Category: Political Science Notes

An ideology is that set of ideas and beliefs which seeks to articulate the basic values of a group of people – what they cherish for themselves and for others. Ideologues are related to interests, but in a complex and uncertain manner. Ideologies demand partisanship, i.e., involvement in the struggle for power, and not mere commitment to the pursuit of ideas as an end in itself

“Ideology is a disputed concept; its meaning is not transparent”. (Gary K. Browning) It is used as a system of political, legal, ethical, religious and philosophical views and ideas. It can be a set of empirically derived scientific statements or a programme based on certain principles or goals, or a loose statement of certain ideas, goals and ends with means to realize them..

The concept was first used in the 17th century by Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) of France as ‘ideologie’ (French) or ‘ideology’ English) which meant ‘science of ideas.’ Condillac defined it as ‘study of ideas based on sensory experience’. Since then it has carried many meanings. Napolean and Jeremy Bentham used it in a pejorative sense and scoffed at it. German philosophers like Kant and Hegel used it in a broader philosophical sense as ‘theory of knowledge’. Marx and Engels considered it as a by-product of false consciousness. For Minogue, it was an escape from the realities of practical life to imaginary Utopias.

In its neutral sense also there is no unanimity. Social scientists find it as ‘a set of symbols’ (Lasswell), ‘crecenda and miranda’ (Merriam), ‘myth’ (Sorel), ‘political formula’ (Mosca), ‘derivations’ (Pareto), ‘a culture system’ (Apter), etc.

R.M. McIver observes it as, “any scheme of thinking characteristic of a group or class”. Dahl defines it as” a set of more or less persistent, integrated doctrines that purport to explain and justify leadership in the system”. Louis Wirth appreciates it as “complexes of ideas which direct toward the mainte­nance of the existing order”. Lyman Tower Sargent examines it as “a value or belief system that is accepted as fact or truth by some groups”.

Meehan includes in the term:

(a) A pattern of belief relating to some particular aspects of social, political or economic life,

(b) A programme of action, and,

(c) Element of irrationalism or absolute faith.

It is now used in a social-scientific sense. It refers to a more or less coherent set of ideas that provide the basis for some kind of organised political action. In this sense all ideologies (i) offer an account or critique of the existing order, usually in the form of a ‘world view; (ii) provide the model of a desired future, a vision of the ‘good society’; and (iii) outline how political change can should be brought about. Ideologies thus straddle the conventional boundaries between descriptive and normative thought, and between theory and practice. In sum, it is a set of ideas which are adopted by a group to motivate it for the achievement of some predetermined goals.

In the tradition of Karl Mannheim, William Conolly has argued that it was time that ideology be neutrally defined and its applicability generalised to encompass all political interpretation, from radical polemics to orthodox and scientific treatises in Political Science. He defines it as “a set of empirical claims not fully tested, and for practical purposes not fully testable, which functions both to orient political activity and to preserve from destruction of values and higher level beliefs cherished by its authors and supporters”

Eugene J. Meehan deals with characteristics of ideology in his study of British foreign policy. According to him, ideologies have direct and immediate relation to international affairs. They play a vital role in human behaviour of groups. Ideologies appear different from each other. Externally, they relate to the area of human behaviour, which they affect, demands made upon the supporters and complexity of doctrines.

They depend on absolutes which often provide solutions to the insoluble. For this they restrict their discussions on the first principles. Each one of them passes through (a) initial statement of principles by the founder; (b) their elaboration by specific group of disciples, and (c) development of priesthood to apply them to all problems. The process of interpretation goes on constantly. Ideology turns important only when it becomes a social force carrying mass acceptance. Followers both support and control those who accept the ideology.

There are three levels: (i) masses, (ii) secondary group consisting of individuals who accept the basic principles and programme of action, and (iii) concentration of authority in the hands of a relatively small number of persons. For seeking approval of the masses, level of complexity is lowered to a common denominator. To create ‘we-feeling’, there are simple answers and widespread use of symbols. Value judgements are not necessarily based on facts. Any means justifies the end when the end is an absolute postulated by the ideology.

According to Dahl, development of an ideology is an essential feature of all political systems. Leaders in them usually espouse a set of more or less persistent and integrated doctrines that purport to explain and justify their leadership in the system. They develop it to endow their leadership with legitimacy and convert their influence into authority. It is more economical to rule by means of authority than by means of coercion. The leaders usually espouse an ideology that justifies not only their own leadership but also the political system itself.

An official or reigning ideology usually contains standards for appraising the organisation, policies and leaders of the system. It often gives an idealised description of the way in which the system actually works and should work. When a reigning ideology is widely accepted, its leaders would endanger their legitimacy if they violate its prescribed norms. Ideologies vary enormously from one system to another.

Even when it is entirely integrated or internally consistent, it may not be necessarily static. New situations need new explanation and emphasis on newer goals. Sometimes unrelated and inconsistent elements creep in. Sometimes ambiguities may prove positive as they permit flexibility and change in the system.

