Category: Political Science Notes

1. Ideology:

On the basis of the concept of ‘ideology’ many Marxist and neo-Marxist thinkers have thought about differently on the operations of politics. Marx and Engels regarded the dominant ideas of any historical epoch as an expression of the interests of the most powerful social groups. All political and cultural ideas are rooted in the prevailing power relationship. The class which controls economic life dispenses throughout society its attitudinal patterns and belief systems.

But it is understood in two ways:

(a) As false consciousness that masks ‘real interests’ of the bulk of society. Real interests lay in the overthrow of capitalism and its replacement by communism; and,

(b) As expres­sions of material circumstances, such as, attitudes, beliefs, ideologies etc. rooted in the structure of production relations in any given society.

Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), while in prison, questioned why there had not been a successful communist revolutionary overthrow of a regime in the advanced capitalist countries?” He found the cause in the ability of advanced capitalist regimes to rule by consent rather than by coercion.

This was its intellectual and moral leadership rather than military and police repression. It was termed as hegemony used to describe the non-coercive aspects of domination, the diffusion throughout society of the value and knowledge systems of a ruling group.

Louis Althusser, the French structuralist Marxist thinker, elabo­rated it further.’ He highlighted the way in which hegemony actually worked. The state has two key components: repressive and ideological state apparatuses (ISAs). The former functions via coercion in the last instance while the latter work ideologically. The list of ISAs included Religion, Education, Family, Law, Politics, Trade Unions, Communica­tions and Culture.

The ideological supports of state power are deeply embedded in society. The ISAs may also operate as sites of resistance to the dominant knowledge and attitudinal patterns associated with capitalism. Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, both neo-Gramscians, have dealt with the power of knowledge and ideas in the global political economy. Its organising principles come from neo-liberalism which stands for the sanctity of free markets, avoidance of state intervention, free capital movement and efficient allocation of resources on a global scale.

2. Sub-political Cultures:

Many sub-political cultures co-exist within a political system. There is interaction among these sub-political cultures. Political system as a whole comes under this interaction. Sub-political culture stands for a particular identity of a societal group. Sub-political culture makes it a group of people that possesses a distinct and consistent set of attitudes, beliefs and orientations to political objects.

Sub-political cultures become irreconcilable, as in case of Ireland and Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. It may also rise like the Asian Tigers. But the European Union is showing the way to negotiation, mediation, reconciliation, and integration.

Dennis Kavanagh”’ gives four bases of these sub-political cultures:

(1) The elite versus mass culture;

(2) Cultural divisions within the elites;

(3) Generational subcultures; and,

(4) Social structure.

3. Political Identity:

The components of identity include a series of common assumptions, attitudes, dispositions and beliefs. The bound­aries between political identity and political culture are not very clear. However, ‘identity’ is endemic to the human condition. Calhoun says, ‘We know of no people without names, no languages or cultures in which some manner of distinctions between self and other, we and they are not made’. There are many possible bases for political identity and each person is made of multiple identities. Some identities seem to prevail over others.” There are many rationalist, constructivist and power approaches to identity.

4. World Culture:

There are many makers and developers of world culture: intergovernmental organisations, transnational corporations, states, and individuals. Individuals include scientists, policy advisors technical experts, organisational consultants, activists, and so on.’ Much of world culture is embedded in national and local structures to such as extent that it is simply taken for granted. State sovereignty is there.

Yet institutions like the ICC (International Criminal Court) transcends state sovereignty, relying on a principle of individual responsibility for one’s actions and the presumed capacity of individuals to follow their consciences in choosing good over evil. They are obliged to behave as world citizens.

Yet critics of neoliberalism, opponents of radical Islamism and defenders of national identity oppose this phenomenon. According to Lechner and Boli, ‘In the twenty-first century, world culture will be a fact of life. Its content will change; its influence may rise or decline. But in many respects, the world works the way it does because world culture has grown as it

5. World Cultures or Civilisations:

There are many world cultures or civilisations. All tend to clash. Huntington opines that the fundamental source of conflict is not primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating sources of conflict are cultural. Nation-states still remain the most powerful actors, but the principal conflicts of global politics would occur between nations and groups of different civilisations.

There is worldwide Islamic opposition to World Culture. World Culture, in fact, stands presently for Western Culture. But Islam considers itself to be the World Culture. As such, it opposes every other culture, civili­sation or ideology appearing as World Culture. In their revolt against the dominant world order, the Islamists aim to create a new kind of civilisation. Islam is a world religion. It is centred on the universal declaration of the freedom of man on the earth from every authority except God’s.

