism. It is so called because the Fabian society fathered it.

Laissez-faire, individualism and state’s non-intervention in man’s economic and other activities were the guiding principles of the economic and social order of the Victorian Age (1837-1901). But the slow movement of economic growth, the gradual and rapid increase of competition among the capitalists of different nationalities and the adoption of protective tariffs questioned the justifiability of free trade.

Moreover, intermittent depressions and critical unemployment situation created deep-rooted and widespread suspicion in the minds of the people about the efficacy of capitalism as a progressive economic system and its potentiality to fight the evils that had been created by the prevailing economic system capitalism. In a word, capitalism was faced with challenges in the last decades of nineteenth century.

We shall focus our attention on the dismal picture of the economy. There was a remarkable slow growth rate from mid-1870s to mid-1890s in England and this has been termed by many as the Great Depression.

“Economically its most pronounced feature was a deceleration of economic growth and a fall in prices of commodities.” Between 1850s and 1870s (early part) the average growth rate was 3 percent. But after 1870s it was halved.

The impact of this depression was not confined within the British Isles, it spread far and wide. As a result of depression the prices of agricultural commodities fell considerably, the wages of the agricul­tural labourer came down to miserable level.

This sector of the economy was looked upon as un-remunerative. Millions of people left the village to swell the urban population and industrial labour force. The economic depression hit hard the people of both rural and urban areas. There was a clear imbalance between the rural and urban areas. This was not a healthy sign for Britain.

“The depression had its effects on industry too. Growing competition from overseas rivals, a heavy export of capital and consequent under-investment at home, and a growing deficit on a trade balance were features which began to erode some of the self-confidence.”

Although England was industrially developed its technical education system was not up to mark. There was a gap between England and other West European countries, particularly Germany, so far as technical education was concerned.

The British capitalists wanted to expand foreign trade but there it had to face keen competition and it was difficult for them to reap the fruits of foreign trade fully. The depression might have been fought away. But the ways were beyond the reach of the authority.

The foreign trade could be expanded. But for this was required political subjugation. The growing national liberation movements in the Third World states stood on the way of p
olitical subjugation. In the home front there was very little scope of the expansion of market because depression and other factors had considerably curtailed the purchasing power of the people of urban areas.

The rural people were comparatively poor. Particularly the economic condi­tion of the agricultural labourers was miserable. All these combinedly made the British economy miserable.

The unregulated capitalist economy was largely suspected as the root of the evils. The spread of Marx’s thought and ideas, on the one hand, evil effects of capitalism, and the failure of the Industrial Revolution to meet the necessary requirements of common and working people convinced the general mass of the necessity of governmental intervention.

Parliamentary commissions, factory legislations and social investigations were suggested as remedies to the evils of post-Industrial Revolution society. Welfare schemes were needed to meet the growing demands.

It was strongly felt and admitted that any civilized government must do something to give relief to its toiling and helpless masses. During the last decades of the nineteenth century, a sizeable section of the British society came to the conclusion that if the natural resources were properly utilized and wings of capitalism were cut, the miserable conditions of the poor people could be arrested.

Material condition could also be improved. Private enterprise should have freedom to conduct the economy but in the case of its failure the government must come forward to ensure the desired results. That is, private control over the economy cannot be allowed ad infinitum.

In this connection we can quote an observation of a Fabian socialist:

“All seemed to point to the fact that free market principles, the religion of economic individualism and laissez-faire could not coordinate the vast interdepend­ent organization of modern industry. In many areas an extension of public respon­sibility was required and the setting up and funding of public administration which could provide the collective services the society required, and which it would not otherwise get.”

The Fabians formed a part of a ferment of social and political thought which began to reassess the ethical basis and effectiveness of both capitalism and liberalism in providing for the spiritual and physical needs of society.

Amidst the many voices which addressed the social and political questions of the day, the early Fabians emerged as a group. This group wanted political and administrative changes which were not directed to socialism but to a Socialist direction.

Very few enthusiastic persons took active interest about how to come out of the crisis. Those who took interests finally decided to set up a new society whose objectives and ideals would be to set up a socialist society.

In January 1884, a year after Marx died, handful of persons set up the Fabian Society and the socialist ideas propagated by it are known as Fabian Socialism.

The founding Fabians published the first Fabian tract under the title “Why Are the Many Poor?” The tract sold like hot cake. Within a year of its formation a number of great intellectuals joined the Fabian Society and most important of them were the “Big Four” Sidney Webb, George Bernard Shaw, Sidney Oliver and Graham Wallas. These Big Four took the leading part in the Fabian movement.

During the first two or three years the Fabian Society confined its activities within discussion, analysis and debate. It could not make much headway in the practical field. After 1886, the Fabian Society decided to participate in the metropolitan politics.

It realized that propaganda among the people was necessary to their consciousness. The society was urged upon to define its purposes. The purposes were defined in the draft of “Basis.”

Basis for the Fabian Society:

The Fabians agreed that “The competitive system assures the happiness and comfort of the few at the expense of the suffering of the many and that the society must be reconstituted in such a manner as to secure the general welfare and happiness.”

To this end they proposed the following principles which were issued in 1887 as the “Basis for the Fabian Society.” The “Basis” is a document containing the objectives and programmes of the Society. From the writings and activities we can draw the conclusion that the Fabians were quite serious about the function of the Society. They thought that the setting up of a socialist society in the Fabian way could emancipate people. Naturally they did not take the issue of socialism lightly or half-­heartedly.

The “Basis” starts with the declaration – “The Fabian Society consists of social­ists.” This declaration is significant. The members are all socialists and, therefore, their only goal is socialism.

Only the socialist path is the way of emancipation. The working of capitalism during the past centuries, particularly the century after the Industrial Revolution, was the chief cause of miseries and sufferings of masses of men.

The socialism which the Fabians professed to achieve was based on the obvious evolution of society which existed around them. It was not based on the speculation of German philosophers. It was not prefixed by “scientific”.

The edifice of Fabian Socialism was built upon the foundation of political and social institutions which existed in England. So when the Fabians pontifically declared themselves as socialists, the term had a particular connotation. The Fabians had no intention to alienate themselves from the tradition.

What are the objectives of the Fabian Society? The Society aims at the reorganization of society by the emancipation of land and industrial capital from individual and class ownership, and the vesting of them in the community for the general benefit.

In this way only can the natural and acquired advantages of the country be equitably shared by the whole people. Here it is clear that land and capital are the two important factors of production and these two must be released from the private ownership and be placed under the management of society for the common benefit. Feudalism and industrial capitalism both deprived the masses of their legitimate share in national wealth.

The society accordingly works for the abolition of private property in land and of consequent individual appropriation, in the form the rent, of the price for permission to use the earth, as well as for the advantages of superior soils and sites.

The society further works for the transfer to the community of the administration of such industrial capital as can conveniently be managed socially. For, owing to the monopoly of the means of production in the past, industrial inventions and the transformation of surplus income into capital have mainly enriched the proprietary class, the worker now being dependent on that class for leave to earn a living.

If these means be carried out without compensation (though not without such relief to expropriated individuals as may seem fit to the community), Rent and Interest will be added to the reward of labour, the idle class now living on the labour of others will necessarily disappear, and practical equality of opportunity will be maintained by the spontaneous action of economic forces with much less interfer­ence with personal liberty than the present system entails.

This general objective can be divided into three parts – there shall be no provision of paying compensation when the property, i.e., land and capital, is taken away. In special circumstances, compensation may be given.

