Category: Political Science Notes

State sovereignty is like a living organism; it casts off its meanings as it evolves in response to the demands of global governance. In simple terms, sovereignty can be described as a principle that legitimises internal political organisation and serves as a mechanism for enhancing international order. It is, therefore, linked to both internal and global governance.

Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber have argued, state sovereignty is ‘a political entity’s externally recognised right to exercise final authority over its affairs’. With regard to internal political control, sovereignty revolves around population, territory and recognised authority. To this Alan James has added a constitutional dimension, claiming that ‘sovereign states are those territorially-based entities which are independent in terms of their constitu­tional arrangements’.

The present author makes a distinction between three types of sover­eignty. The first is external or juridical sovereignty, which is based on the notion that theoretically ‘the state has over it no other authority than that of international law’. The second is internal or empirical sovereignty, which is based on the view that states have the right (and capacity) to control the people, resources and institutions within their territories.

The third is individual or popular sovereignty, which is predicated on the claim that all people are entitled to fundamental freedoms and that states exercise control over them only with their consent. Empirical sovereignty and juridical sovereignty accord states rights and responsibilities that other no interna­tional actors do have.

The concept of global governance implicitly questions some under­standings of sovereignty because it is based on the assumption that states and non-state actors are partners in the management of global affairs. Realists, who claim that states are the most important international actors, would regard global governance as a diminution of sovereignty. The realist view of sovereignty is that theoretically each state is free to pursue its domestic and external affairs without outside interference.

Hence there appeared Hans Morgenthau’s definition of sovereignty as ‘a centralised power that exercised its law-making and law-enforcing authority within a certain territory’. On the other hand, liberals, who subscribe to the view that transnational forces play important roles in world politics, regard global governance as a necessary process of addressing anarchy in the absence of central authority.

Liberals believe that sovereignty gives states the right to exercise control within their territories, but that this control is to be exercised with some degree of consent and legitimacy from society. For this reason, liberals associate empirical sovereignty with popular sovereignty. Constructivists, who consider sovereignty to be socially constructed, regard global governance as a part of the social construction and reconstruction of international society.

The assumptions that underpin sovereignty date back to the Peace of Westphalia, which inaugurated a new ‘international’ legal order for Europe. The Westphalian regime, which brought about a break from the previous religious order, is best remembered for making the territorial state the cornerstone of the modern international system. Since then, the devel­opment and reinterpretation of sovereignty has closely mirrored the evolution of the state and the prevailing norms of global governance. However, sovereignty has not always been honoured.

In Europe, sovereignty was occasionally subverted with a view to maintaining the balance of power. This is partly why Stephen Krasner has claimed that breaches ‘to the Westphalian model have been an enduring characteristic of the interna­tional environment’. Krasner has more recently written of sovereignty as ‘organised hypocrisy’. Others have suggested that sovereignty can be under­stood only with reference to particular historical periods. Sovereignty has undergone various transformations in accordance with the prevailing norms of global governance.

Whenever serious crises undermine the legitimising principles of sovereignty, new norms are negotiated, and these norms often reflect the preferences of the hegemonic states. It is the processes of negoti­ating the rules for sovereignty which Biersteker and Weber had in mind when they argued that sovereignty was socially constructed. They posited that it is ‘the practices of states and non-state agents [that] produce reform and redefine sovereignty and its constitutive elements’.

In such social inter­actions, all participants help, in varying degrees, to shape, and are also shaped by, the structure of the system. A global structure that is charac­terised by power politics and secret diplomacy is likely to favour the notion that sovereignty resides with governments. However, a global order, which is committed to the promotion of democracy and human rights, would favour popular sovereignty. Thus, it is the norms, values and institutions which underpin global governance that determine the nature of sovereignty.

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Robert A. Packenham observes that ‘political development’ has received varying attention at the hands of scholars. Upto 1965, it was treated as a ‘dependent’ variable. Political development, thus, was based on political modernisation (rationalisation, participation, and integration), and political democracy.

Various approaches use it as:

1. A function mainly of the legal-formal apparatus of government, prescribing features like equal protection of law, rule of law, election by secret ballot, separation of powers, etc.;

2. A function of a level of economic development;

3. A function of administrative capacity;

4. A function of a social system that facilitates popular participation at all levels and helps bridging over various diversities; and

5. A function of political culture reflecting fundamental attitudinal and personality characteristics among members of the political system.

However, these approaches did not study political development deeply and comprehensively. They could not weigh each other comparatively and free themselves from their normative notions. They also lacked data to prove their assumptions. They neglected variables like the will, skill and capacity of political development.