Its call to freedom may be confined by geographic or racial boundaries but is valid for all humanity. Most of the aggressive militants have increasingly focussed on the linchpin of world culture (the chief oppressor of Muslims): the United States of America or the “Great Satan”. The entire earth must be subject to the religion of Allah by all means.

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1. Sufficient and Adequate for Men:

As far as ‘man and his family’ is concerned, the ideology of Human Rights appears sufficient and adequate. It takes all aspects of man as man in view and stands by him. It stops at human concerns, and does not attempt to propose restructuring state and UN systems. At levels above the concerns of man, they may adopt any ideology, prefer a form of structure suitable for them.

2. Dominance of State Sovereignty:

The concept of state sovereignty hangs heavily over UDHR. Human Rights cannot claim to override state sovereignty. Owing to their attitude, both China and United States were not voted onto the UN Human Rights Commission in 2002. US had refused to vote for the landmine restriction and withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol of global warming. China’s record of human rights was poor on the Thianamen Square massacre of 1989.

3. Lack of Universalism:

Human rights so far appear more on paper, and look more theoretical. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) remains sacrosanct and a document of veneration. At many places, its articles are conflicting and lack precision. Genocide, ethnic conflicts, exploitation, casteism, child labour, atrocities on women etc. prevail that shows lack of universalism in the acceptance of human rights.

4. Arrogance of Religions:

Human rights are often challenged by religions like Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism and the like. They often mix up state and religion. State is subordinate to demands of religion. Maintaining their religion as ultimate Message of God, they subordinate human rights to their teachings.

They stand for the otherworldly goals, and neglect the demands of present life. The individual is only a tool and an instrument of religion. Equality is applied only to their followers. Hardly do they permit liberty to the individual. Individual rights undercut Confucius ethics. In Asian societies, community, society and law and order are regarded superior to human rights.

5. Counter-ideologies of Ultra Nationalism and Fundamentalism:

Human rights are often identified with Western cultural imperialism. It is challenged by ultra-nationalism emerging in many developing countries. It has so happened in Yugoslavia, Rawanda, Sri Lanka, Serbia, and others.

There is rise of religious fundamentalism or Islamism, particularly, in Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, Sudan, Indonesia, etc. People there are segregated as damned and saved. The damned part of population is hated, tortured and killed. There is ethnic cleansing in many parts of the world.

Despite dubious, fuzzy and indeterminate status of UDHR, Human Rights is definitely a ‘move forward’ in the field of culture, political devel­opment, world peace and progress of mankind. It shall have a penetrating impact like that of the theory of natural rights.

Its realisation remains incomplete. But even in its incomplete form it would ‘revolutionise’ every walk of individual and community life. In due course of time, most of the bonds, inhuman laws and traditions, inequalities, disparities etc. would be done away with.

Man would become an end and instrument unto himself, as a result of gaining capacities at par with each other. Human Rights would bring about total democratic and liberal change in form of polities. Univer­sality of Human Rights would rationalise the operations of Liberalisation, Privatisation, and Globalisation (LPG) ushered in the Twenty-first Century. It is expected that its understanding and application would incarnate new culture and civilisation of Humanity. For some applications of Human Rights, it would be a turning point towards humanism if a scale for measurement of Human Rights is devised.

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Political influence is the power sought for by politically active persons like legislators, ministers, leaders, etc. For some persons it is a source of enjoyment for its own sake, while for others it may be a means to determine or affect a policy.

Power is the capacity to produce intended behavior. This capacity can be exercised on the basis of coercive or non-coercive sanctions. Force is based on coercive sanctions. Influence is related to non-coercive sanctions. Both are the two main forms of power. However, some regard power as a form of influence, and other treat influence as a form of power. They appear different when power is identified with force, and influence as unrelated to power. Influence and force, both are treated as variants of power.

Influence is persuasive. One submits voluntarily to influence. Influence does not require coercive power. It is attached to an idea, a doctrine, or a creed. It has its locus in the ideological sphere.’ Christ, Buddha, Marx, Gandhi and the like had influence. By ‘influence’ is meant ability to get others act, think, or feel as one intends. From this point of view any cooperative activity – any organisation, formal or informal, ephemeral or lasting can be looked as a sphere of influence.

