Category: Political Science Notes

Power theory requires that power-acts must be clearly defined and fully comprehended, who is influencing or controlling by what acts. Variables included in a two broad definitions usually are very difficult to be analysed properly. Only those acts can be understood and empirically analysed which are performed against the wishes of a person or a nation.

All political interactions, domestic or international, involve the phenomenon of power. But its concept lacks precision. Scholars have attempted to analyse sources, goals, instruments, and effects of power, but lack unanimity over its referents. The concept of power must be explained in the context of various political systems and subsystems, and in a manner that empirical generalisations are derived therefrom. Along with them, it is desirable that a scientific theory is developed which is able to explain power in its various forms and their specificity and uniqueness.

Power as a relational phenomenon to produce induced behaviour presents a unifying and centralising principle. To make the concept empirical, two things must be kept in view: (a) power is behavioural, and (b) relationship between elements of power and power-behaviour must be established in a manner that it may form the basis of explanation, prediction, and empirical experiment. This is what an empirical theory does Power is a relational, interpersonal, and interactive process.

A man or a nation can exercise power only if there is someone else to act upon. Power is not a thing or commodity which can be possessed without exercising it. Weapons, wealth, property, organisation, etc. are important elements, bases, or sources of power. They are considered important as they provide opportunity to exercise control over others. It is improper to treat them all-important, and forget to relate them with actual power-behaviour.

Empirical power goes to the extent a political actor influences the behaviour of others. Power does not exist or remains ineffective if a nation is unable to change or modify the behaviour of other nations. When we say a nation is militarily more powerful, it simply means that it alone has more weapons and a bigger army to change the behaviour of nations concerned, and also has a will to do so when an occasion arises.

Often the analysts of power have not tried to compare the variables or elements of power with power. For this purpose, an adequate concept of power must be developed. It can relate power-behaviour with elements of power, and evolve appropriate hypotheses or suggest propositions. A behav­ioural approach to power is justified on two grounds: (a) As power involves influence or control, it is an observable empirical activity. The power-weilder must be in possession of relevant elements of power.

He must comparatively be free from obstructions or restrictions, and also have capacity or ability to use them. All of these things can be subsumed as ‘capa­bility’, (b) The power-weilder must have the will or resolution to control other Power-setting requires both – capability as well as the will. Or as a potential power, it should be ingrained with credibility, so that it may be empirically observed.

The need to measure power also directs us to adopt the behavioural approach. A scientific power theory aims at comparing and measuring power. Elements or cases of power do not provide standardised units (like currency notes, weights, etc.) for measurement and quantification.

A millionaire cannot be compared with a highborn man. Scholars like Quincy Wright have also found this difficulty that political and social power, because of qualitative variations, cannot be uni-formally measured like physical power. Solution of the problem lies in making activities of political actors as basis of measurement. We can measure the behavioural conse­quences of wealth and status, jointly and separately, observing the number of persons a power-weilder controls over.

For this purpose, power has to be defined or translated into behavioural terms. According to Robert A. Dahl, A has power over B to the extent, A induces B to do acts which otherwise he would not do. Goldhammer and Shils define it as a person having power to the extent he is able to influence others behaviour according to his own intentions. Dahl’s explanation, thus, overlooks internationality of political actors, leaving aside power-acts like manipulation, propaganda, etc.

A nation, even after doing an act under the influence of another nation, can claim that it has done it at its own will. The clause ‘according to his own intentions’ makes the conventional statements, as, ‘against his will’, ‘despite resistance’, ‘which otherwise he would not have done’, etc. redundant.

But if Goldhammer and Shil’s clause is accepted, should all acts pertaining to fulfillment of one’s will or wish be regarded as acts of power? Should a small nation’s wish to live in isolation or neutral be regarded as indicator of its power? Isaac suggests that (i) such acts of power-behaviour should be performed both by the influencer and the influ­enced; and (ii) there should be some contact or communication before the actualisation of power relations between them. Without some form of contact, power relations cannot exist at all.

