Category: Political Science Notes

After reading this article you will learn about Renaissance:- 1. Definition of Renaissance 2. Rise of Renaissance 3. Development 4. Political Theory.

Definition of Renaissance:

To define Renaissance in a brief and meaningful way is not an easy task and in spite of the problem we shall make an attempt to define it. Literally the term means the revival of art and literature under the influence of classical models in the 14th to 16th centuries.

In these centuries there was great and unprecedented revival in various fields of art, literature and other intellectual fields. This overall or combined revival can be called Renaissance.

In the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries several countries of Europe witnessed the recovery of intelligence. But the renowned historian H. G. Wells thinks the Renaissance actually emerged in the twelfth century and “there were many signs that the European intelligence was recovering courage and leisure”.

Wells further maintains that the Middle Ages are generally called Dark Ages because during this period there was practically no progress in numerous fields of art, literature and science. The last progress in such fields was found in ancient Greece.

The Renaissance may be also called revival and rediscovery of rational, this worldly secular and scientific spirit and mentality. The Renaissance was thus a general revival in all fields of knowledge and enquiry.

Rise of Renaissance:

We say that Renaissance is the general revival in various fields but Ebenstein says that Renaissance took place not only in the intellectual fields but also in all the fields of social life and looking at it from that perspective, Ebenstein says that Renaissance is not the consequence of any single work of art or any one genius— it was the discovery of man. “Renaissance is not confined to any particular intellectual field, but in all fields of human knowledge and enquiry. So Renaissance can properly be called an overall revival that man’s intelligence can imagine.”

In a beautiful way Ebenstein says Renaissance goes beyond the moral selfhood of Stoicism, the spiritual uniqueness of Christianity, the aesthetic individuality of the ancient Greeks and views man in his totality, in his flesh and blood as well as in his mind and spirit—man in relation to himself, to society, the world. Displacing God, man becomes the centre of the universe.

Numerous fields of human enquiry and intelligence met at a single point and we may call it the confluence of man’s multifarious enquiries.

There were many tributaries and streams of human knowledge and they maintained their identity. But few people took interest for their development because the mentality of developing them did not activate the mind of the people.

It is the Renaissance that inspired people to go through the numerous fields of human knowledge. Renaissance is, therefore, a revival of man’s urge to know. Its only message is rise and wake and go forward.

It wants to emphasize that there is unlimited latent capacity in man and that must be discovered or revived.

In the Middle Ages common people were preoccupied with the feelings of religious thought and the church plays the most vital role in this field. But they were never told that man’s preoccupation with religion was doing maximum harm to the progress of intelligence.

In fact, man was extremely intoxicated with religion. Finally there emerged a new feeling—the feeling to rise above the present mentality. It is undesirable to be confined within the polis. Man must start his journey to the cosmologies. It is the spirit of Renaissance.

The message of Renaissance is that man has immense potentialities in himself. That is not all. Those potentialities must be revived. In the Middle Ages the religion and the Pope of the church in various ways suppressed the feelings and urge of man.

The restlessness of man could not find avenues to come out. It is the Renaissance that performed the job. Ebenstein, that is why, says; the Renaissance was itself the effect of man’s growing restlessness as well as of changing social and technological conditions Man’s indomitable urge to know the unknown, to cross the sea and to land on an unknown land worked effectively for the cause of Renaissance. H. G. Wells says Trade was reviving, cities were recovering ease and safety, the standard of education was rising in the church and spreading among laymen. All these helped, in a considerable way, the revival and development of Renaissance.

There was a very close relationship between Renaissance and enlightenment in the fields of thoughts and ideas. Man was led by the urge to know the unknown, to sail in an uncharted sea and in this way he started his journey to conquer the world. This feeling of man was practically unknown in the dark atmosphere of the Middle Ages.

The bad and unscientific outlook of the church dominated religion blocked all sorts of progress. Man’s urge to know the unknown ultimately obliterated all sorts of geographical barriers and social, cultural, and political differences.

The differences remained as before but all these did not stand on the way of free mixing and unhindered progress of ideas and thought. The narrowness of mind and outlook that was the characteristic feature of the Middle Ages and the advent of Renaissance feeling destroyed that obnoxious situation. Renaissance helped man to march forward.

Development of Renaissance:

It has reasonably been asserted that there is a close relationship between Renaissance and the development of capitalism and this requires explanation.

The Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century caused the enormous production of commodities and along with it there emerged a flood of commodities.

The producers and merchants started to export the excess commodities to several parts of the globe. The relations between different parts developed unprecedentedly. The export and import of commodities brought about a radical change in foreign trade and along with it the academic and intellectual world underwent change which was unimaginable before the advent of Industrial Revolution and merchant capital which grew along with the growth of capitalism.

Both Marxist and non-Marxist thinkers say that if Industrial Revolution and international trade did not take place Renaissance could not get the opportunity to emerge. This does not mean that Industrial Revolution is the solitary reason of the rise of Renaissance.

The fact is that Industrial Revolution is an important reason of Renaissance. The chief objective of the capitalists was to earn profit by selling their commodities in different countries and their activities gave birth to a new era—an era of relationship among various nations.

It is to be maintained that the capitalists started their business not for the progress of Renaissance but for their economic gains. But Renaissance was indirectly benefited. Marx and Engels have said in their Manifesto of the Communist Party; Bourgeoisie creates a new world after its own images. In this way capitalism helped the Renaissance to progress. Due to the tremendous impact of capitalism all the underdeveloped regions of the world came closer.