It is also a fact that even a reigning ideology is not uniformly accepted by all members of an organisation. Most of its members have only the most rudimentary knowledge of the ruling ideology. Many others have their own private views. Some of its members may reject it or adhere to rival and conflicting ideologies and create a crisis of legitimacy. Ideologies have their rise and fall. A revolutionary or opposing ideology may emerge as reigning ideology after some years.

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Explanation, in a narrow sense, is based on logic, which is study of the methods, and principles used distinguishing the valid from invalid reasoning. Besides sense-experience, every science is based also on the principles of logic or reason. Science involves the rules of reasoning or use of arguments. Arguments are sequences of sentences in which some sentences (premises or antecedents) are claimed to be the justification or support for another sentence (conclusion or consequences).

This justification or support offered on the basis of connection, relationship, association, property, common variable or attribute found between things and activities mentioned in the argument. Their source, ultimately, is sense-experience or empirical observation made by man in his social environment.

Logic is interrelated set of arguments. Arguments relate to validity and truth. Arguments can be (i) deductive, and, (ii) inductive. It should be pointed out that validity and truth are two different things. Validity means that the premises of an argument are related to the conclusion in such a way that the conclusions must be true if the premises are true. Validity is the property or attribute of arguments.

It says nothing about the truth or falsity of individual statements. It the premises of a valid argument are true, then the conclusion must automatically be true. Truth is a property of individual statements which can be either premises or conclusions. It is meaningless to call individual statements ‘valid’ and also to call arguments ‘true’. Arguments can be valid or invalid. Similarly, only individual or single state­ments can be true or false.

Deductive argument is one whose premises provide conclusive evidence for the conclusion. If all the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true. Deductive arguments proceed from general premises to more specific conclusions. The truth of the conclusion is implicit in the premises. It makes the information contained in the premises explicit. Inductive argument derives a generalised conclusion on the basis of particulars, often empirically derived premises or observations.

The premises of an inductive argument make the conclusion probable not certain. The inductive approach relies on scientific discovery of facts. One characteristic of inductive argument is that it establishes a conclusion whose content goes beyond its premises.

From the observation of a sample, an inference is made about a whole population. This is called the ‘inductive leap’, jumping from the premises which relates to an observed sample, to the conclusions which concerns the entire population. The greater the number of representative units in the premises observed in the sample, the smaller is the inductive leap.

The smaller the number of representative units observed in the sample, the greater is the inductive leap. The premises of an inductive argument do not establish the conclusion conclusively. The premises of a valid argument, here, may be true, but the conclusion can still be false. Its premises only support or lend weight to the conclusion, as they do not make the latter certain.

On the basis of two types of arguments or reasoning, explanations fall into two categories:

(a) Deductive explanation, and,

(b) Inductive expla­nation.

Explanations are, basically, answers to ‘why’ questions. In fact, there are many other styles of explanations: genetic, rational, dispositional, and functional. Genetic explanation gives the history of an event by presenting the event as the final stage of a development of a developmental sequence. The event may be described as happening through the hands of many specific individuals or agents directly or indirectly connected with it.

In fact, historical description of events cannot explain why that event took place. However, the events forming the historical sequence are selected on the basis of what the scholar assumes the cause of the final event. These assumptions form his tacit generalisations. The description of preceding events may be regarded as statement of particular facts or initial conditions.

Rational explanations take into account the agent’s calculation of means available in a situation for the attainment of his objectives. His actions are explained by listing the reasons that motivate him to act as in decision-making and communication theories. A decision-maker’s behaviour is explained by calculating the utilities or pay off under different conditions and circumstances. Rational explanations like genetic explana­tions, contain tacit generalisations which can be treated as covering laws.

But they suffer from two shortcomings: their generalisations actually are hypotheses or conjectures, and are not confirmed regularities, and, they often assume that the required initial conditions obtain without independent evidence. Dispositional explanations take into account person’s dispositions, tendencies or attitudes making them to behave in some particular manner. It can be assumed that man happens to be authori­tarian, civic-minded, peaceful, violent or non-violent owing to them.

Frequently such orientations are used to explain why peoples and groups behave in a particular manner. All such assumed dispositions can be recon­structed as covering-laws. Only research or empirical observations can confirm whether man actually carries those dispositions under the given circumstances. Functional explanations take into their consideration the recurrent activities, behaviour-patterns or roles of persons in maintaining a system or in realising a particular goal.

Functional analysis examines a system that requires certain conditions or requisites to remain in adequate working order and particular persons or groups behave to maintain those conditions. It seems that the behaviour of these persons or groups satisfies a need or a functional requirement of that system.

Here the functional expla­nation takes the form of extended affirming of the consequent arguments, affirming or not affirming the antecedent conditional arguments. The antecedent conditional is placed in the form a covering law. It leaves little scope for ‘functional equivalents’, and does not properly define the terms, and assumes antecedents without empirical examination of facts.

In essence, they all are of similar nature, and can be subsumed under two aforesaid categories. A scientific explanation includes a set of laws or generalisations in the premises. As they cover the situation or event to be explained, these are called ‘covering laws’. Explanations that use covering laws are called ‘covering law explanations’ or nomological explanations.

They appear in two forms: deductive and inductive.