Next, if land and capital are placed under the management of society, labourers will get the benefit of rent and interest. Finally, if the above objectives are carried out successfully the systems of idle class and unearned income will come to an end resulting in the emancipation of the exploited
people.

For the attainment of these ends the Fabian Society looks to the spread of socialist opinions, and the social and political changes consequent thereon, including the establishment of equal citizenship for men and women.

It seeks to achieve these ends by the general dissemination of knowledge as to the relation between individual and society, in its economic, ethical and political aspects.

A cursory study of the above objectives reveals that so far as the objectives of Fabian Socialism and Marxian Socialism are concerned there is very little difference between the two varieties of socialism. But this should not lead one to jump upon the conclusion that both are without any difference.

The aim of both is the nationalization of the sources of production and to ensure the collective manage­ment. This will terminate the system of unearned income. The collective manage­ment will open the opportunities for the common people to share the reward derived from land and capital.

The fundamental point of disagreement between Fabian socialists and Marxian socialists relates to the method of attaining the socialist goals. Fabians insisted upon the evolutionary techniques whereas Marxists thought that only a class struggle leading to revolution could make an end of the system.

Marx did not treat socialism as an end. To him it was an intermediate stage between capitalism and communism. But to Fabians it was the goal or final stage.

The Fabian socialism can be called the extension of socialized liberalism or idealized liberalism propounded by Thomas Hill Green. Marxian socialism was indebted to British political economy, German idealism and Utopian Socialism.

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After reading this article you will learn about German Idealism:- 1. Origin of German Idealism 2. Contribution of French Revolution to German Idealism 3. Philosophical Foundation.

Origin of German Idealism:

Idealism in politics during the eighteenth century originated from the doctrines of natural law, natural rights and social contract. There was also idealism in laissez-faire but the events and facts of the nineteenth century deflated the principles of idealism.

Maxey writes:

“The nineteenth century saw revolution degenerate into chaos and reaction, saw democracy itself betray the grand ideals of the eighteenth century; saw economic freedom converted into an instrument of power and acquisition specially fitted to the hands of rapacious industrial moguls.”

Bentham built up the doctrine of utilitarianism in support of the cause of the English middle class He wanted that the middle class should come forward and directly participate in the political and other affairs of state. From this he developed the idea of utilitarianism. His premises of thought were that men are reasonable, they seek their own interests and happiness and if such men are allowed to pursue their own activities and policies without state intervention or minimum intervention, then they will be able to maximize their pleasure.

But the Industrial Revolution com­pletely changed the political, economic and social milieu of European society and it has been asserted by many, especially Barker, that utilitarianism was incapable to cope with this new situation and a new philosophy was required.

The utilitarian philosophy—idea of limited state—required to be replaced by a new philosophy. Some university professors of Germany and England did not make any attempt to modify utilitarianism.

They wanted to lay the foundation of a new philosophy. They thought that the nature, functions of state, role of individuals, their relation to state and many others related issues should be reviewed in the background of the new situation.

These philosophers formed a school and we call it the idealist school. The idealist school formed by the Oxford professors is called Oxford Idealist School. Kant, Fichte and Hegel are German philosophers and the idealism professed by them is called German Idealism. The best known English idealists are T. H. Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet.

But the Oxford Idealism drew its inspiration from German Idealism the idealism in politics as a whole is voluminously indebted to Greek philosophy, specifically Plato and Aristotle. These idealists are called metaphysical idealists.

The doctrine of these metaphysical philosophers is understood by very few, but their influence on modern political thought is enormous.

The ultimate bases of idealist philosophy of the state is thus to be found in the writings of Plato and Aristotle and in a steady tradition of study and teaching of Republic and Ethics.

From Greek philosophy the idealist adopted the view that political philosophy was essentially an ethical study which considered the state as a natural society and which inquired into the methods by which it sought to attain its moral aims.

Man is a member of a state as a political association and his membership is for the purpose of fulfilling moral objectives. The state is the highest manifestation of morality and ethics. So no individual can think of giving up the membership of the political association.

Furthermore, according to Greek idealism, the law is the expression of pure reason. So no question of withdrawing obligation from the state or disobeying the law does arise. The primary objective of every individual is to perform his duties assigned by the community.

The noted German philosopher Kant borrowed from Rousseau’s ‘general will’ and the concept of moral freedom. We find a close relation between the general will of Rousseau and the moral imperative of Kant.

Rousseau thought that members of the body politic are guided by morality and this is more or less self-imposed. Kant’s individuals are also guided by moral imperatives. In both cases, authority does not impose moral principles upon the members of society.

Kant also borrowed Rousseau’s general will. Kant said that individuals thought it to be a moral duty to be an integral part of general duty. Needless to say that it is Rousseau’s theory. Hegel also accepted (though in different form) the general will of Rousseau.

The former said that general will is the will of the national state. Strictly speaking, Rousseau’s body politic and Hegel’s national state are different. But Hegel’s philosophy is based on dialectics. Hegel’s national state is the culmination of family and civil society and, in the whole process, dialectics has worked.

To Kant, to perform a self-imposed duty is morality and the right to will a self-imposed duty—is freedom. Man cannot be politically free if he is not morally free. Man must think that he is an integral part of the whole.

The decision of the whole is his decision. Rousseau’s moral freedom insists that an individual is not permitted to do whatever he thinks. It is said that with Kant freedom has a negative, limited and subjective meaning.

Rousseau revolted against reason. In his view, the development of art, science and civilization was responsible for moral degeneration. To him, emotion was more important than reason.

The German idealists did not give much credence to scientific intelligence and truth. They sought a higher kind of truth. There was a distinction between truth discovered by observation of phenomena and truth arrived by abstract thought. In this process, political theory became a part of transcendental metaphysics.

Contribution of French Revolution to German Idealism:

It is commonly argued that the German idealism has been the theory of French Revolution. The implication of this comment is not that the German idealist philo­sophers set out to interpret the French Revolution in terms of idealist philosophy. But they (Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel) wrote their philosophy largely as a response to the challenge from France to recognize the state and society on a rational basis so that social and political institutions might accord with freedom and interest of the individual.

The ideas of the French Revolution constitute the core of German idealism. It abolished the feudal absolutism and replaced it with the economic and Political system of the middle class.

The most important contribution of the French Revolution is the emancipation of man from the enslavement of thought imposed upon him by others. After the Revolution man began to treat everything with reason and lean/the technique of self-reliance.

Man is a thinking being. His reason enables to recognize his own potentialities. He does not take events and facts as they are, but subject them to the acid test of reason. He accepts those which reason allows him to do. He is not at the mercy of anybody.

Though Rousseau revolted against reason, Hegel held the view that in every sphere of life there were inequality and unreasonableness. In the opinion of Hegel all these dominated French society.

In fact, the lack of reason and courage and absence of freedom force man to surrender to irrationality and servitude. Hegel argues that the French Revolution had succeeded in asserting the dignity of man.

He can now understand what is right and what is wrong Reason dominates hi action and conduct. This reason is, again, central to Hegel’s philosophy. In order to recognize individuality and give it proper scope for its development several things require to be done. Feudal absolutism is to be abolished and free competition is to be established.

The Revolution did these two things. After the disint
egration of feudalism, industrial capitalism came to occupy that place and, with it, free competition was ensured.

Hegel thinks that the French Revolution asserted the supremacy of reason over reality and this is an important part of Hegel’s idealism The German idealists- and particularly Hegel-state that thought or reason ought to govern reality.