In accordance with the behavioural explanation of power a political actor influences the behaviour of others in terms of his own intentions or will. But there arises another difficulty. Unilateral or causal relations do not exist in power-settings. Many acts of power trigger off feedback or mutually influencing operations. If nation A influences the behaviour of nation B, there is an opportunity that B also influences the behaviour of A.

Of course, this analysis, in addition, makes the comparison of their power, at least more difficult, if not impossible. In case there is interval of time, the personal behaviour of the actor must be put under observation. Quantum of power and direction would also tell which side has more power.

Thus, influence on the acts of behaviour of the actors is regarded as the main unit of observation and measurement of power. There are various forms of political acts by which an actor can influence the behaviour of others. They can broadly be divided in three forms: (i) force, (ii) domination and (iii) manipulation. In force, there is exercise of physical acts, namely, empirically observable physical sanctions.

In a situation of domination, the actor expresses his intentions to the other party and realises that situation or intended behaviour. Often force and domination go together. Force is used to make domination effective. In manipulation, the actor does not let others know the aims or objects of his behaviour, namely, exercise of power. It includes actions, which cannot be easily understood or observed. However, techniques are developed to know latent intentions and observe and measure relevant influence. Rest of the acts are open and manifest.

Power theory requires that power-acts must be clearly defined and fully comprehended, who is influencing or controlling by what acts. Variables included in a two broad definitions usually are very difficult to be analysed properly. Only those acts can be understood and empirically analysed which are performed against the wishes of a person or a nation. In power relations, such acts among actors often take place. A strategy is required which may empirically link these stimuli and responses, and produce generalisations.

If a set of a activities is regulated before another set of activities, a correlation between them or probable association can be established. After visualising an observable contact between the two nations, if we find a form of some activity from out of their total behaviour, it can be assumed that power relations exist. Many members of parliament change their public statements after having a meeting with the prime minister. Sometimes, the principle of ‘anticipated expect
ations’ is also used and applied. Only after bringing power into observable dimensions, it becomes probable to measure it.

It is clear that a scientific power-theory cannot consider the state as the sole repository of power. Trietscke, Nietsche, Kauffmann etc. regarded the state as embodiment of power. Such an extremist view subordinates all activities, organisations, groups, etc., to the state. In modern times, state has monopoly over the exercise of legitimate power, but power, both in coercive and non-coercive forms, also operates beside the state.

There are non-state actors of power, such as the terrorists like Al-Queda. The power-principle, or theory in a loose sense, enables us to perceive political activities in an organised and meaningful manner, and is useful to understand the behaviour of nations and other political actors.

Steven Lukes in his book Power: A Radical View (1974) discusses three ways of exercise of power: decision-making, agenda-setting and thought control.’ The postmodern thinker, Michel Foucault (1926-84), discovers a link between power and systems of thought through the idea of a ‘discourse of power’.

But, it may be pointed that power is not the only sole material making up a political systems, and its legal organisation known as state. There are many other factors and contents which constitute political systems and subsystems. If the concept of power is confined only to force or coercion, the theory would prove misleading and too narrow to be of any use. Along with power, we have to study its other forms also. Most important of them are influence, authority and legitimacy.

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Dahl based his typology of political systems on number, subsystem autonomy, and legitimacy. Almond puts forward the criteria of (i) structural differentiation, and (ii) cultural secularisation. In his classificatory scheme, he endorses the influential ideas of Aristotle, Max Weber, Karl Friederich, S. N. Eisenstedt, Edward Shils, Robert A. Dahl, James Coleman, David Apter and Lipset. He has incorporated sociological and systems perspectives, particularly, from Talcott Parsons, Marion J. Levy, and Karl W. Deutsch. Almond, along with Powell, has divided all political systems into three broad classes. He classifies them according to the degree of structural differ­entiation and cultural secularisation.