The merchants and capitalists not only exported their goods and commodities but also their ideas and outlook. The cultures of Asia and Africa came in touch with the culture of the developed nations. This added new wings to the body of Renaissance.

Political Theory of Renaissance:

It would be highly misleading to say that Renaissance was the originator of unprecedented expansion of worldwide communication networ
k and spread of scientific knowledge and education.

In the field of political concepts its contribution is not to be ignored. In an indirect way Renaissance gave birth to the idea of nation- state. Throughout the Middle Ages the church and the Pope fully controlled the political affairs of the state. Kings and rulers had no freedom to decide anything related to politics.

The Renaissance successfully diverted the mind of the people from orthodox religion and numerous superstitions. People began to think about religion with a free mind and they discovered that church and the Pope had misguided them for centuries.

This change in mind and outlook diverted their attention from religion and simultaneously they changed their loyalty from church to the political authority, especially king. There appeared radical political changes in the sphere of politics.

The geographical boundaries of many political units were redrawn or re-determined. This gave birth to a new system which may be called the nation-state. A particular nation or a group of people having a separate identity claimed a separate political entity and this came to be called the nation-state.

In 1648 a famous treaty was ratified—the Peace Treaty of Westphalia. From this Treaty the concept of nation-state received maximum encouragement. Many people of Western political thought believe that the rise of the nation-state is a factor of new international relations. In other words, the nation-state was the beginning of international politics.

Renaissance may rightly be called a cause of separation between politics and religion. Many people propagated that, the things that are Caesar’s unto Caesar, the things that are Gods unto God. That is, the domain of God and Caesar are separated from each other.

The simple implication is there is a clear separation between politics and religion. Church has nothing to do with politics and politics cannot interfere with the religious affairs of the church.

The Renaissance indirectly ensured secular­ism in politics which received its final status and form in the hands of Machiavelli.

Renaissance, to a considerable extent, enlightened the mind of the people and this made them conscious of their rights and obligations. In the new socio-economic political atmosphere people thought of getting more rights and opportunities from the state. Not only this, they began to think about the protection of their rights.

They believed that it was the primary duty of the political authority to protect rights. In the Middle Ages the church demanded more and more money and property from common people.

People were also made to believe that donation of wealth or property to the church would enable them to get blessings of God and this would save them to be free from sins. Renaissance removed superstition and kindled the idea of rights.

People demanded more rights and, simultaneously, their protection. This, we believe, a great contribution of Renaissance.

Quentine Skinner in his extensive research work (The foundations of modern political thought, in two volumes) has drawn our attention to another aspect of Renaissance. In Volume I he says that Renaissance, to a considerable extent, gave rise to republicanism.

Skinner chiefly refers to the importance of Renaissance in Italy. Rise of consciousness is the primary reason of republicanism. In many parts of Italy and in other places of Europe the rulers were not elected.

They were nominated. But in the second half of the twelfth century the system of elective government was introduced which means the members of the government were to be elected by the people. This is republicanism.

Skinner says “During the second half of the 12th century a further development took place. The rules of consuls came to be superseded by a stables form of elective government centred on an official known as the podesta. He was invested with supreme power or potestas over the city.”

The podesta was generally a citizen of another. Naturally he had no local obligation or feeling. Podesta was popularly elected and was accountable to people who elected him. This constitutes the central idea of republican form of government.

The Podesta enjoyed enormous powers. He was supposed to be the supreme administrative and judicial authority. But the comprehensive power did not make him a dictator.

Skinner further observes that though the republican type of government was originally set up in selected areas of Italy and other parts gradually this type of government was adopted universally by the leading cities.

A new meaning of liberty was brought about by the Renaissance. It taught people in general that every nation or state had the right to be free from foreign rule and that must be recognized by all nations. Before Renaissance very few nations enjoyed freedom. But this taught nations that the yoke of foreign rule and servitude must be thrown off.

We call it national liberty or the liberty of the nation. Skinner says “By liberty they meant first of all their independence from Emperor. …By liberty they also meant their right to maintain their existing forms of government”.

The mere implication is every nation has right to live in its own way. The simple fact is that two forms of liberty were emphasized—one personal liberty, and the other liberty of the nation. Skinner is of opinion that Italians thought of the two forms of liberty.

Italy and several parts of Europe were plagued by conflicts and internecine war. This stalled the progress and hindered the attainment of peace. Many people seriously thought of restoring peace and Dante (1265-1321) was the foremost of them. Dante’s fundamental plea was for restoration and tranquility.

His firm opinion was that the Emperor was the most suitable person for this crucial task. Dante thought that only an Emperor could achieve this mission.

Skinner writes “Dante’s tract on monarchy asks for total trust to be placed in the figure of Emperor as the only unifying force capable of overcoming the factions of Italy and bringing peace.”

In other words, Dante’s idea of monarchical form of government was circumscribed by a particular thought. Since he wanted unity and progress of Italy he favoured a powerful monarchy or emperor. We think that Dante’s is purely a political view and he emphasized it mainly in the background of contemporary circumstances.

He thought that the conflicts and chaos in his time were creating numerous problems and hindering progress. All these stood on the way of the attainment of justice. So, in order to maximise justice, over lordship of an emperor was badly needed.

Again, by arresting the sources or causes of internal conflicts and chaos, the king would be able to create a peaceful atmosphere in which peace and tranquility could thrive. This would in turn maximize liberty.

Skinner is of opinion that all these concepts of politics were brought about by the Renaissance. We, today, seriously think about republicanism, freedom, justice, unity, peace etc. But several centuries ago it introduced them.