What men think to be true right and good ought to be realized in actual organization of their social and individual life. But the thoughts of different individuals will vary and a cohesive and well-knit social organization will be impossible.

Hegel says that certain universally accepted principles and concepts are required to be properly emphasized.

Philosophical Foundation of German Idealism:

German idealism rejected empiricism and British empiricism is the root of the general doctrine of empiricism. The root of empiricism is that there is no single concept of law of reason and universality of reason.

The British empirical thinkers said that there was no such thing as unity of reason, but there is unity of custom and habit Locke, the great British empiricist, said that the general ideas were the invention and creatures of understanding. The generals are the products of particu­lars.

At the beginning people study particular events and form certain views on the basis of observations. On the basis of these observations they form at subsequent stages-general opinion.

The general cannot be separated from the particular and this forms the basis of empiricism. David Hume, another great empirical philoso­pher, expressed identical view.

The empiricists further said that there was nothing like universal thought and reason. If the particulars differ, the general idea or conclusion will also differ.

German idealism rejected the empirical philosophy of particularize and proceeded to universalize everything. Some critics say that the German philosophers started their analysis primarily to challenge the British empirical philosophy of the eighteenth century.

According to the German idealists, the “empiricist attack jeopardized all efforts to impose an order on the prevailing forms of life. Unity and universality were not to be found in empirical reality”.

Fact is concerned with what is. But the existence of something is not all. There is something beyond the existence of reality or matter. According to German idealism, reason deals with that. It says what ought to be.

German idealist does not intend to confine man or his ability within “the given”. “The given” is temporary and limited. But the universality of concepts and principles goes beyond “the given”.

Reason crosses the boundary of “is” and embarks upon the vast field of “ought”. German idealism argues that, if experience and custom were to be treated as the sole source of knowledge, then men will have no weapon to fight custom.

In the opinion of German idealist philosophers, human psychology is subject to change. There is every possibility of uncertainty and chance and from this no necessity and universality can be derived. But necessity and universality are sole guarantees of reason.

Unless the general concepts that claimed such necessity and universality could be shown to be more than the product of imagination, they could be shown to draw their validity neither neither from experience nor from individual psychology, unless, in other words, they were shown applicable to experience, reason would have to bow to the dictates of empirical teaching.

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After reading this article you will learn about James Harrington:- 1. Life and Work of James Harrington 2. Political Ideas of James Harrington 3. Importance.

Life and Work of James Harrington:

James Harrington was born at Exton, Rutlandshire, in January, 1611. His father was the owner of a large estate and after the death of his father he inherited that estate. This made him economically solvent.

In earlier centuries many educated and intellec­tuals had the tendency to travel to various parts of Europe. Milton and Harrington were no exception.

Even Aristotle extensively toured different parts of Europe and Asia. Returning to England he threw himself into the management of the inherited property. He also developed a personal relationship with King Charles.

He had no interest in the long drawn controversy between king and parliament and this disinterestedness kept him away from the platform of the great polemics. Harrington acted in different capacities in royal family and because of his personal relation with Charles I the antimonarchists suspected him.

The behaviour of James Harrington created suspicion in the minds of many people and they suspected him as a supporter of absolutism of the monarch. After Charles I was beheaded, Harrington retired from politics and started to write his famous work The Commonwealth of Oceana which was published in 1656.

This single book brought for him a lot of eulogy and reputation and he is called one-book genius. Oceana is still read by many who desire to be acquainted with the republican thought of the second half of seventeenth century. Though Harrington’s Oceana was not a solitary one the book sincerely propagated the basic ideas of republican philosophy.

Political Ideas of James Harrington:

Before entering into the details of Harrington’s political ideas let us make a glance over the plan of the book—Oceana. The book is divided into five sections. The first is called the “Preliminaries”.

This is the most important part of the book in the sense that it contains the gist of his political ideas. The second, called “The Council of Legislators”, deals with the composition and procedure of the constituent body of the imaginary Commonwealth of Oceana.

The name of the third section is “The Model of the Commonwealth called Oceana.” The subject matter of this section is the constitution of Oceana. This section is full of imaginary narratives of the legislators.

“The Corollary” is the fourth section. There are several things in this section, such as the proposed constitution of Oceana, its adoption and inauguration. The form of the new government is also discussed in this section.

The final section is named “Description of Oceana.” It is a short postscript depicting the unexampled felicity and prosperity of Oceana under her ideal government.

While Harrington was framing Oceana the picture of England was in his mind. He wanted that England would be governed by sound principles and right reason. Otherwise its stability would be at stake.

In the guise of fiction he had re-written the history of England and had prepared a horoscope for the future. This approach of Harrington created immense interest in the minds of people and a large number of people read it. Interpretation of the book began to be different from person to person which became a source of controversy.

James Harrington, with great acumen, has elaborated the economic basis of republicanism. Here he has followed the policy and method of Aristotle. According to Harrington, not the tyrannies of monarchs, the ruthless behaviour of the ruling class, religious in-toleration of different religious groups or the all-pervading corruption were the real causes of civil war. It was the unequal distribution of property—that is, land, which contributed to the emergence of civil war.

That is, there was no economic balance in English society and this fomented the dissension. Harrington has said that domestic empire is founded upon dominion and the dominion is property real or personal; that is to say, in lands of goods or money.

If the distribution of property is in proportion or balance then the empire or commonwealth is in stable condition. But if the balance is disturbed or upset then there will be disturbances in the state.

It is now obvious that Harrington has blamed economic inequality as the primary cause of revolution and in this respect he borrowed Aristotle’s idea. But we are of opinion that economic inequality is not singularly responsible for revolution. Other factors are also responsible.

The central idea of the above is that if the total amount of land is held by a few persons, the majority of the people will be both economically and politically dependent upon the nobility, that is, the economically powerful class, and this dependence will cause dissension among the members of this class. But if the land is distributed among the masses, the power and influence of the nobility will be curtailed and the Commonwealth will be saved.

James Harrington wants to emphasize that powerful nobility is inconsistent with a republican form of government. There is also a striking resemblance between Harrington and Machiavelli, both held that there is inconsistency between nobility and republicanism.

Let us highlight another aspect of Harrington’s economic basis of republican state. He classifies the states according to the distribution of land. If one man is the sole owner of the entire landed property he is grand signeur and his empire is absolute monarchy.

If the few or a nobility with clergy be landlords or overbalance the people to the like proportion, it makes the Gothic balance and the empire is mixed monarchy. And if the whole people be landlords or hold the lands so divided among them that no man or number of men overbalance them the empire is a commonwealth.

The law which determines the distribution of land is called agrarian law and any government which has no agrarian law can never be stable. England at the time of Harrington was an agricultural country and this inspired him to deduce the conclusion that in the agricultural sector there shall be balance.

This again reminds us of Aristotle’s influence upon Harrington. But his economic balance was not limited to the agrarian country; it was extended to non-agricultural states. His contemporary Holland and Genoa were not agricultural states. The source of wealth of these countries was trade. It is believed that he was also thinking of these states.

Harrington’s ideal state is the ideal balance of economic forces. This ideal can be attained only by the establishment of an equal Commonwealth.

Harrington’s doctrine of economic balance is, no doubt, novel and, in the opinion of Sabine “He stood alone among the political writers of his time.” The almost same idea has been expressed by Maxey when he says that he was a new departure in political thought. The ultimate base’s of political authority, according to Harrington, is not social contract or covenant in its various forms of the divine right theory or the military force. These bases are misleading and false.