They are:

1. Primitive Systems:

These are intermittent political structures and a minimum of structural differentiation, along with a dispersed and narrow culture.

They can further be sub-classified as:

(a) Primitive nomadic bands, as, Ouagadougou (old)

(b) Segmentary systems, as, Nuer

(c) Pyramidal systems, as, Ashanti

2. Traditional Systems:

These consist of differentiated governmen­tal-political structures oriented toward a ‘subject’ culture.

These have further been classified as:

(a) Patrimonial systems, as Ouagadougou

(b) Centralised bureaucratic systems, as, Inca, Tudor England, Ethiopia, etc.

(c) Feudal political systems, as the twelfth century France

3. Modern Systems:

These systems mainly consist of differentiated political infrastructures, such as, political parties, interest groups etc., and have some form of ‘participant’ political culture.

Among them there is a large variety:

A. Secularised city-states: Limited differentiation, as in Athens.

B. Mobilised modern systems: High differentiation and secularis­ation.

1. Democratic systems:

Subsystem independence and partic­ipant culture:

(a) High subsystem independence, as, in Great Britain.

(b) Limited subsystem independence, as, in Fourth Republic France.

(c) Low subsystem independence, as, in Mexico.

2. Authoritarian systems:

Subsystem control and subject – participant culture

(a) Radical totalitarian, as, in the former USSR.

(b) Conservative totalitarian, as in Nazi Germany.

(c) Conservative authoritarian, as in Spain.

(d) Modernising authoritarian, as in Brazil.

C. Pre-mobilised modem systems: Limited differentiation and secularisation

1. Pre-mobilised authoritarian, as in Ghana prior to February 1966.

2. Pre-mobilised democratic.

Almond and Powell have analysed the above political systems in the light of their conceptual framework and have reached a set of empirical propositions.

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Scholars belonging to this school of thought are also known as positivists, behaviouralists, or factualists. They want to eliminate all values that are personal ‘preferences from the study of Political Science. The value-neutral political scientists want to study political events, activities, groups, and organisations in the way scientists study natural facts.

They want to give social phenomena a specific, continuous and discrete shape. While doing so, they keep their personal value consideration away from the investigation. If human or social facts are treated in this objective manner, they hope, in due course of time, to develop a value-free human science.

August Comte, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and other sociologists made efforts to develop a universal social science. Besides them, the idea received further fillip from logical positivists belonging to the Vienna Circle. This academic circle was started in 1922 by the scholars of Vienna University – Moritz Schlick, Rudolf Carnap and others. They severely criticised traditional disciplines like Metaphysics, Ethics etc. They accepted only mathematical and empirical statements as ‘meaningful’, and regarded all values as personal preferences.

Nothing could be told about their superiority or inferiority. T.D. Weldon in his ‘Vocabulary of Politics’ has enunciated this doctrine of preference: Determination of good or bad political institu­tions, like any other value judgements are made by individuals. They differ because of their biases, parochialism, selfishness, ignorance, etc.

According to logical positivists, there can be no last or ultimate values, as science can prove no values as the highest or ultimate. Scientific method requires that values should be kept apart, failing which no social science, including Political Science, can attain the status of a ‘science’. A social scientist has to remain value-free and value-neutral. Objectivity is the basis of scientificity.

Consequences of Value-Neutralism:

It is possible for the western scholars only to develop social sciences by adopting scientific method in the study of social phenomena. Underlying this venture, they had certain common tacit values. Most of their values were almost identical, and a form of consensus had emerged. As such, they did not have to face conflict over values.

While adopting value-neutral stance, very few were aware that they themselves had been standing on the ground of certain values. In this sense, value-neutrality became a part of their scientific method. But this closed approach has proved to be a great tragedy of twentieth century.

Some of the adverse consequences are enumerated below:

(1) Social scientists, on account of their scientific method based on value-neutralism, became unable to judge a goal or purpose superior to some goal or purpose in absolute terms.