Deductive explanation is very powerful because it makes use of a valid form of deductive argumentation where the explanandum must be true if the explanans are true. Both individual and general events can be explained with certainty as the covering laws and the initial or given conditions are true. But such explanations have limited applicability to political and other social sciences.

In Political Science we do not have universal covering laws. Understanding of deductive explanation helps us to understand even inductive explanation because of their similarity in a number of respects. However, political scientists cannot give up the search for universal gener­alisations or covering laws.

In some areas deductive explanations have been evolved and achieved. Analysis of deductive explanations is necessary because of their employment by ideologues and spokesmen of various causes, interests, and power-patterns. Analysts should remain ready to challenge validity as well as truth of deductive arguments and explanations.

Inductive explanations, like deductive explanations, also have explanandum and explanans. Political Science abounds in inductive expla­nations which contain statistical generalisations in their explanans. Explanandum, ther
efore, cannot be deduced from the explanans with certainty. The explanandum is generally probable. It is implied by the explanans.

The explanans confer support or evidence for explanandum but does not make the latter certain. The explanans can be true and the explanandum can still be false in inductive explanation. Inductive explana­tions explain either the probability of individual events or statistical generalisations.

Major difference between deductive and inductive explanations is that one negative event can falsify a deductive explanation, but one negative event cannot falsify an inductive generalisation. Deductive explanations usually employ universal generalisations. Only some negative mass events or a high frequency of negative events can falsify inductive explanation.

It may be pointed out that explanations both in social and natural sciences are rarely presented in formal or standard logical form. Generalisa­tions and initial conditions are not explicitly specified. In most cases, they are either assumed or treated as implied or understood. Demand of readability too compels scholars to do away with formal forms.

Many expla­nations presented in paragraph style conceal unspecified and untested generalisations or initial conditions. They can be reconstructed in proper manner and presented systematically exposing their logical errors and limitations. On the basis of degrees of explanatory completeness, there can be (a) complete, (b) elliptic, (c) partial, and (d) sketchy explanations.

In complete explanation all relevant generalisations and initial condi­tions are completely known and completely specified. But in Political Science, such explanations remain as ‘ideals’. In elliptic explanations, all the generalisations and initial conditions are known but all of them are not specified. The scholar assumes that the reader already knows them all and does not mention. But this omission is harmless and can be recouped easily. In the partial explanations all the relevant generalisations and initial condi­tions are not known. Only the known ones are specified.

As the relevant generalisations and facts or conditions are not given, the claimed explanandum cannot be deduced from the explanans. In other words, the explanandum appears to claim more than what appears in the explanans. The sketchy explanations or Explanation Sketches do not contain all relevant generalisations and conditions. Arguments are advanced on the basis of some hypotheses or stray incidents or conditions. Explanatory completeness is negligible in them.

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Almond has divided the seven functional requisites into two broad categories:

(a) Inputs, and

(b) Outputs.

Both have functional sub-divisions in the following manner (see diagram).

(a) Input Functions:

(i) Political socialisation and recruitment

(ii) Interest articulation

(iii) Interest aggregation

(iv) Political communication

(b) Output Functions:

(v) Rule-making

(vi) Rule application

(vii) Rule adjudication

In the context of developing areas, Almond finds greater role of input functions. They are also called by him as ‘political’ functions, and are mostly performed by non-governmental structures, relating to society, culture, and others. But they are not performed in a specialised, recognised, and orderly manner. Output or ‘governmental’ functions are performed by govern­mental structures.

Consequences or effects of the operations of these functions-inputs and outputs can prove eu-functional or dys-functional to the system. Their performance may lead toward the maintenance of equilibrium or cause maladjustment or decay. In the latter eventuality, functions operate in a particular, specific, ascribed, affective and self-oriented manner. Agrarian societies described by W.F. Riggs contain all such traits. In Western societies formal structures are more differentiated, effective, and powerful, than informal or primary structures, whereas reverse order is found in non-Western societies. However, such arrangement is rarely available in ‘pure’ form.

(a) Input Functions:

(i) Political socialisation and recruitment:

Political socialisation is the process of ‘induction into the political culture’. Members of the system inculcate values, goals, norms and attitudes pertaining to the political system. Political socialisation can be undertaken in manifest or latent manner, and can be universalistic or specific. There can be some specialised or differentiated structures for this purpose. It can be left to chance or to voluntary agencies. It can be planned leading to accelerated pace of devel­opment and efficiency, as in case of former USSR, China, and other countries. India presents the ‘mixed’ pattern, partly planned and partly voluntary.

The main agencies of socialisation with varying forms and effects are: family, school, church, peer-groups, work-groups, office, service associa­tions, political parties, governmental structures, media etc. All tend to prepare individuals for appropriate roles. These roles interact, and make up the political system. Socialisation expands the cognitive maps of individuals and groups, and can be drawn out and measured to a certain extent.

This can be done on the basis of measuring one’s responses, reactions, and behaviour. In view of its impact on the present and future course of system, it becomes important to know who controls the socialisation process and with what purpose. It may aim at maintaining the status quo (as in Pakistan and Bangladesh), development (in India), revolutionary change (in Cuba), or military grandeur (in China).