Lasswell uses the concept of ‘influence’ in a generic sense: ‘The study of politics is the study of influence and the influential. He is aware of the distinction between power and influence. According to Lasswell, ‘influence is the value position and potential of a person or group. It aims at affecting the policies of others by persuasive means. Rowe includes power and authority in the concept of influence.

Political influence is the power sought for by politically active persons like legislators, ministers, leaders, etc. For some persons it is a source of enjoyment for its own sake, while for others it may be a means to determine or affect a policy. It intends to decide what interest it shall serve, of what value, and with what form of expression. Political influence is unevenly shared. Often a vast majority wields very small influence, whereas a small minority, known as the elite can rule over a whole political system. Catlin has observed that influence contributes to building up a control system, especially of a consensual, habitual, or cooperative order.

It is distinct from ‘command’ and ‘coercion’. It has potentiality, but remains on the verge of power as coercive force. It is rather potential power, less than actual control. Potential power appears in persons or groups when someone evokes their attention on some just and suppressed cause. Such causes often stand in suppressed, secondary or unconcerned manner.

They are not immediate but mediate or next to currently conflicting causes. Probable potential power (PPP) exists among a very large number of un-organised people. It belongs to masses. It may erupt in an organised or unorganised manner. Even state power may stand helpless before its avalanche. Successful influence is a form of mental control: authority, leadership, political party, legitimacy, etc., are its various manifestations.

Two Views:

In a general sense, as ‘capacity to induce behaviour’, both power and influence are identical. In order to conceptualise both as one, we propose to use it as ‘Power’ (with capital ‘P’). Analytically, ‘power’ as capacity is a noun while influence is both a noun (fact) and a verb (process or activity). In the elaborate explanation of interrelationship between power and influence, both views can be adopted.

The power view regards influence as a form of power, which is largely indirect and unorganised. Some scholars like Weber, Maclver, Bierstedt, etc., take wider view of power. Morgenthau views all politics as struggle for power. Others distinguish two variants of power, as coercive and non-coercive. In politics, non-coercive power is more important than coercive power. The influence view observes influence as an all-pervading phenomenon. The second view also involves two perspectives.

One finds all behavioural changes as related to influence. Rowe finds it an umbrella concept covering power, authority, etc. According to him, power is coercive influence. The other view is specific, and acknowledges both power and influence as independent variables. Influence is different from power in the sense that man voluntarily submits to influence, whereas power requires submission. Karl Marx and Gandhi had influence, not power.

Influence in this sense does not require power. Power can exist without influence. In politics and political organisations both are found in a mixed form, as m actual practice influence also has power and vice versa, though conse­quences differ in nature and impact.

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The goal of Easton’s political system is to maintain ‘persistence’ and not ‘equilibrium’. He is a critic of equilibrium-approach. His system converts demands and supports into outputs through feedback mechanisms. It is not a routine operation, but a complex cyclic process with a dynamism peculiar to it. The system has its own goal which it tries to reach by facing problems of stress and maintenance.

His analytical framework is based on two critical variables:

(i) Sources of stress and persistence of the system, and

(ii) Regulating processes or mechanisms of regulating these stresses.

Persistence stands for continuity of the capacity of the system to allocate values to the members in a binding manner and implement them. In Easton’s words, it is ‘the continuation of the capacity of a system to make and execute binding decisions of allocations on its members.’ It is a unique trait of political systems. It maintains the system with all modifications and changes entering into its environment. It transforms inputs into outputs, which influence the environment, and creation of inputs. The feedback mecha­nisms communicate reactions and responses to the outputs of the environment to the system.

The latter are interlocking cycles within the systematic cycle, and there is endless, interlinked, and interactive flow of operations which constantly change, and subsequently change the behaviour of the system. Thus, Easton presents a flow model of political system. It has an extraordinary capacity to adjust to, and sometimes even to transform the environment. For this, there operate so many processes and mechanisms, unlike other systems. Apart from regulating its own behaviour and maintaining itself amid changes, it transforms its own structure, even reformulate its goals.

In equilibrium approaches, scholars, mostly sociologists, give all importance to: (i) stability or maintenance of the system as it is; and (ii) neglect the environment or processes bringing about change in the system itself. They overlook the system’s capacity to cope with the problems coming from environment. A system, beyond the assumptions of these scholars, can have goals other than maintaining its equilibrium. At times, it may like to destroy an already existing equilibrium or wish to acquire a new pattern of equilibrium. It may, as Easton opines, like to change its environment so that transactions between the environment and the system are not stressful.