(2) They could not speak on relative superiority of some values or purposes, used as means, in view of other ultimate values or purposes.

(3) All social scientists started deflecting from making any evaluations or criticising preferences in definite terms. In their view now, whatever was considered so far as good was non-scientific, amounting to some philosophical imagination or individual bias.

(4) For all these spokesmen of science, all values were equal, as they, like any other assumptions, were beyond the purview of scientific method. No value was final. All values were treated as impermanent, provi­sional, pre-scientific and relative.

(5) As all social scientists kept away from value-laden politics, they started living in ivory towers. Their output, being value-neutral, had no use for practical politics. They could now live and survive in any kind of regime, democracy or dictatorship.

(6) Between the First and the Second World Wars, humanity and human values reached the lowest ebb in the rise of Bolshevism, Fascism, and Nazism. But the social scientists tied to value-neutralism of their scien­tific method could not speak anything against them. They could not use their science in support and defence of democratic values.

Their ‘science’ did not have any relation with values. Western culture stood helpless to defend its own values. Even John Dewey and Hans Kelsen were standing on crossroads. Albert Einstein, in 1940, had stated that even if one advocated the idea of eliminating all human beings from earth, it could perhaps not be repudiated on scientific grounds.

Thus, all values were considered as dogma, ideology or myth, and put beyond the scope of science. The main problem was not the presence of several ideologies, but to maintain that no choice can be made with the help of scientific method among various ultimate values. Every value-free social scientist considered all values as relative and dispensable.

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Behaviouralism has been criticised from several quarters. It can be divided into three parts:

(1) General,

(2) Objections from traditionalists, and

(3) Reactions from phenomenologists, Marxists and others.

1. General Criticism:

(i) Behaviouralism suffers from lack of consensus and consistency. The behaviouralists are academically modest as they regard their findings and assumptions as relative. But in practice, they are immodest who refuse to accept the existence of a fact if it cannot be quantified, weighed, or measured. They declare themselves as purists and value-neutrals, but do have a set of values. Christian Bay has pointed out that they have a bias towards liberal democracy, and a liking for status quo and stability. Personally, they want to keep away from politics, and wish to remain apolitical or sit behind blue curtains.

(ii) Even if their achievements are ‘scientific’, they are trivial and unimportant. Rammey, Kirkpatrick, Dahl, Deutsch, Eulau, etc., have observed that despite expenditure of millions of dollars, the behaviouralists have not been able to produce a science of human behaviour. The making of a reliable, valid, and satisfying Political Science is still a mirage. They have yet to discover laws of human behaviour.

(iii) Behaviouralists overlook the simple fact that the subject matter of Political Science and natural sciences is different. As such, they should have different methods and techniques of study and evaluation. The subject matter of politics is comparatively much more complex, less uniform, more changing, discrete, intentional, and not directly observable.

The methods of natural sciences, therefore, are not suitable to the study of Political Science. Unfortunately, there is the tendency to concentrate everything on the use of those methods. Either substantive areas are not taken up or unimportant matters are chosen to collect data and information. Some critics regard their methods and techniques as inadequate for the making of a scientific theory, and its verification.

(iv) Behaviouralism is a historical, and neglects the role of values. James A. Gould and Vincent V. Thursby exhort how can an act be ‘political’ without a purpose and value. Neglect of values simply leads to value nihilism. According to them, most of our present is deeply ingrained in or is the result of the past.

(v) The sole concern to produce a ‘science of human behaviour’ has resulted in running away from politics. Alfred Cobban considers the concern as a device invented by the teachers of universities to avoid controversies or politics without producing a science. The tendency to escape from immediate and urgent problems of society had made the behaviouralists arm-chair intellectuals or stooges and parasites living in high ivory-towers. Their ‘pure’ findings, away from dust and dirt of actual politics, cannot be considered useful for laymen and politicians.