The contribution of Renaissance also relates to other great aspects of political thought and these are individualism and liberalism. Renaissance enabled man to know what he is. Self-consciousness was brought about by Renaissance. Under the great influence of Renaissance man discovered himself and this was the root of his self-consciousness.

Everywhere rise of consciousness plays important and constructive role and political sphere is no exception. Once Ernest Barker said; Political consciousness postulates liberty, liberty involves rights, rights demand the state The development of self-consciousness led people to demand liberty and rights Along with it they demanded the protection of rights and liberty. In this field the state must play the key role.

We know the expansion of rights and liberties also means the limitation of the power of the state. In the Middle Ages the state had ve
ry little opportunity to play crucial role in the fields of guarantying and protecting rights and liberties of individuals Renaissance changed this situation. In real terms the role of the state increased. But at the same time men’s consciousness did not allow it to cross limit.

In this way individualism became a key-word in society and political discussion. Liberalism also came to be regarded as a product of Renaissance. People became highly conscious of the protection of rights.

In earlier epochs church controlled the political and related affairs of state which created inconvenience in the political sphere. After Renaissance, conscious people started to assert themselves everywhere.

This led to limit the sphere and role of the state. In this way the concept of liberalism began to appear slowly but steadily. Renaissance enabled man to think about religion with an open mind. This outlook was also a cause of liberal thought and attitude. To sum up, the emergence of Renaissance is the prime factor of rise of self-consciousness and this ultimately created a series of political issues.

The Renaissance also created some opposite concepts which are political in nature. Under the influence of Renaissance, there was an unprecedented growth in the fields of international trade, transport and communication.

Some people took up trade as a profession and began to export commodities to foreign countries. Simultaneously they imported articles from foreign lands to home. Before Renais­sance there was international trade in limited scale.

The Renaissance enhanced it considerably. Scholars are of opinion that foreign trade enabled people to earn huge profit which was practically unthinkable before the rise of Renaissance. But it is to be remembered that only a microscopic section of people got the opportunity to earn huge profit from trade.

The larger section remained in the darkness of poverty. The society in this way was divided into two broad classes—rich and poor. This division brought along with the inevitable consequence—the class struggle. Though class struggle was the inevitable consequence of Industrial Revolution but in a remote sense it arose after Renaissance.

It has been argued by Skinner that scholasticism is the product of Renaissance . What is scholasticism? It is a system of theology and philosophy taught in medieval European Universities, based on Aristotelian logic and the writings of the early Christian Fathers and having a strong emphasis on tradition and dogma. Before the emergence of Renaissance people in general and scholars in particular had little inclination to philosophical knowledge and scholastic ideas.

But the discovery of man led people to think about everything philosophically as well as seriously. This was the source of scholasticism. Skinner maintains – The foundations of scholasti­cism were first laid with the gradual rediscovery of the main corpus of Aristotle’s philosophical works.

Aristotle’s philosophical work practically remained untouched in Europe. Some scholars of Arab began to translate them for their use.

In the twelfth century they were smuggled into European states. The scholars began to study Aristotle’s works and started their research on the philosophy of Aristotle. In the thirteenth century Aristotle’s philosophy and works were popularized by non-Greek scholars and his political works were translated into various European languages.

Aristotle’s politi­cal works, particularly his Politics, was popularized by European scholars. Skinner maintains that the impact of Renaissance was quite prominent in many parts of Europe, but it was more prominent in Italy.

Concepts and methods of Aristotelian political theory were incorporated in various branches of knowledge. Particularly the Roman scholars did this job. In the universities of Italy and Paris Aristotle’s political and other concepts as well as theories were taught.

The origin of state polis individual’s role, revolution, nature of politics, classification of government etc. were the main aspects of Aristotle’s political theories.

The scholars and students of European Universities began to study these enthusiastically. From Greek philoso­phers the scholars of Italy and France borrowed the concept of justice and they began to think to apply it in their political system.

It is a fact that Renaissance could not give or provide any origin of new political ideas or views, but it is undeniable that old ideas were seriously discussed and attempts were made in some cases to remodel politics and institutions in the light of Greek political ideas.

It can indirectly be called the political concept of Renaissance. Many people of Italy and France after studying Aristotle’s Politics, started to think about direct democracy or various forms of government.

We finally observe that though Renaissance did not create any new political theory the old theories were viewed in new light.

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After reading this article you will learn about the rise of Christianity with the fall of Roman Empire.

The rise of Christianity and its overall importance characterized the Middle Ages. This ascendency of Christianity was accelerated by Roman philosophy, institutions and, above all, by the Roman emperors, particularly Constantine.

The establishment of Christian religion and Christian church in a unified form became so important that it began to control the medieval political thought. Towards the declining periods of Roman Empire, Christian religion spread rapidly and this received a further impetus when the Roman emperor Constantine declared Christianity as the official religion of the state.

Declaration of Christianity as state religion brought about several far-reaching consequences. First of all, it cornered the pagan beliefs. Towards the end of the Roman imperialism pagan beliefs were almost in a dying condition.

At that opportune moment Christianity attacked paganism and clipped its wings. Christian beliefs made heavy inroads into Teutonic barbarians. The Christian religion spread so rapidly that soon it became the legal or official religion of the Roman Empire.

This elevation of Christianity was really surprising. The emperor, in collaboration with the church, exercised supreme authority and this helped the latter to be involved in active politics. This involvement became the characteristic feature of medieval political thought and supplied the fuel of conflict between the church and the state.