Obviously, except in a democracy, the ruling elite controls the form and content of socialisation. But at the family level, it is latent, informal, and affective. Later, it becomes manifest, formal, and intellectual. One can study it from many angles, of form, content, style, impact, scope, and volume.

It is political socialisation which determines the form of political recruitment. It decides who would take up what roles. Some of the people, by law or otherwise, may be debarred from undertaking particular political roles. Recruiting individuals to appropriate political roles bears a direct relationship with the maintenance of a political system.

(ii) Interest Articulation:

Interest articulation determines the boundary-lines of a political system. It is the process of joining issues and problems, or making of common interest among small scattered groups. What interests would enter the political system is conditioned by its political socialisation, which, again, is controlled and directed by the political culture. The demand of establishing an agricultural university or an industry may not become the ‘political interest’ of a populace. In a different context, many people may not be ready to accept that demand as their political interest.

Articulation of interest can take place by and through many structures:

(i) Institutions, e.g., legislature, services, army, etc.

(ii) Non-institutional interest groups, e.g., tribes, racial groups, priests, community, etc.

(iii) Anomic-interest groups, e.g., spontaneous rioting, demonstrations, etc.

(iv) Associational -groups, e.g., civic, cultural, and other commercial associ­ations, trade unions, etc.

Interest articulation maintains the boundary-line between society and the political system. Anti-equilibrium style of functions, according to Parsons, tends to be particularistic, specific, affective, and self-oriented.

(iii) Interest aggregation:

A political system can cope with innumerable interest or diversities if they again are aggregated or grouped at higher levels. Various interests, demands, pressures, wants, etc., have to be combined and expressed in the form of broad policy decisions. Aggre­gation can be realised in two forms (a) by accommodating various interests into wider policies, and (b) by recruiting persons belonging to various particular interests into the decision-making body.

Interest aggregation enables the system to operate in a simplified, acceptable, responsive, accountable, and efficient manner. It becomes easy for it to jump from input to output stage. Aggregation makes it possible to act in a measurable and calculated way. However, distinction between interest articulation and interest aggregation is subtle and flexible. Sometimes, the ministers in a coalition cabinet, begin to act and perform articulation functions. In tribal, traditional, and developing societies, some of the functional categories are and often get mixed up.

Structures specialised to perform aggregation-functions are political parties, council of ministers, bureaucracy, national convention, etc. The political parties are particularly suitable to do this job. They can be classified on the basis of (i) type of organisation, and (ii) style. From the viewpoint of organisation the political parties can be (a) authoritarian, (b) dominant non-authoritarian, (c) competitive bi-party system, and (d) competitive multi-party system.

Their style can make them (a) secular, pragmatic or bargaining; (b) absolute-value oriented or ideological; (c) particularistic, and, (d) traditional. In fact, they can be further sub-divided in many other ways. Aggregation of multiplicity or myriad of interests by political parties generates effective control by the system over groups, bureaucracy, and other associations. Their demands can be selectively met and channelised.

(iv) Political communication:

Communication is the medium through which all other functions are performed. Almond equates it to circulation of blood in human body. Its scope and form is wider than conventional terms like public opinion, mass media, press, etc. It is sharing of ideas, infor­mation, and values by various means, and expressions thereof. Communication when revolves around ‘legitimate physical compulsion’ takes the form of political communication. It performs the function of boundary-maintenance by deciding on the issues as political or non-po
litical. Political communication interconnects society and polity directly and through feedback, and saves the latter from man-made calam­ities.

Communication ferets out the secrets or underworld happenings to come into the open, making the latent manifest. If communication system has specialised structures, and operates in an autonomous and neutral manner, it can compel other functions to confine themselves in their specific spheres. If it has evolved its own vocational ethics, it may not allow aggregation-structures to dabble in articulation-functions, and vice versa. That way, though it is one of the seven functional requisites, yet it becomes a ‘regulator of regulators’, by disallowing structures to transgress their boundaries.

But communication itself can prove obstructive to the maintenance of a political system. It is always necessary to find out the decontrolling of the communication system. They can be money-bags, ruling elites, press lords, and dictators. In closed systems, minds are moulded by these elements, and communication transforms into propaganda, indoctrination, or interest articulation, for a group or clique. Every form of non-official communication is forbidden by law. In open or democratic societies, communication, to a large extent, remains free. Its structures are multi-dimensional, neutral and their functioning is smooth, speedy, flexible, and expanding. Open commu­nication system strengthens inputs of the system towards equilibrium.

However, as a process, it can be studied and compared on the basis of:

(a) homogeneity, (b) mobility, (c) volume, (d) cost, and (e) direction. It can also be related to levels of education, literacy, language, class, caste, and values. In such analysis, roles of interpreters, analysts, spokesmen, and intellectuals cannot be neglected.

(b) Output Functions:

Almond has analysed input functions in detail owing to their dominating role in the developing countries. They have also been called political functions. The political system converts them into outputs. Because of their transformation through formally recognised mechanisms. They have also been designated as ‘governmental functions’. Though they have been classified into three in a traditional manner, yet he separates them analyti­cally from traditional structures, namely, legislature, executive, and judiciary. The three outputs – rule-making, rule applications and rule adjudication – are functions which can be performed by any formal or informal structures. As their content-part is widely known.