(vi) Behaviouralism tends to substitute spiritualism and morality by materialism or sensory knowledge. Knowledge based only on human senses happens to be partial, limited, crude, segmental, and transitory. A part, a particular or a unit can be comprehended only with reference to the whole, the general, or the unity. The latter is provided by disci­plines like Philosophy, Metaphysics or Religion. According to them, behaviouralism requires the control, guidance or supervision of higher, subtle and super sensory elements. The higher should govern the lower. The subtle and the abstract abounds the physical and the concrete.

2. Objections by Traditionalists:

Traditionalists have repeated some of the objections mentioned above.They have not accepted all the characteristics or features described by David Easton.

Their criticism is summed up below:

(i) Political reality is multi-variety and complex. It is utterly fruitless to seek regularities or a claim to study it objectively or dispassionately. As observations of political events cannot be replicated or controlled and experiments are almost naught the findings cannot be regarded as testable. Any search for obtaining replicable generalisations is futile. Reality may remain hidden underground.

(ii) As dynamic politics operates much below the surface, the techniques of interview, questionnaire, etc., do not help in knowing the reality. When reality remains unknowable through these techniques, there remains no room for verification. Behind every apparent behaviour there exists a social and cultural background, which can rarely be comprehended by behavioural tools and techniques.

(iii) Even the collection of facts, data or information cannot be fully objective. Quantification is closely related to subjective considerations. If we start following the behaviouralists, by upholding the methods and techniques over contents and problems, about 70-80 per cent of the subject matter of Political Science will go out of the discipline itself. Most of the subject matter of Political Science is not observable.

(iv) Data collected by the behaviouralists do not represent the political reality. They tend to observe the unobservable, and sometimes measure the immeasurable, or quantify the unquantifiable. Phenomena like liberty, equality, patriotism, peace, etc., cannot be put under the category of observables.

(v) It is impossible to claim oneself to be value neutral. Every scholar or researcher entertains his own value preferences, and cannot separate them even for a moment.

(vi) As the behaviouralists do not possess even middle range or low-level empirical theories, there is no hope for general or overarching theories. If the theory is general, it will not be valid, and vice-versa. In fact, theories with them, in terms of their own definitions, are not ‘theory’.

Reactions from Critical Theorists and Marxists:

Critical theorists like Habermas present the view that the modern industrial society can be understood only by a holistic and synthetic perspective. Each individual is an operating embodiment of his cultural and technological milieu, and of forces of economic production which make up his praxis. This praxis or learning from this milieu is the determining factor. Praxis incul­cates legitimacy to the system. With this view, all attempts to develop an empirical theory appear futile.

Under the influence of growing neo-Marxism in the United States, the student community and the young scholars have joined Neo-Political Science Movement. They want to free social sciences from the behaviouristic shackles of the status quo. They are closely related to the movement regarding Civil Rights for all, anti-nuclear war, rise of Black Power etc.

Their ideology is receptive to Marxism as well as Existentialism. According to them, behaviouralists stand for capitalism and military dictatorship and have led Political Science to a death trap. It has come in support of the affluent and self-contented American society. Its impact elsewhere also will be the same.

Bernard Crick considers it as undemocratic as it tends to treat man either as a machine or animal. Conclusions derived from individual and micro studies cannot be applied at macro levels. It has led to so much specialisation and professionalisation that the elements of integrity and harmony are disappearing. The whole discipline is disintegrating. At the moral level, behavioural scholars appear to be ready to serve the dictators, monopolists, and power-hungry politicians.

Another critic has remarked that the behaviouralists have so far not been able to say anything which had not been said before. Behaviouralism has triggered off a war and brought about anarchy in academics. It cannot show any path to humanity to march toward a desirable direction. It lacks even allegiance towards the autonomy of the discipline.