The declining condition of the Roman Empire also signalled the weakness of the emperor. This happened during the last century of the empire. Erosion of the imperial power encouraged the ecclesiastical authorities to enter into active politics. The church fathers began to accumulate more and more power and their involve­ment in political affairs began to increase in astronomical proportions.

The weakness of the Roman emperors failed to stop this growth of power. With the fall of the Roman Empire, the political tradition and institutions also faced crisis. This again facilitated the growth of the influence of the church. It appeared as the representa­tive of Roman tradition and emphasized the unity and integrity of the empire.

We have noted how political changes brought the church into limelight. These and other changes hastened a central organization and made it more powerful. Rome was the political capital of the empire and naturally it became the capital of the religious world.

As a result of the disintegration of the Roman Empire and gradual decline of the imperial power, authority and power were transferred from palace to the church, and, in course of time, the church became a hot-bed of politics. Pope and clergymen threw their weight in favour of intense political propaganda.

The church was the real authority and decisions of all affairs would come from the church. “In the absence of emperor from Rome, the bishop became the most important official in the city, and considerable power of local political administra­tion passed into his hands. In this way there was added to the large ecclesiastical power of the Roman bishop the practically independent political government of a little state.”

Originally it was the duty of the Pope to look after religious affairs. But circumstances led the Pope and the church fathers to play the role of the potential actor in the political fields. This role reached the zenith towards the beginning of the seventh century.

At this time, in fact, there was no political authority in real sense. Every decision on political matters emanated from the church and the emperor had not the courage to alter or defy the decision.

The unified church established almost a parallel government or administration to Rome. It created a vast network of religious institutions through which politics was controlled. It has been claimed that the church also controlled the intellectual world of Europe. Rise of church or Christianity eclipsed the importance of state and politics in the Middle Ages.

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After reading this article you will learn about the limits of political obligation and the problem of resistance.

The very fact that this problem is presented to us is itself a proof that we cannot enjoy the peace of acquiescence in a final will. It is, in effect, a double problem. The first of the problems is whether there is a sphere of life and conduct in which there is no political obligation. The second is whether political obliga­tion, in the sphere in which it exists (whatever that sphere may be) is absolute, or conditional.

Mill, in his Essay on Liberty, assumed the existence of two different spheres of conduct. One sphere or part of the conduct of anyone, he argued, is that which concerns others; and for that he is ‘amenable to society’.

The other part is that which merely concerns himself; and here ‘his independence is, of right, absolute … and the individual is sovereign’. The assump­tion made by Mill is open to a double criticism. In the first place, as his critics have urged, he separates the inseparable.

The con­duct of any man is a single whole: there can be nothing in it that concerns himself only, and does not concern other men: whatever he is, and whatever he does, affects others and there­fore concerns them. In the second place, it would also appear that Mill fails to separate the separable.

He lumps together, as the phrase ‘amenable to society’ suggests, both the social and the political: he vindicates the liberty of the individual, in one breath, both against the Mrs. Grundy of social convention and the St. Stephen’s of political enactment. We cannot separate two different compartments of individual conduct; but we can separate the sphere of Society from that of the State.

Because we cannot separate our individual conduct into two different compartments, and because we are bound to regard the whole of our conduct as concerning others no less than ourselves, we have to admit that the whole of our conduct is controllable— so far as the criterion of its concerning others is the criterion of judgement.

But because we can separate the sphere of Society from that of the State; because we are able, and even bound, to regard the one as the sphere of voluntary action, proceeding by the method of free co-operation, and the other as the sphere of uni­form and regulated action, based, in the last resort, on the method of compulsory enforcement; we are free to contend that there are some things which are best left to the first of these methods, and others which are best left, and indeed must be left, to the second.

How are we to decide which things belong to the sphere of Society, and which to that of the State?

In general terms, the answer is that since the State acts by the method of compulsory enforcement, the things that belong to it are the things which had better be done under compulsion than not be done at all; and since Society acts by the method of free co­operation, the things that belong to it are the things which, in their nature, must be done freely if they are to be done well and to have any value.

If we seek to translate these general terms into detail, we may say that the things (if they may be called things) which are best left to the sphere of Society are the ex­pression of thought and opinion, in matters of the mind; the exercise of the moral virtues, such as, for example, the virtue of temperance; the practice of religion, not only in private pro­fession, but also in public worship and the public propagation of belief; the development of culture, in the sense of a general way of life or type of civilization, and (along with that, and as part of it) the making and changing of social customs, habits, and fashions.

But it cannot be said that any of these things be­long to Society so wholly and so absolutely that no factor or element in them can ever belong to the State. On the contrary, there may well be factors or elements in each (for instance, even in the expression of thought) which had better belong to the State, and be brought under State-regulation, because they involve the method of compulsory enforcement.

There is no fixed category of things which must always and in all cases be left to Society; there is only a fixed principle about the sort of things which it is better generally to leave to Society—exceptis excipiendis.

This notion of ‘exceptions’ may appear to be dangerous, and particularly dangerous when it is applied to the expression of thought. We all assume it as an axiom that the expression of thought, opinion, and belief is a matter for free social action, limited only by the decencies of courtesy and consideration for others. So it is, in the main: but it cannot always be left there.

There are elements or factors in the expression of thought which enter the area of the State and are amenable to State- regulation. If an author’s expression and publication of his thought and opinion is adjudged by the common conviction of the members of the political community to be a nuisance—that is to say an injury to the health of their minds, as being unclean and obscene, in the same way as an open sewer is an injury to the health of the body—it will be the duty of the State, in the course of declaring and enforcing common conviction, to deal with the nuisance by its own method of compulsory enforce­ment, and to vindicate the community’s claim that it should not be made to suffer injury against the writer’s claim that he should be free to express his thought.