It may seek to insulate itself against undue pressures from the environment, and, the members ‘even fundamentally transform their own relationships and modify their own goals and practices so as to improve their chances of handling the inputs from the environment.’ Easton’s system has the capacity for creative and constructive regulation of disturbances. It is both open and adaptive to environment and liking of its own members. Thus Easton’s model is different from equilibrium models which neglect their changing environments.

Their goal is survival or maintenance of the status quo. Easton’s political system does not operate merely to face stresses, crises or change for maintaining itself. It is creative, innovative, forward-looking, persistent, goal-determining, and capable to cope with crises. However, the goal of persistence is bound up with problems of systematic survival and the preservation of essential variables within the critical range. Goal-attainment is restricted by the needs of system’s maintenance. As such, the theory contains little beyond the question of persistence.

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In scientific value relativism, the political scientist keeps his personal values separate from his study and does not permit them to influence it. He studies the problem, event, or phenomenon in a value-relative manner, or with reference to the stated values.

While conducting a research or making inves­tigation, one has to suspend his own ultimate values. Scientific Method merely leads to description and analysis of facts of political life. It has no relation with specific values. As such, it is not helpful in studying value-laden things, events or activities. This direct helplessness of scientific method has been, to a great extent, removed by scientific value relativism.

Brecht has presented it in the form of a positive-negative formula:

(1) The question whether something is ‘valuable’ can be answered scientifi­cally only in relation to:

(a) Some goal or purpose for the pursuit of which it is or is not useful (valuable).

(b) The ideas held by some person or group of persons regarding what is or is not valuable.

(2) It is impossible to establish scientifically what goals or purposes are valuable irrespective of:

(a) The value they have in the pursuit of other goals or purposes, or

(b) Of someone’s ideas about ulterior or ultimate goals or purposes.

In brief, analysis of values, ideas, and activities, by scientific method is possible only with reference to ultimate values or ideas expressed about those values. For example, voting for a person or party can be scientifically analysed only when a scholar knows the ultimate values or ideas about the values of the voter. Science cannot ‘prove’ the ultimate, highest, absolute, or standards of values.

The latter are a product of mind, will, faith, inhibition, instinct or ignorance which is beyond the empirical ‘eye’ of scientific method. But it can clarify their meaning, and analyse consequences and risks involved in their pursuance. Scientific value relativism is the logical implication of scientific method; they are the two sides of the same coin. But it consistently refuses to take a stand on the choice of ultimate values.

After acknowledgement of ultimate values or ideas, the value relativist can discuss, analyse, speak on adequacy or inadequacy of all secondary values, ideas, actions, events and propositions. It can empirically know the contents of ‘human nature and needs’ which make up bases or sources of so-called universal norms or values. It can enlighten us on all moral or mental attitudes of man.

Still they would be regarded, in view of the prevailing socio-economic and cultural level of development, as relative and contingent. Such analysis can point out human preferences, nature and need of man, and form of environment and social organisation required to sustain them. Knowledge thus obtained is transmissible, testable and valid.

Scientific value relativism is ‘scientific’ because it is based on scientific method. Regarding ‘values’, it adopts ‘relativism’, which means the scholar studies the values or purposes of an individual or group, keeping either the latter’s ultimate values or some other given value system in view. The scholar or researcher, except in assumptions of scientific method, does not involve his own personal values or ideas. He can, if he likes, do so, but clearly expresses his values or ideas beforehand. In that case, he appears more as an ideologue than a scholar.

Criticism of Scientific Value Relativism:

There has been a sharp reaction to scientific value relativism.

It has been criticised in two ways:

(a) One group of scholars attempt to come closer to it without repudiating it. Brecht calls them as ‘escapists’. Their view is that it is unworthy of scholars that they are unable to give any judgement or solve problems. Some of them find final solution in religion or God, or take ultimate values as general agreements, or working hypotheses. Some have favoured democratic majority or initiation as the ultimate verdict on good or evil.

(b) Another group has tried to prove that scientific value relativism is false. Scholars like Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and others misrepresent and denigrate them by saying that they do not have faith in any absolute value and regard all values as equal. Dewey and Kaufmann do not recognise the difference between fact and value stating that scientific judgement is also a value.

Other scholars like Saint Thomas, Jacques Maritain, Alfred Weber, etc., enlarge the meaning and scope of the term ‘science’. According to them, science is not the only source of knowledge. Intention, religion and imagi­nation are also dependable sources of empirical understanding.