Harrington’s equal Commonwealth does not imply equalitarianism. He has insisted upon the balance of economic forces, and not on the distribution of land or wealth among individuals.

James Harrington was a believer of natural aristocracy. Those, from the standpoint of wisdom and capacity, all men are not equal. Some possess higher abilities than others.

This must be recognized. In the equal Commonwealth the natural inequalities must be given due importance and, on the basis of the natural inequalities, the mutual relationships should be determined.

Laws will be framed and government institutions are to be erected upon this grou
nd. James Harrington, it is now clear, was emphasizing upon artificial inequalities created by the misdistribution of agricultural land and this type of imbalance was the root cause of various forms of discord. But in his frame of commonwealth there shall exist natural inequalities and he did not regard them harmful for society.

The distribution of land among all individuals was not all. The government should be organized for that purpose. Harrington has recommended that in the imaginary Commonwealth there shall be a senate to initiate policies and enact laws, a council consisting the mass of population or their representatives with the function of rating upon the recommendations of the senate and magistracy to execute the policies and laws.

Though James Harrington clearly specifies the idea of separation of powers, his analysis, we believe, focuses that idea. He was thinking of dividing the powers of government among several organs for the purpose of ensuring good administration.

The characteristic feature of Harrington’s Commonwealth is that it is an “empire of laws and not of men”. This is typical Aristotelian principle of constitutional government. Aristotle distinguished between constitutional government and tyran­nical government.

The former looks after the public interest and the administration of the state is run on the basis of laws or constitution. There is hardly any scope of arbitrariness. In the latter, arbitrary rule and personal interest predominate.

Hobbes’s Commonwealth was the “empire of men and not of laws”. Harrington has criticized Hobbes from different angles. He has said that “Hobbes was guilty of mere confusion.”

James Harrington agrees with both Aristotle and Machiavelli on the point that politics is an art. So its management or organisation is a difficult task. Everyone cannot acquire this art. For the smooth running of the Commonwealth the balance between the economic power and political power is no doubt necessary, but it is also necessary that there should be predominance of laws and not of men.

The absolute monarchy is essentially a government of men and that is why this type of government is not stable. In the monarchy there is no scope of rotation of power. One man holds power permanently. This goes against the stability of the state. He has suggested that the laws of elections will be framed in such a manner that every able and qualified person gets the opportunity to serve.

Importance of Harrington:

James Harrington was not an outstanding philosopher of the seventeenth century. Nor there was any radically new idea in his entire thought system. Notwithstanding, the students of political thought enthusiastically read his Oceana because it contains certain republican as well as Utopian ideas.

James Harrington was a political philosopher, a Utopian thinker and a theorist. Oceana was his dream-child. The dream or the imagination of a man cannot immediately be applied to practice. “But” observes Maxey “many of ideas and principles he wove into his dream have been translated into reality and are extant in the world today as living political institutions Particularly, his repeated emphasis on economic equality and rule of law constitutes the kernel of today’s political thought.

Dunning comments; “Harrington has been preserved from oblivion only be appre­ciation of a small circle of readers. Yet to the few who have got to the essence of Harrington’s thought it has been very rich in practical suggestions; and so it happens that the actual institutions in which the Commonwealth ideas has been realized in England and America present a remarkably large aggregate of resem­blances to the establishment of Oceana”.

James Harrington created a profound influence upon the later day political thought. “He laid the foundation of modern political theory”. Locke, Montesquieu, Hume, Burke and a host of other European thinkers and publicists of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were indebted to Harrington.

John Adams and Daniel Webster of USA were inspired by Harrington. He gave a very brief outline of the doctrine of separation of powers, which was later on developed by Locke and fully elaborated by Montesquieu.

This again has constituted the central idea of the American constitution. The principle of rotation in offices is really interesting and no doubt a great check upon the misuse of power and corruption. Harrington supported the system of secret ballot which was unheard of in his own days. The system of popular ballot today is popular and part of election.

We shall conclude with the observation of Sabine:

“James Harrington was a political thinker of quite unusual power and independence, the only philosopher of Puritan Revolution who had any philosophical group of social causes behind it”.

His analysis of Puritan Revolution in the light of economic factors evoked consid­erable interest in those days. His approach to revolution and, above all, to politics, is systematic and scientific. Harrington was less interested in liberty than was Milton, but he was more practical.

He had a good understanding of the real situation. His analysis of economic and political facts is still worth remembering. His name is connected with three revolutions—Puritan Revolutions, American Revolution and French Revolution. The economic factors acted behind these revolutions.

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After reading this article you will learn about Renaissance:- 1. Definition of Renaissance 2. Rise of Renaissance 3. Development 4. Political Theory.

Definition of Renaissance:

To define Renaissance in a brief and meaningful way is not an easy task and in spite of the problem we shall make an attempt to define it. Literally the term means the revival of art and literature under the influence of classical models in the 14th to 16th centuries.

In these centuries there was great and unprecedented revival in various fields of art, literature and other intellectual fields. This overall or combined revival can be called Renaissance.

In the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries several countries of Europe witnessed the recovery of intelligence. But the renowned historian H. G. Wells thinks the Renaissance actually emerged in the twelfth century and “there were many signs that the European intelligence was recovering courage and leisure”.

Wells further maintains that the Middle Ages are generally called Dark Ages because during this period there was practically no progress in numerous fields of art, literature and science. The last progress in such fields was found in ancient Greece.

The Renaissance may be also called revival and rediscovery of rational, this worldly secular and scientific spirit and mentality. The Renaissance was thus a general revival in all fields of knowledge and enquiry.

Rise of Renaissance:

We say that Renaissance is the general revival in various fields but Ebenstein says that Renaissance took place not only in the intellectual fields but also in all the fields of social life and looking at it from that perspective, Ebenstein says that Renaissance is not the consequence of any single work of art or any one genius— it was the discovery of man. “Renaissance is not confined to any particular intellectual field, but in all fields of human knowledge and enquiry. So Renaissance can properly be called an overall revival that man’s intelligence can imagine.”

In a beautiful way Ebenstein says Renaissance goes beyond the moral selfhood of Stoicism, the spiritual uniqueness of Christianity, the aesthetic individuality of the ancient Greeks and views man in his totality, in his flesh and blood as well as in his mind and spirit—man in relation to himself, to society, the world. Displacing God, man becomes the centre of the universe.

Numerous fields of human enquiry and intelligence met at a single point and we may call it the confluence of man’s multifarious enquiries.

There were many tributaries and streams of human knowledge and they maintained their identity. But few people took interest for their development because the mentality of developing them did not activate the mind of the people.

It is the Renaissance that inspired people to go through the numerous fields of human knowledge. Renaissance is, therefore, a revival of man’s urge to know. Its only message is rise and wake and go forward.

It wants to emphasize that there is unlimited latent capacity in man and that must be discovered or revived.

In the Middle Ages common people were preoccupied with the feelings of religious thought and the church plays the most vital role in this field. But they were never told that man’s preoccupation with religion was doing maximum harm to the progress of intelligence.

In fact, man was extremely intoxicated with religion. Finally there emerged a new feeling—the feeling to rise above the present mentality. It is undesirable to be confined within the polis. Man must start his journey to the cosmologies. It is the spirit of Renaissance.

The message of Renaissance is that man has immense potentialities in himself. That is not all. Those potentialities must be revived. In the Middle Ages the religion and the Pope of the church in various ways suppressed the feelings and urge of man.