The issue, if we probe the matter, is not in the last resort an issue between the writer and the State. It is an issue between two parts or sections of the community; between two trends of opinion; between the claim of one part or section to a right of expressing its opinion, and the claim of the other to a right of keeping its own opinion uninjured and undamaged.

There is a danger of shock or colli­sion between the two opposite sides; and the State has to act, as it were, in the office of a buffer for the purpose of absorbing the shock. It must diminish the collision by adjusting the con­flicting claims; but in doing so it will act as an arbiter, and not as a party in the case.

The issue, however, is far from simple. How can we be sure of the fact that there is a common conviction? And even if we are sure of the fact, a further question arises. Why should the writer be required to obey a conviction which in his view, and possibly also in the view of his profession generally, is mistaken; and why should the claim of others, however numerous, to be free from suffering the supposed nuisance of the expression of his thought overbear his claim to express his thought for what he believes to be the benefit of the public?

An answer may be made to these questions which is cogent enough so far as it goes. Within the political community a claim of the members, en­dorsed by a common conviction formally expressed in law and thereby registered as a fact, has the validity of a right, and a writer is thereby politically obliged to respect that right in his expression of his thought. But there is an answer to this answer.

The writer whose works are challenged on this ground may plead that there is something higher than political obligation: that his final obedience is due to the demand of that something higher, the cause of beauty or the cause of truth; and that political obligation accordingly ceases when it is contrary to that demand.

This plea, in effect, is a plea that political obliga­tion is conditional, and not absolute; due under certain con­ditions, when it does not clash with a higher demand, but not due under all.

We are thus confronted with the second of the problems raised at the beginning of this inquiry. Is political obligation, within its sphere, an absolute obligation, which is due under all conditions, or are there occasions and conjunctures in which a member of the community, or a group of members, are justified in re
fusing obedience, or in offering resistance?

Various grounds have been taken, in the course of the history of political thought, by those who have sought to find an answer. First (and this is the oldest ground) there is the ground of natural law. Here the contention advanced is that all positive enactments and admin­istrative acts contrary to natural law are null and void.

They may therefore be disobeyed; they may even be resisted, if an attempt is made to apply them by force. The paradox of this contention, if the term ‘natural law’ be interpreted strictly, is that it results in the proposition that law may be legally dis­obeyed. But the real gist of the contention is something less, or more, than that.

It is that law may be disobeyed justly, and that it is possible, in the name of justice, to disobey a law which does not express, as all law should, the idea of justice. This was the ground adopted in the American Declaration of Indepen­dence of 1776, with its appeal to the laws of nature and of nature’s God; and with some modifications it is a ground which,may still be defended.

There is less to be said for a second ground, which is that adopted by the Utilitarian’s at the end of the eighteenth century. On this ground the issue between the acceptance and the rejection of political obligation was reduced to a calculus of material utility.

Accord­ing to Bentham it was ‘allowable to, if not incumbent on, every man … to enter into measures of resistance . . . when … the probable mischiefs of resistance (speaking with respect to the com­munity in general) appear less to him than the probable mischiefs of obedience’.

By virtue of this calculus, as Paley frankly admitted, ‘the justice of every particular case of resistance is reduced to a computation’, with danger and grievance on one side and the probability and expense of redress on the other. There is little satisfaction to the mind in a computation of this order, which weighs the consequences but omits the cause.

More may be said in favour of the ground which is taken by the French jurist Duguit, when he argues for the limited and conditional nature of all political obligations. His contention is that all laws or other acts of the persons styled ‘governors’ may be resisted passively, defensively, and even aggressively, if they conflict with the Rule of Right (regle de droit) deduced from the basic fact of economic solidarity.

The ground thus taken enthrones Right above law, and makes the obligation of obedience to law con­ditional on the conformity of law to Right; but the Right thus enthroned by Duguit is only a derivative or expression of economic fact and process, or rather of a part of such fact and process.

Is there anything to add to these answers, or any way of draw­ing them together in a comprehensive view which does justice to the elements of truth they contain? We may begin by drawing a distinction.

(1) Within the State, and so far as con­cerns the State and its operation, there is an absolute and un­conditional obligation, incumbent upon its members as such, to obey a law duly passed by the legislature in conformity with the constitution, or an act of government duly done under a law so passed. Even here, however, and even within the limits of the State, obligation to a law is conditional upon its being in conformity with the constitution; and it may thus be contended that, in a strict sense, the only unconditional obligation is the obligation due to the constitution. The proviso is just; but it need not prevent us from laying it down that just as a law is unconditionally and absolutely valid when once it is duly passed in conformity with the constitution, so obligation to a law so passed is unconditional and absolute, within the State and in terms of the State.

(2) If we transcend the terms of the State, and take into view the play of Society and the activity of social thought in creating and developing the idea of a just order of relations, we have to amplify, or rather to qualify, our view of the nature of political obligation.

Upon the assumption, pre­viously made, that the socially created and socially developed idea of justice is the supreme sovereign, we are bound to admit that obligation, even to a law duly passed in conformity with the constitution, is after all in some sense conditional upon its squaring with the idea of justice.

The distinction which has just been drawn would appear, prima facie, to involve a contradic­tion. We seem to be saying in a breath that political obligation is unconditional and that it is, ‘in some sense’, conditional. What exactly is meant by the latter of these sayings? It is not meant for a moment that political obligation ceases, for a man or a group of men, when once they conceive that a law, or a set of laws, fails to square with the idea of justice entertained in their minds.