Some others believe in objectivity of values. Sociologists like Mannheim demand more relativity in the perspective of ‘sociology of knowledge’. They relate knowledge to socio-economic and cultural contexts along with individuals’ limited perspective and vested interests.

Brecht has refused to accept most of these objections which fail to disprove the position taken by him. His basic stand is that ultimate value cannot be scientifically validated. It does not debar anyone to have or cherish ultimate values. His simple claim is that the latter cannot be empiri­cally proved. In order to undertake scientific study, one has to make observation in the light of its underlying assumptions or other expressed values. In the field of Political Science, he, at his own, cannot start with his own set of ultimate values.

Some scholars, in place of ‘relativism’, have proposed other terms. They like to substitute the term ‘relative’ with ‘relational’, ‘dialectic’, ‘problem­atic’, etc. But Brecht does not find them suitable to convey the underlying sense of relativism. Radbruch uses the term ‘perspectivism’ on the plea that values or value-laden things can be studied only with the perspective of ultimate values. But the term ‘perspective’ is ambiguous, and lacks specific meaning.

However, Brecht, has regarded ‘scientific value alternativism’ as acceptable as it connotes the value as a choice among many other values. But, for historical reasons and clarity, he opts for ‘scientific value relativism’. Scientific method is complete along with it.

It has, thus, bridged over the long-standing gap between ‘is’ and ‘ought’ and removed the deadlock in the development of a scientific political theory. It has enabled scholars to study political facts which mostly are value-laden. In a sense, scientific value relativism pushed behaviouralism and scientific method ahead to the making of an empirical political theory.

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Difficulties arise when limitations of behaviouralism are regarded as their weaknesses and shortcomings. Behaviouralists themselves have accepted that their approach and its attainments suffer from a number of limitations. Besides, other arguments and objections have to be analysed carefully.

Replies and explanations from the behaviouralists are summed up below:

1. Personal:

Some of the arguments from the traditionalists are personal, namely, that they are immodest, liberal, conservative, capitalist, status quoist, arrogant, etc. Behaviouralism as such has no relation with them. If some professors use it as a trick or device to avoid politics or making a choice, it cannot be regarded as a fault of behaviouralism.

2. Inability:

Another line of criticism is about their inability or failure to produce a science of politics even after a long time. This demand and dissatisfaction of the scholars and laymen against them is justified. The behaviouralists have yet to produce a ‘science of man’ or discover the ‘laws of human behaviour’.

But the anti-behaviouralists themselves explain and remind them that the subject matter of politics being more complex and excessively intentional, the cause of delay or failure becomes too clear to need further explanation. Even Einstein had cautioned that the study of politics is more difficult than the study of Physics.

3. Trivial and Micro:

The charge that they avoid larger and urgent problems of society and take up only micro or trivial problems to study as the latter are more useful in gathering data and other empirical information is true to a large extent. But, the selection of a problem depends on several factors like resources available at the disposal of a researcher, evolution of tools and techniques, availability and nature of data, etc. In the early stage, the behaviouralists had to fight for their survival and existence.

They did not get adequate support from society. Under those circumstances, perhaps they could not do much. Now when behaviouralism has almost been accepted and endowed with more tools and techniques provided by ever-advancing science and technology, it can be expected that more important and macro problems would be undertaken for conducting behavioural studies.

4. Inapplicability:

Another serious charge against the behaviouralists is that their studies are conducted under a given situation which may not be repeated or found anywhere. In practical politics, while taking decisions, political actors keep many things into consideration – history, culture, morality, power, caste, class, strategy, etc. A behav­ioural finding, howsoever scientifically derived, may not be at all useful.

The argument appears to be cogent and formidable. In fact, Political Science requires higher type of qualitative research suitable for studying dynamics of politics. Tools and techniques, including concepts and findings, borrowed from comparatively static disciplines cannot fulfil our expectations, even if we formally adopt and learn all tenets of behaviouralism and post-behaviouralism.

Similar is the argument of uniqueness of events, persons, and processes. Their multi-variety nature makes the search of uniformities and regularities totally futile. But, the argument is true to a limited extent, as politics is concerned with uniqueness only in a limited manner. Man as man is gregarious by nature, and most of his behaviour is uniform, similar, and patterned. Existence of government, law, groups, associations, family, tribe, etc. is a proof to this concrete obser­vation.