The restlessness of man could not find avenues to come out. It is the Renaissance that performed the job. Ebenstein, that is why, says; the Renaissance was itself the effect of man’s growing restlessness as well as of changing social and technological conditions Man’s indomitable urge to know the unknown, to cross the sea and to land on an unknown land worked effectively for the cause of Renaissance. H. G. Wells says Trade was reviving, cities were recovering ease and safety, the standard of education was rising in the church and spreading among laymen. All these helped, in a considerable way, the revival and development of Renaissance.

There was a very close relationship between Renaissance and enlightenment in the fields of thoughts and ideas. Man was led by the urge to know the unknown, to sail in an uncharted sea and in this way he started his journey to conquer the world. This feeling of man was practically unknown in the dark atmosphere of the Middle Ages.

The bad and unscientific outlook of the church dominated religion blocked all sorts of progress. Man’s urge to know the unknown ultimately obliterated all sorts of geographical barriers and social, cultural, and political differences.

The differences remained as before but all these did not stand on the way of free mixing and unhindered progress of ideas and thought. The narrowness of mind and outlook that was the characteristic feature of the Middle Ages and the advent of Renaissance feeling destroyed that obnoxious situation. Renaissance helped man to march forward.

Development of Renaissance:

It has reasonably been asserted that there is a close relationship between Renaissance and the development of capitalism and this requires explanation.

The Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century caused the enormous production of commodities and along with it there emerged a flood of commodities.

The producers and merchants started to export the excess commodities to several parts of the globe. The relations between different parts developed unprecedentedly. The export and import of commodities brought about a radical change in foreign trade and along with it the academic and intellectual world underwent change which was unimaginable before the advent of Industrial Revolution and merchant capital which grew along with the growth of capitalism.

Both Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers say that if Industrial Revolution and international trade did not take place Renaissance could not get the opportunity to emerge. This does not mean that Industrial Revolution is the solitary reason of the rise of Renaissance.

The fact is that Industrial Revolution is an important reason of Renaissance. The chief objective of the capitalists was to earn profit by selling their commodities in different countries and their activities gave birth to a new era—an era of relationship among various nations.

It is to be maintained that the capitalists started their business not for the progress of Renaissance but for their economic gains. But Renaissance was indirectly benefited. Marx and Engels have said in their Manifesto of the Communist Party; Bourgeoisie creates a new world after its own images. In this way capitalism helped the Renaissance to progress. Due to the tremendous impact of capitalism all the underdeveloped regions of the world came closer.

The merchants and capitalists not only exported their goods and commodities but also their ideas and outlook. The cultures of Asia and Africa came in touch with the culture of the developed nations. This added new wings to the body of Renaissance.

Political Theory of Renaissance:

It would be highly misleading to say that Renaissance was the originator of unprecedented expansion of worldwide communication networ
k and spread of scientific knowledge and education.

In the field of political concepts its contribution is not to be ignored. In an indirect way Renaissance gave birth to the idea of nation- state. Throughout the Middle Ages the church and the Pope fully controlled the political affairs of the state. Kings and rulers had no freedom to decide anything related to politics.

The Renaissance successfully diverted the mind of the people from orthodox religion and numerous superstitions. People began to think about religion with a free mind and they discovered that church and the Pope had misguided them for centuries.

This change in mind and outlook diverted their attention from religion and simultaneously they changed their loyalty from church to the political authority, especially king. There appeared radical political changes in the sphere of politics.

The geographical boundaries of many political units were redrawn or re-determined. This gave birth to a new system which may be called the nation-state. A particular nation or a group of people having a separate identity claimed a separate political entity and this came to be called the nation-state.

In 1648 a famous treaty was ratified—the Peace Treaty of Westphalia. From this Treaty the concept of nation-state received maximum encouragement. Many people of Western political thought believe that the rise of the nation-state is a factor of new international relations. In other words, the nation-state was the beginning of international politics.

Renaissance may rightly be called a cause of separation between politics and religion. Many people propagated that, the things that are Caesar’s unto Caesar, the things that are Gods unto God. That is, the domain of God and Caesar are separated from each other.

The simple implication is there is a clear separation between politics and religion. Church has nothing to do with politics and politics cannot interfere with the religious affairs of the church.

The Renaissance indirectly ensured secular­ism in politics which received its final status and form in the hands of Machiavelli.

Renaissance, to a considerable extent, enlightened the mind of the people and this made them conscious of their rights and obligations. In the new socio-economic political atmosphere people thought of getting more rights and opportunities from the state. Not only this, they began to think about the protection of their rights.

They believed that it was the primary duty of the political authority to protect rights. In the Middle Ages the church demanded more and more money and property from common people.

People were also made to believe that donation of wealth or property to the church would enable them to get blessings of God and this would save them to be free from sins. Renaissance removed superstition and kindled the idea of rights.

People demanded more rights and, simultaneously, their protection. This, we believe, a great contribution of Renaissance.

Quentine Skinner in his extensive research work (The foundations of modern political thought, in two volumes) has drawn our attention to another aspect of Renaissance. In Volume I he says that Renaissance, to a considerable extent, gave rise to republicanism.

Skinner chiefly refers to the importance of Renaissance in Italy. Rise of consciousness is the primary reason of republicanism. In many parts of Italy and in other places of Europe the rulers were not elected.

They were nominated. But in the second half of the twelfth century the system of elective government was introduced which means the members of the government were to be elected by the people. This is republicanism.

Skinner says “During the second half of the 12th century a further development took place. The rules of consuls came to be superseded by a stables form of elective government centred on an official known as the podesta. He was invested with supreme power or potestas over the city.”

The podesta was generally a citizen of another. Naturally he had no local obligation or feeling. Podesta was popularly elected and was accountable to people who elected him. This constitutes the central idea of republican form of government.

The Podesta enjoyed enormous powers. He was supposed to be the supreme administrative and judicial authority. But the comprehensive power did not make him a dictator.

Skinner further observes that though the republican type of government was originally set up in selected areas of Italy and other parts gradually this type of government was adopted universally by the leading cities.

A new meaning of liberty was brought about by the Renaissance. It taught people in general that every nation or state had the right to be free from foreign rule and that must be recognized by all nations. Before Renaissance very few nations enjoyed freedom. But this taught nations that the yoke of foreign rule and servitude must be thrown off.

We call it national liberty or the liberty of the nation. Skinner says “By liberty they meant first of all their independence from Emperor. …By liberty they also meant their right to maintain their existing forms of government”.

The mere implication is every nation has right to live in its own way. The simple fact is that two forms of liberty were emphasized—one personal liberty, and the other liberty of the nation. Skinner is of opinion that Italians thought of the two forms of liberty.

Italy and several parts of Europe were plagued by conflicts and internecine war. This stalled the progress and hindered the attainment of peace. Many people seriously thought of restoring peace and Dante (1265-1321) was the foremost of them. Dante’s fundamental plea was for restoration and tranquility.

His firm opinion was that the Emperor was the most suitable person for this crucial task. Dante thought that only an Emperor could achieve this mission.

Skinner writes “Dante’s tract on monarchy asks for total trust to be placed in the figure of Emperor as the only unifying force capable of overcoming the factions of Italy and bringing peace.”

In other words, Dante’s idea of monarchical form of government was circumscribed by a particular thought. Since he wanted unity and progress of Italy he favoured a powerful monarchy or emperor. We think that Dante’s is purely a political view and he emphasized it mainly in the background of contemporary circumstances.