(v) Rule-making:

The concept of ‘rule’ is broader than ‘law”. Interests after being articulated and aggregated have to be given formal recognition, and legitimate expression. In ancient times, it was divinely ordained or oracled through some godly person, priest, or saint. Religion and religious persons expanded it further. As the people had faith in them and their divine origin and destination, they accepted and obeyed them almost unthinkingly. Traditions, taboos, usages etc. along with divine laws left little room for ‘rule-making’ by man. Later, kings and lords, took over this function.

With the rise of democracy and expansion of state activities, specific structures like legislature, legislative committees, executive, higher bureaucracy and judiciary began to perform this job, i.e., rule-making by man. Rule-making too has two levels – higher, and ordinary. At the higher or governing level, there is superior law or Constitution or unwritten rule of law embodying the basic elements of values and culture. The lower house, which is directly elected by the people on the basis of adult franchise legislates ordinary laws.

All laws or rules actually represent human interests, which operate through political parties, pressure or interest-groups, elite, and other vested interests. Functions performed by some of them may go against the mainte­nance of a political system, as in case of committed party leaders or money-bags, who operate through costly election system in India and other such countries. Rule-making formalises the accepted part of the demands or claims made by the people through their representatives. At times, rule-making or its specific part can be dysfunctional or non-functional.

(vi) Rule application:

After making of rules, or formal recognition of the will or interests of the people, the next category of functional requisites is ‘rule application’. It is putting of rules into actual practice. In modern times, it is the biggest part of outputs. In olden times, most of these functions were performed by society or community, and various religious bodies. Functions left with the political system were performed by army or aristocracy. Citizens or subjects themselves were responsible for many operations.

With the increasing role of the political system, more and more functions are made over to it. It requires specialised and expanded struc­tures to deal with the situation. State’s monopoly over coercive power appears in the form of rise of bureaucracy. Originally it was a sub-structure, but, later on, has became a formidable autonomous structure or system. Its functioning requires an independent study.

To what extent is it carrying out the rules or wishes of the people in practice? Does it serve the purpose for which it was instituted and developed? Does it have its own interests and purposes to serve? Rules, it may be noted, unless implemented faithfully can cause much frustration and decay in the system.

(vii) Rule adjudication:

Rule application functions broadly apply rules or will of the people equally to all in equal situations. But there can be individual or specific situations wherein it is difficult to apply or if applied, it can cause injustice or grevious injury to some persons. Such difficult situa­tions require specialised functioning by expert, experienced, intelligent, neutral, and independent structures. Apart from individual cases non-application or improper application of rules, it has to be observed and analysed whether other functions – both inputs and outputs – are operating in accordance with the basic rules formulated and accepted by the political system.

It is necessary that rule adjudication structures – courts, tribunals, popularly selected judicial bodies etc. – remain free from the influence of other structures, and are able to do their job well. Their function is to keep structures and sub-structures within the given confines, and see that the system operates on expected lines. However, functioning of the rule adjudi­cation structures itself is hypothetical, and can prove dysfunctional to equilibrium of the system, on account of its incapacity, favouritism, inexpe­rience, cost, delay, lengthy procedure, and non-implementation of their decision.

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Theoretical Contribution:

Easton has developed his systems theory as a conceptual framework for empirical political analysis. His approach, as such can be considered as a brainchild of behavioural revolution. It can be regarded as a blueprint for developing an empirical political theory. His input-output analysis presents a flow model of political system. He goes beyond stability and equilibrium as goals of political systems and finds them as dynamic systems capable of coping with not only the stresses and crises arising from the environment, but to transform even itself and the goals themselves.

He looks not only into the system, but also other systems and subsystems, and the totality of environment. As his ‘theory’ is analytical or conceptual, it is not attached to any particular ideology, system or culture. The ‘Systems theory’ gives a complete set of categories which can be utilised for the analysis of any particular system as well as for making comparative; study of political systems.

Easton, in order to develop a general theory of political life takes up the basic unit of ‘interaction’, and sees persistence as the goal of a political system. The latter is an interaction system, conceptually devised by a scholar. It is separate from actual or concrete system.

So is ‘political’ analyti­cally separate from ‘non-political’. Oran Young regards it as ‘the most inclusive systemic approach so far constructed specifically for political analysis by a political scientist’. Meehan also considers it as ‘one of the few comprehensive attempts to lay the foundation for systems-analysis in political science and provide a ‘general’ functional theory of politics’.

The approach is particularly useful for analysis of political life and its process. It is different from other systems in the sense that a political system has its own dynamism and its operations are purposive and goal-directed. Each segment of a political system is susceptible to its own special types of stress and maintenance-difficulties which are counter balanced by the typical regulatory mechanisms peculiar to that segment. It is based on a combination of deductively derived categories and generally accepted empirical material.

However, the theory has had a promising future in the field of interna­tional relations, international politics, regional associations and unions, world-systems and the like. Kaplan has used Systems Approach with mechanical and engineering perspectives.