Behaviour of aggregates and collectivities is, to a large extent observable, testable, and verifiable. Do not governments and their departments and other autonomous units maintain statistics on a regular basis? In practice, they have been working with them quite successfully. A few exceptions do not falsify their generalisations. These exceptions can be dealt with separately. Still, they generate some gener­alisations of specific or contextual nature.

5. Problem of Values:

Post-behaviouralism has cut the Gordian knot on values. Their earlier position was more or less misunderstood. They were not against values as such. They had to remain value-neutral to make their studies ‘scientific’. In case they could not do so, they had to expressly declare their values.

Values always remain there, but they should not vitiate their research process and findings. Post-behaviouralism has added another dimension to the whole problem in the sense that the scholars should boldly uphold human values, and actively come out in support them. Rather, they should organise and fight for them.

Now the problem before behaviouralism is that of what values and why?

What would be their impact? What values do behaviour as such reflect?

Which are the ways and means to realize them effectively?

Which system, group or milieu is more congenial to a particular set of values?

There can be several other questions.

But now the problem does not remain unresolved. Arnold Brecht has developed ‘scientific value relativism’ for the understanding and analysis of secondary values in a scientific manner. He has expressed his faith that the ultimate values can also be empirically explained and analysed, though their sources cannot be ascertained scientifically.

6. Higher-Lower:

Knowledge gained through behavioural means, being based on senses, has been regarded as lower. Experience obtained through extra-sensory means – imagination, meditation, introspection, intuition, divine inspiration, etc., is considered as higher. Acceptance of behaviouralism results in ‘lower-governing the higher’, whereas classicalists wanted the reverse. Leo Strauss talks of ‘pre-scientific’ and ‘post-scientific’ knowledge of the individual as the dominating factor in behavioural research.

The whole set of argument is fallacious, and beyond context. A political scientist pursues exact, empirical, and reliable knowledge which has to be limited, partial, and concrete. Arguments from the unknown and unknowable periphery of wholes has little relevance to his own venture. If one is really serious about the argument, the case is otherwise, the higher can prove its existence only on the basis and existence of the lower.

If there is no lower, no higher can be upheld. Lower can exist without any higher. This ‘lower’ is the basis of ‘inter-subjectively transmissible knowledge’. How can one, except with reference to the lower, prove that the ‘higher’ is really higher and is not self-delusion. Is there any unanimity of opinion or experience about that higher? How is that the ‘higher’ is always a monopoly of the few only? Why should the lower ones surrender to those possessing the knowledge of ‘higher’? To sum up, everything ‘higher’ has to come down to the lower.

7. Undependability of Techniques:

Political reality remains beyond the comprehension of research tools and techniques, like interviews, questionnaires etc. Indeed, these instruments are inadequate. But this observation merely proves a greater need to construct sophisticated, suitable and standard tools to know the yet unknown reality. While using them, the researcher should stand dispassionate. The tools cannot be the criteria of empiricism.

The contents and nature of the subject matter must govern the quality and shape of tools. At a higher and later stage of their development, one would not have to say that the behaviouralists ‘measure the immeasurable’ or ‘quantify the unquantifiable’. At the beginning, political scientists can develop micro theories whic
h may lead to a general theory of politics.

8. Capitalist Ventures:

Some scholars relate it to capitalism which stands for the status quo and exploitation. They want to free it and organise a social science liberation movement. Others do not want to tolerate the attempts of the behaviouralists to treat ‘politics’ as ‘non-political’ or lead it to ‘end of polities’.

But how can all of them do it. In fact, their attitude towards behaviouralism is itself ‘behavioural’, viz., deriving conclusions after observation of the behaviour of the behaviouralists. And their demand and claim is to become greater behaviouralists.

Their wishes and the credo of the post-behaviouralists appear to be identical: changing the status quo, anti-establishment, restoration of values etc. None of the behaviouralists, oppose the view of critical theorists that a holistic and synthetic approach should be adopted to study praxis and the system.

9. Jargon:

Language of behaviouralism is technical, specific, and difficult. The behaviouralists one after another continue to coin new words and concepts which obstruct the way of communication among the scholars of Political Science. But this is being done to evolve a standard termi­nology to make observations precise and exact. Some of the behaviouralists like W.F. Riggs make the language more difficult, but in due course of time, some usable, specific and acceptable language of Political Science would come up.

Political Science, more than any other discipline, requires standard terminology. Even classicists like Kant and Hegel do have their own jargon, but that is not the goal or liking of behaviouralism. Behaviouralists want to have ultimately a smooth and effective communication system. As it would be closer to realities, it would soon gain currency among the common people.

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