He thought that the conflicts and chaos in his time were creating numerous problems and hindering progress. All these stood on the way of the attainment of justice. So, in order to maximise justice, over lordship of an emperor was badly needed.

Again, by arresting the sources or causes of internal conflicts and chaos, the king would be able to create a peaceful atmosphere in which peace and tranquility could thrive. This would in turn maximize liberty.

Skinner is of opinion that all these concepts of politics were brought about by the Renaissance. We, today, seriously think about republicanism, freedom, justice, unity, peace etc. But several centuries ago it introduced them.

The contribution of Renaissance also relates to other great aspects of political thought and these are individualism and liberalism. Renaissance enabled man to know what he is. Self-consciousness was brought about by Renaissance. Under the great influence of Renaissance man discovered himself and this was the root of his self-consciousness.

Everywhere rise of consciousness plays important and constructive role and political sphere is no exception. Once Ernest Barker said; Political consciousness postulates liberty, liberty involves rights, rights demand the state The development of self-consciousness led people to demand liberty and rights Along with it they demanded the protection of rights and liberty. In this field the state must play the key role.

We know the expansion of rights and liberties also means the limitation of the power of the state. In the Middle Ages the state had ve
ry little opportunity to play crucial role in the fields of guarantying and protecting rights and liberties of individuals Renaissance changed this situation. In real terms the role of the state increased. But at the same time men’s consciousness did not allow it to cross limit.

In this way individualism became a key-word in society and political discussion. Liberalism also came to be regarded as a product of Renaissance. People became highly conscious of the protection of rights.

In earlier epochs church controlled the political and related affairs of state which created inconvenience in the political sphere. After Renaissance, conscious people started to assert themselves everywhere.

This led to limit the sphere and role of the state. In this way the concept of liberalism began to appear slowly but steadily. Renaissance enabled man to think about religion with an open mind. This outlook was also a cause of liberal thought and attitude. To sum up, the emergence of Renaissance is the prime factor of rise of self-consciousness and this ultimately created a series of political issues.

The Renaissance also created some opposite concepts which are political in nature. Under the influence of Renaissance, there was an unprecedented growth in the fields of international trade, transport and communication.

Some people took up trade as a profession and began to export commodities to foreign countries. Simultaneously they imported articles from foreign lands to home. Before Renais­sance there was international trade in limited scale.

The Renaissance enhanced it considerably. Scholars are of opinion that foreign trade enabled people to earn huge profit which was practically unthinkable before the rise of Renaissance. But it is to be remembered that only a microscopic section of people got the opportunity to earn huge profit from trade.

The larger section remained in the darkness of poverty. The society in this way was divided into two broad classes—rich and poor. This division brought along with the inevitable consequence—the class struggle. Though class struggle was the inevitable consequence of Industrial Revolution but in a remote sense it arose after Renaissance.

It has been argued by Skinner that scholasticism is the product of Renaissance . What is scholasticism? It is a system of theology and philosophy taught in medieval European Universities, based on Aristotelian logic and the writings of the early Christian Fathers and having a strong emphasis on tradition and dogma. Before the emergence of Renaissance people in general and scholars in particular had little inclination to philosophical knowledge and scholastic ideas.

But the discovery of man led people to think about everything philosophically as well as seriously. This was the source of scholasticism. Skinner maintains – The foundations of scholasti­cism were first laid with the gradual rediscovery of the main corpus of Aristotle’s philosophical works.

Aristotle’s philosophical work practically remained untouched in Europe. Some scholars of Arab began to translate them for their use.

In the twelfth century they were smuggled into European states. The scholars began to study Aristotle’s works and started their research on the philosophy of Aristotle. In the thirteenth century Aristotle’s philosophy and works were popularized by non-Greek scholars and his political works were translated into various European languages.

Aristotle’s politi­cal works, particularly his Politics, was popularized by European scholars. Skinner maintains that the impact of Renaissance was quite prominent in many parts of Europe, but it was more prominent in Italy.

Concepts and methods of Aristotelian political theory were incorporated in various branches of knowledge. Particularly the Roman scholars did this job. In the universities of Italy and Paris Aristotle’s political and other concepts as well as theories were taught.

The origin of state polis individual’s role, revolution, nature of politics, classification of government etc. were the main aspects of Aristotle’s political theories.

The scholars and students of European Universities began to study these enthusiastically. From Greek philoso­phers the scholars of Italy and France borrowed the concept of justice and they began to think to apply it in their political system.

It is a fact that Renaissance could not give or provide any origin of new political ideas or views, but it is undeniable that old ideas were seriously discussed and attempts were made in some cases to remodel politics and institutions in the light of Greek political ideas.

It can indirectly be called the political concept of Renaissance. Many people of Italy and France after studying Aristotle’s Politics, started to think about direct democracy or various forms of government.

We finally observe that though Renaissance did not create any new political theory the old theories were viewed in new light.

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After reading this article you will learn about the rise of Christianity with the fall of Roman Empire.

The rise of Christianity and its overall importance characterized the Middle Ages. This ascendency of Christianity was accelerated by Roman philosophy, institutions and, above all, by the Roman emperors, particularly Constantine.

The establishment of Christian religion and Christian church in a unified form became so important that it began to control the medieval political thought. Towards the declining periods of Roman Empire, Christian religion spread rapidly and this received a further impetus when the Roman emperor Constantine declared Christianity as the official religion of the state.

Declaration of Christianity as state religion brought about several far-reaching consequences. First of all, it cornered the pagan beliefs. Towards the end of the Roman imperialism pagan beliefs were almost in a dying condition.

At that opportune moment Christianity attacked paganism and clipped its wings. Christian beliefs made heavy inroads into Teutonic barbarians. The Christian religion spread so rapidly that soon it became the legal or official religion of the Roman Empire.

This elevation of Christianity was really surprising. The emperor, in collaboration with the church, exercised supreme authority and this helped the latter to be involved in active politics. This involvement became the characteristic feature of medieval political thought and supplied the fuel of conflict between the church and the state.

The declining condition of the Roman Empire also signalled the weakness of the emperor. This happened during the last century of the empire. Erosion of the imperial power encouraged the ecclesiastical authorities to enter into active politics. The church fathers began to accumulate more and more power and their involve­ment in political affairs began to increase in astronomical proportions.

The weakness of the Roman emperors failed to stop this growth of power. With the fall of the Roman Empire, the political tradition and institutions also faced crisis. This again facilitated the growth of the influence of the church. It appeared as the representa­tive of Roman tradition and emphasized the unity and integrity of the empire.

We have noted how political changes brought the church into limelight. These and other changes hastened a central organization and made it more powerful. Rome was the political capital of the empire and naturally it became the capital of the religious world.

As a result of the disintegration of the Roman Empire and gradual decline of the imperial power, authority and power were transferred from palace to the church, and, in course of time, the church became a hot-bed of politics. Pope and clergymen threw their weight in favour of intense political propaganda.

The church was the real authority and decisions of all affairs would come from the church. “In the absence of emperor from Rome, the bishop became the most important official in the city, and considerable power of local political administra­tion passed into his hands. In this way there was added to the large ecclesiastical power of the Roman bishop the practically independent political government of a little state.”

Originally it was the duty of the Pope to look after religious affairs. But circumstances led the Pope and the church fathers to play the role of the potential actor in the political fields. This role reached the zenith towards the beginning of the seventh century.