He has proposed structures of six global or international systems:

(1) Balance of Power System;

(2) Loose Bipolar System;

(3) Tight Bipolar System;

(4) Universal International System;

(5) Hierarchical International System; and

(6) Unit Veto Interna­tional System.

He could empirically test only the first two till the seventies. With the spread of LPG (Liberalisation, Privatisation and Globalisation) and global economic reforms, time has come when scholars can make use of even General Systems Theory on empirical grounds.

Criticism:

Easton’s ‘systems theory’ is not a ‘theory’, and lacks explanatory power. He intended to develop such a theory and made a start, but remained at where he was. Even in 1965, he could not produce a general theory of politics. His theory is unable to deal with fundamental, basic or revolutionary changes, such as, revolutions, growth, decline, disruptions, breakdowns, etc. His political system is confined to deal with variables which seek persistence and remain within ‘the critical range’.

It has various mechanisms to cope with stresses, like overload, lag, and others, at the most marginal or incre­mental changes. His approach is more interested in systems maintenance, and has little material to go beyond its persistence. His approach has no room for problems concerning power, the elite, leadership, mass politics, representation, etc. As input-output analysis has not been put to empirical investigation, actual utility of the approach cannot be anticipated beforehand. It has not generated any general political theory which Easton has wished to obtain. His concept of ‘persistence’ also does not appear to be logical or inclusive.

In fact, he mixes the two aspects of ‘political system’, as an analytical concept, and, as a membership system. He could not stick to his original conceptual scheme. While elaborating his system’s analysis, he has before him a concrete national system, though he tries to use it in abstract sense.

Even while taking up the problem of ‘allocation of values’, he left the distributive aspects like who gets, what, when, and how? He does not discuss the problems of attaining and retaining the values. In fact, concrete entities like persons, groups, roles, etc. find a secondary or no place in his scheme of analysis. He has neglected actual political facts for an abstract scheme of political analysis which suffers from reification, rationalism and formalism.

His categories of concepts of a certain extent have distorted the reality of politics. Easton has not been very successful in separating political system from non-political systems. He could not explain how allocation of values m a club or a firm is separate from that of a political system. He is vague about the meaning and scope of the term ‘political’. It is difficult to understand how, after standing for persistence of political systems, it is possible to develop a general theory of political life.

Political interactions are not restricted to the allocation of values and their implementation for the society. His attempt to narrow down the political system to ‘roles and inter­actions relevant to the authoritative allocations for society as a whole’ is simply and empirically not true.

Easton, like other functionalists, has committed the error of using members and their behaviour in a concrete political system for abstract political interactions. He proceeds on the basis of some self-made defini­tions which are related to each other. In consequence, he has a conceptual framework from which he wanted to get empirical relevance of a high order; this has resulted into an abstract structure which, according to Meehan, is logically suspect, conceptually fuzzy, and empirically almost useless. His approach according to Hannah Arendt is Archimedean wherein one thinks everything ‘in terms of processes’ and is not concerned with single entities.

Paul Kress, Runciman, Gvishiani, etc. have severely criticised Easton’s conceptual framework. According to Kress, Easton’s analysis lacks empirical basis, and is empty of facts. Runciman regards it as a shield against Maraan analysis to protect western capitalist society. Gvishiani regards it a symbol of bourgeois attitudes to maintain the status quo.

Easton is not interested in knowing the impact of a political system ‘on individuals who constitute the system’.” In his claim to move from the insti­tutional to the behavioural approach, he, because of his interest in the ‘interactions’, really hangs somewhere between the two. He has dissolved the traditional political action in the acid of interaction,” ‘men are without qualities, lacking all essentials, and remain as containers’. Kress describes Easton’s theory as ‘an empty vision of polities’.

Implication for the Third World:

Easton’s system theory, though not an empirical political theory, provides a useful conceptual framework to analyse, understand, and compare politics of the Third World countries. It gives them a systemic perspective to know their environment and relationship with other inter and intra systems. Mostly these countries are passing through a transition, and are not interested in maintaining the status quo.

They have certain goals, which they want to realise without confronting major crises, conflicts, or breakdowns. Rulers are relatively new to politics, and have limi
ted knowledge of under­standing the forces underlying the political system. Concepts like feedback, output, and support can prove very fruitful to them. Equilibrium approach, obviously, could not serve the purpose.

Systems approach enables them to know the sources of stress, and finds the way to remove them. It makes necessary that the rulers get some minimum support at all the three levels. It permits them to modify their internal structures, and other regulatory mechanisms to achieve desired goals which too may be reformulated to cope with the prevailing environment.

Still it is useful for them to a limited extent only. Some of the devel­oping countries are interested in bringing about major political changes: social, economic, cultural, and political. They even prefer radical changes. For them, persistence is not enough. The countries look for basic and fast structural changes, though they do not know the direction. There is internal turmoil and conflict, even violent struggle between various segments of society.