Scholars from Phenomenology, Philosophy of Science, and others have considered its emergence as ‘end of
polities’. It tries to justify improper as proper by transforming ‘political’ as ‘non-political’. Irrationality becomes rationality, and vice versa. Its value-neutralism can be treated as another kind of mischievous politics.

This game of ‘Scientificing’ is being played through journals, articles, seminars and conferences, and research projects. According to them, it is useless to talk about ‘pure knowledge’. Scientific method and ideology both are closely related. There is a great need to develop a Social Science which may bring about radical changes. It should understand and examine social reality while giving utmost priority to human existence. The problem is that of total change of contemporary society, much less of mere interpretation, still less of explanation.

Most of the arguments advanced above pertain to early stage of behaviouralism; very soon, the behaviouralists prepared themselves in a positive and constructive manner. They concentrated their efforts in all seriousness and sincerity, and remedied several weaknesses, accepting the limitations and rescheduling their goals and priorities.

Post-behavioural movement represents the culmination of this overall reform and reorien­tation amounting to another ‘revolution’ and ‘change’ in Political Science. Its emergence has to a large extent dispelled many of the above arguments and crudities of early behaviouralism. As such, reply to the remaining objections would suitably be taken after the discussion of post-behavioural revolution in Political Science.

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It has already been pointed out that all political interventions, acts, decisions, tactics, techniques, styles, strategies etc. operated by political leaders, successful or failure, are not political technologies in the strict sense of the term examined earlier. To bring them within the parameters of ‘Political Technology’, a lot of work has to be undertaken. Till it is done, they can be nominally treated as ‘Political Technologies under Consideration’ (PTsUC). Processing of ‘Political Technologies involves refinement, repair, renovation and modification for their present and future use in a context-free sense.

This work is very necessary to update them for use to current political affairs. Thus, the task of merely identifying political technologies is not enough. Political operations and programmes under­taken in the past cannot be considered as ‘political technologies’ unless they are properly tested, refined, reformulated and redesigned as such. Politics and political scenario always undergo minor or major change.

As such, political technologies, applied in the past, have to be renewed and reoriented in view of changed political situations. However, discovery and identification of old and ‘under consideration’ political technologies presents us an opportunity to restructure and redesign the older ones suitable to newer situations.

Application of Political Technologies:

Processing of political technologies is updating them. It is taking them from ‘context’ to ‘problem’. Problem-specific political technologies always look towards ends and goals. A political technology is a kind of race or ‘run’ from problem to its goal. In its run all relevant factors such as time, events, concerning persons, cost and others have to be calculated and pointed out.

Finalisation takes places after political operations, experiences or activities are ‘identified’ under the concept of ‘political technology’. In it, identified political experiences are separated from their specific context, and generalised as problem-oriented political technologies.

This process undergoes certain stages:

(a) The relation between the political experience and the persons while solving certain problem or responding to certain demand is de-person­alised.

(b) Non-essential factors are removed, and essential factors and features are retained.

(c) If it is found necessary, in view of its earlier inadequacies, deficiencies or weaknesses new factors, elements or additions or alterations are made.

(d) Thereafter, the impugned identified or under-consideration political technologies are tagged with particular categories of problems and demands.

(e) In view of new circumstances, they are further processed.

This process of processing goes on till identified political technologies are recognised as full-fledged and workable political technologies. Process of refinement can go on for long.

Identified political technologies that have proved useful or successful in the past may not appear viable for solving present or future problems. They can suffer from several limitations. Processing or updating identified political technologies is a calculated attempt to remove these limitations. After undergoing this process, political technologies may look ready for application. Processing of identified political technologies presents us an opportunity to restructure, redesign and apply them to newer situations.

Many political leaders now feel that a political academy should be set up. It is essential to nurture political management as a new discipline and to devise appropriate curriculum for training the politicians. The proposed political management courses at the academy can also aim at producing experts in this new discipline of democracy.