At this time, in fact, there was no political authority in real sense. Every decision on political matters emanated from the church and the emperor had not the courage to alter or defy the decision.

The unified church established almost a parallel government or administration to Rome. It created a vast network of religious institutions through which politics was controlled. It has been claimed that the church also controlled the intellectual world of Europe. Rise of church or Christianity eclipsed the importance of state and politics in the Middle Ages.

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After reading this article you will learn about the limits of political obligation and the problem of resistance.

The very fact that this problem is presented to us is itself a proof that we cannot enjoy the peace of acquiescence in a final will. It is, in effect, a double problem. The first of the problems is whether there is a sphere of life and conduct in which there is no political obligation. The second is whether political obliga­tion, in the sphere in which it exists (whatever that sphere may be) is absolute, or conditional.

Mill, in his Essay on Liberty, assumed the existence of two different spheres of conduct. One sphere or part of the conduct of anyone, he argued, is that which concerns others; and for that he is ‘amenable to society’.

The other part is that which merely concerns himself; and here ‘his independence is, of right, absolute … and the individual is sovereign’. The assump­tion made by Mill is open to a double criticism. In the first place, as his critics have urged, he separates the inseparable.

The con­duct of any man is a single whole: there can be nothing in it that concerns himself only, and does not concern other men: whatever he is, and whatever he does, affects others and there­fore concerns them. In the second place, it would also appear that Mill fails to separate the separable.

He lumps together, as the phrase ‘amenable to society’ suggests, both the social and the political: he vindicates the liberty of the individual, in one breath, both against the Mrs. Grundy of social convention and the St. Stephen’s of political enactment. We cannot separate two different compartments of individual conduct; but we can separate the sphere of Society from that of the State.

Because we cannot separate our individual conduct into two different compartments, and because we are bound to regard the whole of our conduct as concerning others no less than ourselves, we have to admit that the whole of our conduct is controllable— so far as the criterion of its concerning others is the criterion of judgement.

But because we can separate the sphere of Society from that of the State; because we are able, and even bound, to regard the one as the sphere of voluntary action, proceeding by the method of free co-operation, and the other as the sphere of uni­form and regulated action, based, in the last resort, on the method of compulsory enforcement; we are free to contend that there are some things which are best left to the first of these methods, and others which are best left, and indeed must be left, to the second.

How are we to decide which things belong to the sphere of Society, and which to that of the State?

In general terms, the answer is that since the State acts by the method of compulsory enforcement, the things that belong to it are the things which had better be done under compulsion than not be done at all; and since Society acts by the method of free co­operation, the things that belong to it are the things which, in their nature, must be done freely if they are to be done well and to have any value.

If we seek to translate these general terms into detail, we may say that the things (if they may be called things) which are best left to the sphere of Society are the ex­pression of thought and opinion, in matters of the mind; the exercise of the moral virtues, such as, for example, the virtue of temperance; the practice of religion, not only in private pro­fession, but also in public worship and the public propagation of belief; the development of culture, in the sense of a general way of life or type of civilization, and (along with that, and as part of it) the making and changing of social customs, habits, and fashions.

But it cannot be said that any of these things be­long to Society so wholly and so absolutely that no factor or element in them can ever belong to the State. On the contrary, there may well be factors or elements in each (for instance, even in the expression of thought) which had better belong to the State, and be brought under State-regulation, because they involve the method of compulsory enforcement.

There is no fixed category of things which must always and in all cases be left to Society; there is only a fixed principle about the sort of things which it is better generally to leave to Society—exceptis excipiendis.

This notion of ‘exceptions’ may appear to be dangerous, and particularly dangerous when it is applied to the expression of thought. We all assume it as an axiom that the expression of thought, opinion, and belief is a matter for free social action, limited only by the decencies of courtesy and consideration for others. So it is, in the main: but it cannot always be left there.

There are elements or factors in the expression of thought which enter the area of the State and are amenable to State- regulation. If an author’s expression and publication of his thought and opinion is adjudged by the common conviction of the members of the political community to be a nuisance—that is to say an injury to the health of their minds, as being unclean and obscene, in the same way as an open sewer is an injury to the health of the body—it will be the duty of the State, in the course of declaring and enforcing common conviction, to deal with the nuisance by its own method of compulsory enforce­ment, and to vindicate the community’s claim that it should not be made to suffer injury against the writer’s claim that he should be free to express his thought.

The issue, if we probe the matter, is not in the last resort an issue between the writer and the State. It is an issue between two parts or sections of the community; between two trends of opinion; between the claim of one part or section to a right of expressing its opinion, and the claim of the other to a right of keeping its own opinion uninjured and undamaged.

There is a danger of shock or colli­sion between the two opposite sides; and the State has to act, as it were, in the office of a buffer for the purpose of absorbing the shock. It must diminish the collision by adjusting the con­flicting claims; but in doing so it will act as an arbiter, and not as a party in the case.

The issue, however, is far from simple. How can we be sure of the fact that there is a common conviction? And even if we are sure of the fact, a further question arises. Why should the writer be required to obey a conviction which in his view, and possibly also in the view of his profession generally, is mistaken; and why should the claim of others, however numerous, to be free from suffering the supposed nuisance of the expression of his thought overbear his claim to express his thought for what he believes to be the benefit of the public?

An answer may be made to these questions which is cogent enough so far as it goes. Within the political community a claim of the members, en­dorsed by a common conviction formally expressed in law and thereby registered as a fact, has the validity of a right, and a writer is thereby politically obliged to respect that right in his expression of his thought. But there is an answer to this answer.

The writer whose works are challenged on this ground may plead that there is something higher than political obligation: that his final obedience is due to the demand of that something higher, the cause of beauty or the cause of truth; and that political obligation accordingly ceases when it is contrary to that demand.

This plea, in effect, is a plea that political obliga­tion is conditional, and not absolute; due under certain con­ditions, when it does not clash with a higher demand, but not due under all.

We are thus confronted with the second of the problems raised at the beginning of this inquiry. Is political obligation, within its sphere, an absolute obligation, which is due under all conditions, or are there occasions and conjunctures in which a member of the community, or a group of members, are justified in re
fusing obedience, or in offering resistance?

Various grounds have been taken, in the course of the history of political thought, by those who have sought to find an answer. First (and this is the oldest ground) there is the ground of natural law. Here the contention advanced is that all positive enactments and admin­istrative acts contrary to natural law are null and void.

They may therefore be disobeyed; they may even be resisted, if an attempt is made to apply them by force. The paradox of this contention, if the term ‘natural law’ be interpreted strictly, is that it results in the proposition that law may be legally dis­obeyed. But the real gist of the contention is something less, or more, than that.

It is that law may be disobeyed justly, and that it is possible, in the name of justice, to disobey a law which does not express, as all law should, the idea of justice. This was the ground adopted in the American Declaration of Indepen­dence of 1776, with its appeal to the laws of nature and of nature’s God; and with some modifications it is a ground which,may still be defended.

There is less to be said for a second ground, which is that adopted by the Utilitarian’s at the end of the eighteenth century. On this ground the issue between the acceptance and the rejection of political obligation was reduced to a calculus of material utility.

Accord­ing to Bentham it was ‘allowable to, if not incumbent on, every man … to enter into measures of resistance . . . when … the probable mischiefs of resistance (speaking with respect to the com­munity in general) appear less to him than the probable mischiefs of obedience’.