The view suggested is entirely different. Political obligation, as such, remains: indeed we may even say that, as such, and within the State, it remains an unconditional obligation. But a new and super-political obligation enters as soon as we take into our view the socially created and socially developed idea of justice: an obligation which we may call ‘social’, in the sense that it springs from Society and from the product of social thought.

This super-political or social obligation may conflict with, and be pitted against, the political obligation which exists in the area of the State. A dilemma then arises. What is to be done in this dilemma? What is the weight of political obligation, and what is the weight of the super- political, when the two are opposed to one another? How is the State to act to the ‘protestant’ who pleads against it the cause of justice, and how is the ‘protestant’ pleading that cause to act to the State?

Because political obligation, as such, remains, and because it remains, as such, absolute and unconditional, we may lay it down that in any case of disobedience or resistance to law, based on the idea of social justice and social obligation, it is the clear duty of the judge, in his capacity of judge, and of all the organs of government, in their capacity of organs, to enforce the established law (it is not their business to recognize, far less to enforce, any idea of justice other than that expressed in such law); and it is equally the clear duty of the disobeying or resist­ing citizen to obey, as a citizen, the established law, by accepting the legal consequences involved in his disobedience or resistance.

But because social obligation is also a fact, and because, to the ‘protestant’ penetrated by a conviction of its sovereign nature, it is the highest fact, it is also his duty to accept its demands and to offer his testimony to its sovereignty.

Here, however, a problem arises, which must always vex the mind of every serious and reflective ‘protestant’. If the higher obligation is social, how can a mere individual, relying on his own idea of justice, or even a group, relying on an idea enter­tained only by its members, defy the general run of opinion? Must not any challenge to established law be based upon, and be backed by, some measure of general social support? This difficulty disappears if we reflect on the nature of social thought and the process of its formation.

The process is one of the initial production, the subsequent discussion, and the eventual com­position, of a number of different ideas. Each individual, and each group, has something to throw into the pool of discussion in order to stir the waters. Sometimes the contribution must be made in pain if it is to achieve that stirring.

A group which feels its idea to be a vital element in any just order of relations will then feel bound to stake itself upon that idea: it will disobey, or even resist, any law to the contrary: it will seek, by the visible testimony of its disobedience and its acceptance of the legal consequences, to impress
the value of its idea on others, to get it incorporated in social thought, to make it part of common conviction, and ultimately to secure its adoption as part of the law of the State.

Many causes have followed this way in the course of the centuries: the cause of the abolition of slavery, for instance, in the United States, and the cause of the enfranchise­ment of women in the United Kingdom. It is not, in itself, a way of revolution, though it may sometimes seem to approach the verge.

It is at once a rejection and an acceptance of political obligation: a rejection, so far as it denies that obligation on a particular issue: an acceptance, so far as it affirms it in general and on the whole, and so far as it attests its affirmation by facing and accepting the legal consequences of the partial denial.

In­deed we may almost say that resistance of this order is still in the area of debate, arid is a method of persuasion rather than a recourse to force. The resister puts his plea into the arena of debate, and stakes himself upon it: and if he invites the applica­tion of force to his own person, he does not seek to apply it to the persons of others.

But the resister who thus courts martyrdom (which in the original Greek from which it is derived meant the simple giving of witness, but with us has come to mean the giving of witness in and by the suffering of pain) can never escape the dilemma in which he is necessarily involved.

In following to the utter­most some idea which is part of himself he is also breaking, at some point, the scheme of political obligation which is also part of himself. Nor is that all. There is more in question than the breach of political obligation at a particular point.

The resister who defies a law is also disturbing (and incidentally encouraging others—less scrupulous than himself and more intent on private ends—to disturb) the general scheme of law and order, and the general validity of obligation.

He has therefore to ask himself whether the contribution which he may make to social thought about justice, by staking himself on the particu­lar idea he wishes to add, is worth the possible cost of distur­bance of the whole scheme of existing law and order, itself based upon and itself expressing the idea of justice.

This is to make a calculation, and as such it is something like—and yet also very unlike—the calculation of which Bentham and Paley wrote. It is like, in so far as in either case mischief has to be measured against mischief: it is very unlike, in so far as the mischiefs to be measured differ greatly in the two cases—the mischiefs weighed in the one case being mischiefs to the cause of utility, and those weighed in the other being mischiefs to the cause of justice.

There is no simple rule for the weighing of the mischiefs of obedience against the mischiefs of resistance. There is only the general rule that weighing is needed in every case in which a conflict arises between political obligation and the obligation which is super-political. The weighing itself will differ according to time and place; and the decision will depend on the degree of stability of law and order existing in a given country at a given period.

The common love of use and wont, the strength of con­vention, the habit of tradition, are sometimes a sufficient guarantee of the stability of law and order; and where and when that guarantee is present, the electric disturbance of a new idea, pressed to the point of resistance, may serve to correct men’s tendency to settle down on the lees of custom.

On the other hand, it may well be said that the age in which we live is already sufficiently electric; and it may also be said that new ideas which are ready to appeal to force always introduce an incongruous and explosive element into the peaceful process of social thought and persuasion. This is only a ‘dusty answer’. But it is also the only answer which the mind can ever get, however hot for certainties it may be.

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This article will help you to differentiate between society and state.

(a) By ‘Society’ we mean the whole sum of voluntary bodies, or associations, contained in the nation (and even ramifying beyond it by the connexions which they establish with similar bodies in other nations), with all their various purposes and with all their institutions. Taken together, and regarded as a whole, these associations form the social substance which goes by the general and comprehensive name of ‘Society’.