An academy may be of interest to business houses and all concerned citizens who wish to understand and use the political system for their own benign benefits. There could be both public as well as private initiative. Only after accumulation of a stock of political technologies it would be possible to build up an Engineering wing of Political Science. The latter might open vistas of research, trade and job opportunities.

Thus, one can undertake the task of solving problems found in any areas: of (a) social justice and democratic participation, (b) nation-state and globalisation, and, (c) internal subversion coming from communalism, fundamentalism and terrorism. In fact, an ocean of political experience lies ahead to be fathomed out of different nation-states, regional organisations, and inter-state and global community.

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Meaning of the right of self-determination:

The right means that each nationality should have in separate state. John Stuart Mill in his book, “Representative Government”, has laid a special emphasis on the theory. Late President Woodrow Wilson of the U.S.A. also said, “Self-determination is not a mere phrase, it is an imperative principle of action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril”. (Quoted by Dr. Garner).

Implementation of the right of self-determination:

According to this principle the province of Alsace Lorraine was given to France. Poland was considered as a free state and its boundaries were merged with ethnic boundary. North Sheleswig was returned to Denmark. The Czechs and Slovaks got freedom from the slavery of Austria and a new state named Czechoslovakia was formed by merging both of them.

Western Slov-serbs; Crete and Slovene were also freed from the Austria- Hungary Empire and a new free state named Yugoslavia way established. Similarly Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Hejaz were freed from the control of Turkish Empire and became partially independent states. According to this right, after the Second World War, India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Egypt, Cyprus, Algeria, Ghana, Rhodesia, Congo, Zanzibar and Guinea were freed.

Violation of this right:

In spite of this, the principle was not fully implemented in Paris Peace Conference, 1920. Many Germans were left under the regimes of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Italy and certain people of Hungary were pulled out of the country and were handed over to other states.

Many Lithunian and Rudinian nationals were shifted to Poland and Czechoslovakia. Many Austrians, Albanians and Bulgarians were sent over to Yugoslavia. Similarly in Rumania and Greece, the number of people of other races was so high that they outnumbered the original inhabitants.

Practical difficulties in adopting this principle:

If this principle is adopted, there will be practical difficulties. According to this principle, Scotland and Wales shall have to be separated from England. Moreover, many nationalists will have to be given the right of separation from the Soviet Union and China which will not be tolerated by the governments of these countries.

The Pakhtoons shall be separated from Pakistan, and there will be disorder and anarchy in India. The rebel Naga leaders and Sikh terrorists, had demanded separate states for the Nagas and the Sikhs respectively. These demands were not accepted by the Government of India. Pakistan is harping on the theme of self-determination for Kashmiris.

If on the basis of this right, a plebiscite is held in Kashmir, it will give rise to many complications. According to this principle, many states of Europe will be cut into pieces because, they are inhabited by people belong to several nationalities.

Therefore President Smarik in his tract ‘Small Nations in the European Crisis” wrote that “there are 68 small nations in Europe and if this principle is adopted, Europe will have to be divided into 68 instead of 28 states, which will be a practical difficulty.

For this reason, in Lausanne Peace Conference, 1923 Lord Curzon said, that the principle of self-determination is a double-edged sword and it can only be accepted with some reservations. In 1918 and 1919, plebiscite took place in Aland Island (Europe) and according to that the people decided, almost unanimously, to be separated from Finland and to join Sweden. There was a great controversy over it.

The League of Nations appointed a committee of renowned jurists. The committee suggested that, “there will be a great shock to the sovereign power of the modern states, if the inhabitants of Aland Islands are given the right of self-determination and this will endanger the stability of the state. Not only this, there will be a great danger to the interests of international society.

In India on the basis of this principle, the Muslim League continuously demanded the right of self-determination till 1946-47, with the result that the country was divided in 1947 and Pakistan was established. It rendered millions of people homeless as refugees. Thus this right should be utilized with great caution.

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