By virtue of this calculus, as Paley frankly admitted, ‘the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation’, with danger and grievance on one side and the probability and expense of redress on the other. There is little satisfaction to the mind in a computation of this order, which weighs the consequences but omits the cause.

More may be said in favour of the ground which is taken by the French jurist Duguit, when he argues for the limited and conditional nature of all political obligations. His contention is that all laws or other acts of the persons styled ‘governors’ may be resisted passively, defensively, and even aggressively, if they conflict with the Rule of Right (regle de droit) deduced from the basic fact of economic solidarity.

The ground thus taken enthrones Right above law, and makes the obligation of obedience to law con­ditional on the conformity of law to Right; but the Right thus enthroned by Duguit is only a derivative or expression of economic fact and process, or rather of a part of such fact and process.

Is there anything to add to these answers, or any way of draw­ing them together in a comprehensive view which does justice to the elements of truth they contain? We may begin by drawing a distinction.

(1) Within the State, and so far as con­cerns the State and its operation, there is an absolute and un­conditional obligation, incumbent upon its members as such, to obey a law duly passed by the legislature in conformity with the constitution, or an act of government duly done under a law so passed. Even here, however, and even within the limits of the State, obligation to a law is conditional upon its being in conformity with the constitution; and it may thus be contended that, in a strict sense, the only unconditional obligation is the obligation due to the constitution. The proviso is just; but it need not prevent us from laying it down that just as a law is unconditionally and absolutely valid when once it is duly passed in conformity with the constitution, so obligation to a law so passed is unconditional and absolute, within the State and in terms of the State.

(2) If we transcend the terms of the State, and take into view the play of Society and the activity of social thought in creating and developing the idea of a just order of relations, we have to amplify, or rather to qualify, our view of the nature of political obligation.

Upon the assumption, pre­viously made, that the socially created and socially developed idea of justice is the supreme sovereign, we are bound to admit that obligation, even to a law duly passed in conformity with the constitution, is after all in some sense conditional upon its squaring with the idea of justice.

The distinction which has just been drawn would appear, prima facie, to involve a contradic­tion. We seem to be saying in a breath that political obligation is unconditional and that it is, ‘in some sense’, conditional. What exactly is meant by the latter of these sayings? It is not meant for a moment that political obligation ceases, for a man or a group of men, when once they conceive that a law, or a set of laws, fails to square with the idea of justice entertained in their minds.

The view suggested is entirely different. Political obligation, as such, remains: indeed we may even say that, as such, and within the State, it remains an unconditional obligation. But a new and super-political obligation enters as soon as we take into our view the socially created and socially developed idea of justice: an obligation which we may call ‘social’, in the sense that it springs from Society and from the product of social thought.

This super-political or social obligation may conflict with, and be pitted against, the political obligation which exists in the area of the State. A dilemma then arises. What is to be done in this dilemma? What is the weight of political obligation, and what is the weight of the super- political, when the two are opposed to one another? How is the State to act to the ‘protestant’ who pleads against it the cause of justice, and how is the ‘protestant’ pleading that cause to act to the State?

Because political obligation, as such, remains, and because it remains, as such, absolute and unconditional, we may lay it down that in any case of disobedience or resistance to law, based on the idea of social justice and social obligation, it is the clear duty of the judge, in his capacity of judge, and of all the organs of government, in their capacity of organs, to enforce the established law (it is not their business to recognize, far less to enforce, any idea of justice other than that expressed in such law); and it is equally the clear duty of the disobeying or resist­ing citizen to obey, as a citizen, the established law, by accepting the legal consequences involved in his disobedience or resistance.

But because social obligation is also a fact, and because, to the ‘protestant’ penetrated by a conviction of its sovereign nature, it is the highest fact, it is also his duty to accept its demands and to offer his testimony to its sovereignty.

Here, however, a problem arises, which must always vex the mind of every serious and reflective ‘protestant’. If the higher obligation is social, how can a mere individual, relying on his own idea of justice, or even a group, relying on an idea enter­tained only by its members, defy the general run of opinion? Must not any challenge to established law be based upon, and be backed by, some measure of general social support? This difficulty disappears if we reflect on the nature of social thought and the process of its formation.

The process is one of the initial production, the subsequent discussion, and the eventual com­position, of a number of different ideas. Each individual, and each group, has something to throw into the pool of discussion in order to stir the waters. Sometimes the contribution must be made in pain if it is to achieve that stirring.

A group which feels its idea to be a vital element in any just order of relations will then feel bound to stake itself upon that idea: it will disobey, or even resist, any law to the contrary: it will seek, by the visible testimony of its disobedience and its acceptance of the legal consequences, to impress
the value of its idea on others, to get it incorporated in social thought, to make it part of common conviction, and ultimately to secure its adoption as part of the law of the State.

Many causes have followed this way in the course of the centuries: the cause of the abolition of slavery, for instance, in the United States, and the cause of the enfranchise­ment of women in the United Kingdom. It is not, in itself, a way of revolution, though it may sometimes seem to approach the verge.

It is at once a rejection and an acceptance of political obligation: a rejection, so far as it denies that obligation on a particular issue: an acceptance, so far as it affirms it in general and on the whole, and so far as it attests its affirmation by facing and accepting the legal consequences of the partial denial.

In­deed we may almost say that resistance of this order is still in the area of debate, arid is a method of persuasion rather than a recourse to force. The resister puts his plea into the arena of debate, and stakes himself upon it: and if he invites the applica­tion of force to his own person, he does not seek to apply it to the persons of others.

But the resister who thus courts martyrdom (which in the original Greek from which it is derived meant the simple giving of witness, but with us has come to mean the giving of witness in and by the suffering of pain) can never escape the dilemma in which he is necessarily involved.

In following to the utter­most some idea which is part of himself he is also breaking, at some point, the scheme of political obligation which is also part of himself. Nor is that all. There is more in question than the breach of political obligation at a particular point.

The resister who defies a law is also disturbing (and incidentally encouraging others—less scrupulous than himself and more intent on private ends—to disturb) the general scheme of law and order, and the general validity of obligation.

He has therefore to ask himself whether the contribution which he may make to social thought about justice, by staking himself on the particu­lar idea he wishes to add, is worth the possible cost of distur­bance of the whole scheme of existing law and order, itself based upon and itself expressing the idea of justice.

This is to make a calculation, and as such it is something like—and yet also very unlike—the calculation of which Bentham and Paley wrote. It is like, in so far as in either case mischief has to be measured against mischief: it is very unlike, in so far as the mischiefs to be measured differ greatly in the two cases—the mischiefs weighed in the one case being mischiefs to the cause of utility, and those weighed in the other being mischiefs to the cause of justice.

There is no simple rule for the weighing of the mischiefs of obedience against the mischiefs of resistance. There is only the general rule that weighing is needed in every case in which a conflict arises between political obligation and the obligation which is super-political. The weighing itself will differ according to time and place; and the decision will depend on the degree of stability of law and order existing in a given country at a given period.

The common love of use and wont, the strength of con­vention, the habit of tradition, are sometimes a sufficient guarantee of the stability of law and order; and where and when that guarantee is present, the electric disturbance of a new idea, pressed to the point of resistance, may serve to correct men’s tendency to settle down on the lees of custom.

On the other hand, it may well be said that the age in which we live is already sufficiently electric; and it may also be said that new ideas which are ready to appeal to force always introduce an incongruous and explosive element into the peaceful process of social thought and persuasion. This is only a ‘dusty answer’. But it is also the only answer which the mind can ever get, however hot for certainties it may be.

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