Some of them are not so ‘open’ and ‘adaptive’ political systems. Political power is confined to the elite – traditional or modern. The elite sometimes fear that ‘if they loosen their hold over the power-structure more backward and conservative forces may take over the system. Even their administrative system is in the making. With a backward economy, the people are unpre­pared to live with the prevailing socio-economic structure.

Moreover, Easton’s theory is not an empirical theory, and hence unable to generate confidence, guidance and support to the ruling elite to deal with actual politics. It is merely a conceptual framework for doing research and analysis. That too is born of the experience of advanced countries like the USA. The elites play a critical role which finds no place in his systems approach. There is neither consensus on available scarce values, nor on their acceptable or binding allocations, nor on their proper implementation.

Sometimes, para-political systems or subsystems appear to be more powerful than the political system. When the environment to them appears more compelling than their own political system, what sort of help or expla­nation can Easton’s theory render to them? Often the problem for them is to find out ways and means to adjust under the umbrella of a super political system, yet claim survival and independence. Obviously, Easton’s systems theory has a limited and restricted capacity to speak on their problems. But it certainly paves way to them for making their own political theory.

In recent years Easton has turned to structural constraints as a second major element underlying political systems. He has recently completed a book about the influence of political structure on various aspects of political life. He has also been associated with a project inquiring into the effects that variations in the structure and organisation of democratic political systems have on the effectiveness of their public policies.

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Like facts and values, theory and facts also have a closer relationship. As in case of values, facts are the basic raw material of theory. Kant’s famous adage may be rephrased as, ‘fact without theory is blind theory without fact is empty’. In fact, there exists a continuous relationship between facts and theory, popularly known as ‘theory-data-continuum’. If theory is vital to every scientific advancement facts are the building blocks of every science. Both remain in constant interaction. Development in facts leads to devel­opment in theory, and vice versa.

In fact, the researcher perceives the concerned or relevant aspects, properties or relations in an event or activity. Fact, as stated earlier, is a purposeful relevant observation. From the observation of similar facts, he goes to the foundation of concepts. A concept is a shorthand representation of a variety of facts. It is an abstraction formed by generalisation from particulars. It is a generalised term for a class of objects. As such, it helps in classification and measurement of facts.

As a set of directions, or abstraction of certain properties or relation, it directs the researcher to pick out a particular kind of experience. After having classification of facts on the basis of concepts, the researcher analyses the various categories and discovers interrelation among them. From analysis, he goes to the stage of generali­sation – making a general statement applicable to a large number of facts – both observed and unobserved. A good number of interconnected generali­sations make up a theory.

A theory is facts assembled, put in an order, and seen in a relevant relationship. After coming to the stage of generalisation, one takes a jump or makes theoretical thrust and speaks for the similar, but hitherto unobserved, facts and events.

In a scientific venture, facts, concepts, generalisation, and theory should be based on empirical experience. When we go upwards from fact to theory, we move from validity to generality. Both rarely go together. As we go higher towards generality, which means speaking for a larger number of facts, we gradually lose validity or closeness to all actual empirical facts. Quantum of validity in factual statements differs in proportion to closeness to empirical facts. Scientific method keeps us close to observation of political facts. Theoretical movement takes us higher to generality of facts, but away from validity of observation.

Theory simply means the putting up of the relevant facts under the umbrella of some relation, property or abstraction. This is done on the basis of actual observation of some facts which enables the researcher to include other unobserved facts. For this, he uses the tools of concepts and generalisations. However, the whole structure has to stand on the foundation stone of empirical observation or validity of facts.

On the basis of validation or validity, theoretical statements can be put at four levels:

(1) Factual statements:

These are based on hundred per cent empirical evidence. Being observable, they are fully reliable.

(2) Probabilistic statements:

These are based on empirical evidence, but are applied on similar objects or events. They are hypothetically applied to all of them, and are accepted as true till proved false. They lack cent per cent validity, but mostly are regarded as empirical.

(3) Hypothetical statements:

Here we guess about facts. They are based on the interrelation of various variables which become a basis to prove them empirically. They help us in knowing the relationship between the change in one variable and the change in another variable. Lesser the ambiguity in the interrelation of variables, greater the precision. The mutual relationship makes hypothetical statements more fruitful and valid.

(4) Theoretical statements:

This is the highest stage of theoretical movement made on the road to validity. At this level, all facts, probable and hypothetical statements are woven into a widening relationship. The theoretical structure at this level is more general and universal than the lower three. However, each higher level tends to lose more and more validity.

In the diagram below as the scholar rises higher towards the theoretical top, his knowledge about the facts gets more and more generalised. The area of his knowledge enlarges, but validity dilutes. As given therein, at the lowest factual level, if generality is 25°, validity is 100°. At the next higher probabilistic level, generality is increased 50°, but validity goes low to 75°, and so on so forth.

To illustrate, if a vigilant citizen knows all the members of his ward, his knowledge about the ward can be counted valid up to 100 per cent. But his generality at higher level remains limited to a few hundred persons only, and validity about the people of his ward is not cent per cent. His factual knowledge, if applied to members of other wards, would only be probabilistic, with increased generality and reduced validity. If he applies the knowledge of the results of his municipal council to the elections of other local bodies, such an attempt can roughly be called as the use of his hypothetical knowledge.