Taken separately, and regarded in themselves, they generally show and share two features: first, they are essentially voluntary in origin: secondly, they are essentially specific in purpose, each existing for some one purpose—religious, economic, educational, chari­table, or ‘social’ in that narrower sense in which we speak of any of the purposes of our ordinary human intercourse (such as the common enjoyment of sport or the common cultivation of leisure) as being a ‘social purpose’.

But if each, taken separately, thus exists for a specific purpose, all taken together exist for a number and a variety of purposes. In view of the many and various purposes of its parts, we may accordingly say that Society does, in Burke’s words, constitute ‘a partnership in all science, … in all art, … in every virtue and in all perfection’; and we may even say that, so conceived, Society is in a sense total or ‘totalitarian’. But to say that is not to say—indeed it is a very different thing from saying—that the State, which has its own separate basis and its own peculiar character, is also ‘totalitarian’.

(b) What, then, is the separate basis and the peculiar cha­racter of the State? By ‘the State’ we mean a particular and special association, existing for the special purpose of maintain­ing a compulsory scheme of legal order, and acting therefore through Jaws enforced by prescribed and definite sanctions.

The State, as a rule, is national in its scope (though a given State may be multi-national), just as Society also is national: in other words, most States are what we call ‘national States’. But if, on this point, the State agrees with Society—or, more exactly, is coextensive with Society—it also differs (and differs pro­foundly) from the associations other than itself which we call, in their sum, by the name of ‘Society’. It differs in two respects.

First, it includes all the members of the stock which inhabits its space or territory, and it includes them all as a matter of neces­sity: other associations include only some (though a national church, in Sweden for instance, may include nearly all), and they include these on a voluntary basis.

Secondly, the State has the power of using legal coercion, the power of enforcing obedi­ence, under the sanction of punishment, to ordained rules of behaviour; other associations, in virtue of their voluntary basis, can apply only social discipline, and can expect only voluntary obedience to agreed ways of behaviour, obedience enforced in the last resort by the sanction of exclusion from membership.

We may therefore say of the State that while it is an association like other associations, in the sense of being a union of men for the pur­pose of acting as social or partners in the realization of a common purpose, it is also an association which is unlike other associa­tions, in the sense of having a unique purpose (the purpose of maintaining a compulsory scheme of legal order) which gives it the unique scope of including compulsorily all the persons resident in a given territory and the unique power of making law and using legal coercion.

The distinction here stated is a problem, or rather a cause of problems, as well as a distinction. On the argument which has been followed a nation is simultaneously, and coextensively, two things in one. It is a social substance, or Society, constituted of and by a sum of voluntary associations, which have mainly grown of themselves—in the sense that they have been formed by voluntary and spontaneous combination—and which desire to act and to realize their purposes as far as possible by them­selves.

That is one side of the nation. The other side (which we may call either the reverse or the obverse, according to our pre­ference) is that it is a political, or, as it is perhaps better called, a legal substance; a single compulsory association including all, and competent, in all cases where it sees fit, to make and enforce rules for all.

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After reading this article you will learn about:- 1. Introduction to the President 2. Qualifications of the President 3. Method of Election and Tenure 4. Powers and Functions 5. Position.

Introduction to the President:

The offices of the President and the Vice-President of the People’s Republic of China were abolished by the Constitution of 1975. Their responsibilities and powers were transferred to the Chairman of the Standing Committee.

He was made responsible for the discharge of the functions of the Head of the State of the Chinese Republic. The 1982 Constitution however restores the two offices and gives to the President of PRC the status of the Head of the State. Now Hu Jintao has taken over as the President of the PRC.

Qualifications of the President:

The following qualifications have been prescribed for the office of the President of PRC:

(a) He should be a citizen of China

(b) He must not be of less than 45 years of age

(c) He should be a duly eligible and registered voter

Method of Election and Tenure of the President:

The President of the PRC is elected by the National People’s Congress for a term of five years. Any citizen of China who is above 45 years of age, is a registered voter and is eligible to seek election, can be elected as the President of the PRC. The 1982 Constitution lays down that no person can serve or remain President for more than two consecutive terms.

Along with the President, a Vice-President is also similarly elected by the NPC. If the office of the President falls vacant, the Vice-President becomes the President. In case the office of the Vice-President falls vacant, the National People’s Congress elects a new Vice- President.

In the event of simultaneous vacation of the two offices, the Chairman of the Standing Committee becomes the acting-President and carries out the duties of the Head of the State until the election of a new President and Vice-President by the National People’s Congress.

Powers and Functions of the President:

The President of the People’s Republic of China performs all the ceremonial functions as the head of the state. He also performs several other functions which the Constitution has allocated to him.

In pursuance of the decisions and recommendations of the National People’s Congress, the President of the PRC, promulgates statutes, appoints and removes the Premier, Vice- Premiers, State Councilors, Ministers in charge of Ministries and Commissions, the Auditor General and the Secretary General of the State Council.

Upon the recommendations of the Standing Committee of the NPC, the President confers state medals and titles of honour on the people as well as grants special pardons to the criminals. Acting on the basis of the decisions of the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee, the President proclaims martial law, a state of war and issues mobilization orders.

All such orders are issued by the President in accordance with the decisions of the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee.

As Head of the State, the President appoints and recalls Chinese ambassadors and other diplomatic agents in foreign countries. He receives the ambassadors of foreign countries in China. All these functions are performed by him upon the recommendations of the Standing Committee of the NPC.