In that case, generality will further be increased, but validity may go to a lowest ebb. ‘If there is heavy polling in those elections, the opposition will be benefited’ – can be a useful hypothetical statement. If more hypothetical statements are transformed into generalisa­tions after empirical observations, and weared into a set or cluster, the latter will reach the level of a theory. Its validity will further be reduced.

All these levels of statements or knowledge are somehow related to or based on facts. A structure of knowledge originates from simple factual statements and ends in abstract and general statements. All such statements or generation of knowledge presents ‘theory-data-continuum’.

At the highest level of knowledge or theory, one is able to generate many new hypotheses, and predict unobserved but probable and important facts of political life. Without a higher and more abstract set of concepts and gener­alisations, one cannot know much about political facts and processes. A theorist cannot stand without a collection of empirical facts.

In all situations, knowledge of a political theorist is based on obser­vation of facts, and their analysis in terms of scientific method. One has to constantly shuttle from facts to theory and theory to facts. But one may stop at the level of facts, their observation or analysis only. He is a political scientist, and not a theorist. He may even go a little beyond the facts and make some statements. Even this attempt does not amount to a theory.

A theory emerges in the form of interrelated concepts and generalisations under a certain scheme. A theorist refers to relationship between facts by ordering them in some meaningful way. Each theory has to go beyond facts and events. Thus, a theorist has necessarily to be a scientist, but the two roles can separately be taken up by two sets of scholars.

However, knowledge of facts can tell a lot about their ‘what’, ‘how’, ‘when’, ‘where’ etc., but remains empirically unable to speak on its ‘why’. The understanding of ‘why relates to values. If ultimate values or ideas about them are known or shown, the researcher can scientifically study the lower level or secondary values also. As political facts are deeply involved with facts, a the
orist has to know a lot about meaning and implication of various values also.

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It may be pointed out that the concept of ‘political technology’ is different from many other forms of politics, which often are long or short-term, legal, ephemeral, specific, secretive and vague like strategy, policy, diplomacy, manipulation, technique, appeal, and other several similar expressions.

They may, however, be observed as various forms of ‘political technologies’ in making. Future research on them will encompass both an evolving philosophy and a range of techniques. Its primary objective will be to assist decision makers to understand better the potential consequences of present Social Sciences. This concept has to be expanded further.’

The proposed concept of ‘political technology’ is made of two terms, viz., ‘technology’ and ‘polities’. Politics usually is the art or science of government or governing, especially the governing of a political entity, such as a nation, and the administration and control of its internal and external affairs. It includes the activities or affairs engaged in by a government, politician, or political party and also the methods or tactics involved in managing a state or government.

In a broad liberal-moderate way, politics also is the regulation and government of a nation or state. It also means the preservation of its safety, peace, and prosperity, the defense of its existence and rights against foreign control or conquest, the augmentation of its strength and resources, and the protection of its citizens in their rights, with the preservation and improvement of their morals. Pejoratively, it also means intrigue or manoeuvring within a political unit or a group in order to gain control or power, often internally conflicting interrelationships among people in a society.

Politics, in its non-pejorative sense, is a specific kind of activity concerning ‘Who gets, What, When and How?’ It pertains to power, influence, and control or activities relating to governing of man by man. When broadly viewed, it is an ensemble of certain types of activities within, and related to a political system, including the environment in which the latter operates.

The concept of ‘Political technology’ directly relates to politics wherein power is generated and employed to gain rewards, and through which the interests of broad segments of population are affected. ‘Technology’, in human terms, is a relational activity including interpersonal relationships to realize certain goals and values. It is knowledge and a pattern of activities used to manipulate physical environment in order to achieve desired practical ends.

It is generally used in some rational, settled and dispas­sionate manner. Political technology means mastery and utilisation of the art of politics for directing political operations and manipulating political methods. It implies systematic application of knowledge to practical tasks. But political technology, as such, is different from ‘technique’, which is a personal skill. It is a method of doing something expertly for realising a given end. Techniques are learned, and require the acquisition of specialised skills.

Political technology concerns political goals and values, related to power relationships and/or deals with specific forms of interpersonal activ­ities relating to politics. On the basis of past and present experience, and in view of changing goals and objectives, it prepares and applies new patterns of relationships or triggers off appropriate sets of activities. It involves inter­est-relationship between two or more ends of political actors or groups.

Conceptually, at its bare minimum, each political relationship has one end, on the left hand, and the other end, on the right hand. As a cluster of inter­est-relationship, it can also have many ends or hands. Interest-relationship connects one with the other. This relationship can be concrete or abstract. It may appear in the form of human, moral or material interests.

A wider concept of political technology involves three types of relationships. One is the player or actor, second is that which is played or acted upon, and the third is the connection or relation emerging out of the two. When there are three ends or hands in a political relationship, the third one can be called as the connecting or interpersonal relationship, bond, link or engagement operating in a cluster of interrelationship.

The person or the user, who has the need of having a political technology, can be seen as the client, operator, customer, player, receiver, and political leader or simply as an activist. However, for all of these persons, the term ‘political leader’ (PL) has been used here.

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