All the treaties concluded by the government with the foreign countries are ratified by the President. He has the power to abrogate any treaty if the circumstances so demand. These functions are again performed by the President under the advice of the Standing Committee.

In discharging his functions, the President can seek the assistance of the Vice-President. Article 82 of the Constitution states that the Vice-President “may exercise such parts of the functions and powers of the President as may be deputed by the President.” As such, he can be assigned any work by the President.

A primary responsibility of the President is to recommend the name of the person who is to be appointed as the Premier of China. The National People’s Congress can appoint the Premier only upon the recommendation made by the President of the PRC.

Position of the President:

The office of the President of the Republic is a ceremonial office. His powers and functions are formal and ceremonial. He performs all his functions, with a few exceptions, upon the recommendations of the National People’s Congress or its Standing Committee. Even the decisions of the State Council are neither announced nor implemented in the name of the President.

The 1982-Constitution, while restoring the office of the President, has not restored to him all the functions which he used to perform under the 1954-constitution. For example, he has not been assigned the power to command the armed forces, he has not been made Chairman of the National Defence Council, and his power to convene a meeting of the Supreme State Conference has been also not restored.

To sum up, we can say that the office of the President of the People’s Republic of China is a ceremonial office. He acts as the constitutional and nominal head of the State. However, when this office is held by a strong party leader, it works as a powerful office.

On 15 March 2003 Mr. Hu Jintao, the General Secretary of CPC became the Sixth President of the Peoples Republic of China and for took place previously held by Ziang Zemin. This change of guards made the office of the President more powerful and presently, Chinese political system revolves around the policies and decisions of president Hu Jintao.

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This article throws light upon the top six characteristics of comparative government. The characteristics are: 1. Essentially Non-Comparative 2. Essentially Descriptive Studies 3. Historical-Legalistic-Institutional Approach 4. Essentially Parochial 5. Essential Static 6. Essentially Monographic.

Characteristic # 1. Essentially Non-Comparative:

The vast majority of publications in the field of comparative government deal either with one country or with parallel descriptions of the institutions of a number of countries. The majority of the texts illustrate the non-comparative character of this approach.

Characteristic # 2. Essentially Descriptive Studies:

Undoubtedly the description of political institutions is vital for the understanding of the political process and that it leads to comparative study. However mere description is not enough. Hardly ever can any real comparison between the particularly institutions described.

A reading, for instance, of one of the best texts, “Governments of Continental Europe” edited by James T. Shot-well, reveals that as we pass from France to Italy, Switzerland, Germany and the U.S.S.R., there is no common thread, no criterion of why these particular countries were selected and no examination of the factors that account for similarities and differences.

The same generally applies to Frederic Oggs and Harold Zink’s “Modern Foreign Governments” and to Fritz M. Marx’s “Foreign Governments.”

Characteristic # 3. Historical-Legalistic-Institutional Approach:

There are two typical approaches in the descriptive study of political institutions. The first is historical and the second is legalistic. We trace the origin of the British parliamentary system to the Magna Carta and then study its development through successive historical accounts of the evolution of the French Parliament or the German Representative Assemblies which indicate similarities and differences.

The second most prevalent approach is what we might call the legalistic approach. Here, the student is exposed primarily to the study of the ‘legal powers’ of various branches of government and their relationships with reference to the existing constitutional and legal prescriptions.

This is almost exclusively the study of what can be done or what cannot be done by various governmental agencies with reference to legal and constitutional provisions. Hence the traditional approach has been legalistic.

Characteristic # 4. Essentially Parochial:

The great number of studies on foreign political systems has been addressed to the examination of Western European institutions. Accessibility of the countries studied, relative ease of overcoming language barriers, and the availability of official documents and other source materials, as well as cultural affinities, account for this fact.

The traditional approach has been parochial because it has concentrated only upon European political systems.

Characteristic # 5. Essential Static:

In general, the traditional approach has been ignoring the dynamic factors that account for growth and change. It has concentrated on what we have called political anatomy. After the evolutionary premises of some of the original works in the nineteenth century were abandoned, students of political institutions apparently lost all interest in the formulation of other countries in the light of which change could be comparatively studied.

Characteristic # 6. Essentially Monographic:

The most important studies of foreign political systems, apart from the basic texts, have taken the form of monographs that have concentrated on the study of political institutions of one system or on the discussion of a particular institution in different systems.

Works such as those by John Marriott, Arthur Keith, Joseph Barthelemy, James Bryce, Ivor Jennings, Harold Laski, A.V. Dicey, Frank Good-now, W.A. Robson, Abbott L. Lowell, Woodrow Wilson, and several others were addressed generally to only one country or to a particular institutional development within one country.

In other words, the main characteristics of Comparative Government have been:

(1) Emphasis upon the study of political institutions of various countries.

(2) Main focus on the study of major constitutions of the world.

(3) Emphasis upon the study of powers and functions of various political institutions working in different states.

(4) Legal Intuitionalism i.e. formal study of the organisation and powers, description of the features of the constitutions and political institutions, and legal powers of political institutions, form the basic contents of Comparative Government study.

(5) Building a theory of ideal political institutions constituted the objective.

With all these features, Comparative Government remained a very popular area of study unto the 1st quarter of the 20th century. Thereafter, a large number of political scientists got greatly dissatisfied with its narrow scope, unscientific methodology, formal legalistic- institutionalistic and normative approach.

They revolted against it and came forward to adopt comprehensiveness, realism, precision and scientific study of the processes of politics as their new goals. Their efforts came to be designated as Comparative Politics.

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