After 1965, political development was visualised as a continuous process, and not some fixed-end-state. Helpern defined it as ‘a persistent capacity for coping with a permanent revolution’. Various terms were used for this conceptualisation, such as, the will and capacity, problem-solving capacity, institutionalisation, ability to sustain new goals, etc. Scholars of post-1965 era treated it as an independent or intervening variable. Huntington is his article, ‘Political Development and Political Decay’ defined it as ‘the institutionalisation of political organisations and procedures.’

Almond and Powell explained it as, ‘the increased differentiation and specialisation of political structures and the increased secularisation of political culture.’ A political system is said to be developing, according to Diamant, ‘where there is an increase in its ability to sustain successfully and continuously new types of social goals and the creation of new types of organisation.’

Halpern observes it as the relationship between ‘the structural changes and demands set loose by uncontrolled force of transformation’ and ‘the will and capacity of political authority to cope with these changes and demands.’ Eisenstadt finds it as ‘an institutional framework capable of continuous absorption of change.’

This perspective also uses concepts like skill, capacity, etc., in imprecise manner. Huntington’s concept of ‘institutionalisation’ is also not very clear. Diamant, Eisenstadt and others have an overlap between definition and explanation. They arbitrarily treat it from independent to dependent or intervening variable.

Political development has some normative aspects also. Its goal is said to be ‘modernisation’ which has not been operationalised and explained properly. Scholars leave such aspects open to others. Statements like ‘the capacity to cope with changes’, ‘problems arising out of political develop­ment’, etc., are not properly explained.

Often they overlook short-range aspects in favour of long-range aspects. Western scholars generally regard cost of violent revolution more than cost of flow and piecemeal modernisation. Thus, in these studies of political development, various important aspects have been either neglected or over-emphasized.

However, political development, finally, can be explained as a generic process of successfully sustaining new demands, goals, and organisation in a flexible manner. In view of the developing countries, it also means meeting of particular goals and demands. In these countries, it is simultaneously a cause for other types of social changes.

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Everyone related with politics is interested in measuring his adversary’s political influence. Influence in politics largely depends on political sources and skill to use them. Political resource is a means by which one can influence the behaviour of other persons. For measuring influence, one can rely on Dahl’s notion that A influences B to the extent that he gets B to do something that B would not otherwise do. We can notionally measure A’s influence on B when the latter does x when A does not influence B. When A does influence, B does x₁. Thus, the influence of A on B would be x₁ – x. We can determine direction, volume, scope, weight and durational effect of a person’s influence under study. Dahl has suggested five ways of comparing influence.

They can be taken as the basis of measuring influence:

(1) The amount or extent of change occurred in the position of the actor influenced;

(2) Subjective psychological costs of the influences while complying with an order or undergoing a hardship;

(3) The amount of difference in the probability of compliance, especially when the influencer puts the influences under his act of influence;

(4) Difference in the nature and extent of responses. Some may respond in all general matters while others may react to specific stimuli; and

(5) The number of persons responding to the situation, act, or influence.

These steps are not at all foolproof. In order to arrive at better and reliable results one has to make use of maximum number of measures. The paradigm given by Dahl for comparison would make it more specific: … is more influential than … with respect to … as measured by… and… Rowe opines that influence owing to secrecy and other factors can rarely be measured.

It can only be approximately assessed in terms of:

(a) Extent,

(b) Duration,

(c) Certainty, and,

(d) Fecundity.

The last relates to policy-sustaining effects. He rightly observes that political influence is unevenly shared. It is a fact of life. But this unevenness is ever-changing. None can peacefully sleep over with what one has at a particular point of time. Though a small minority rules over a particular system, yet its influence continues to change over time. Fortunately, computers and automation have come to their rescue.

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Almond and Powell have shown the possibility of comparing political systems at three levels: (a) maintenance and adaptation, (b) conversion, and, (c) capability – and their patterns of relationship among the three levels of functions. The concept of political development, according to Almond and Powell, involves these levels of functions.

However, their comparison scheme dwells upon three major criteria: (i) structural differentiation or multi-functionality; (ii) secularisation; and (iii) the stage of political development. The first two relate to the basic concepts of ‘structure’ and ‘political culture’. The third is the interrela­tionship among the three levels of analysis. The theory of political systems consists of ‘the discovery of the relations among these different levels of functions, and of the relation of the functions at each level.

Political development denotes some significant changes in the size and substance of the flow of inputs into a political system. It results in further structural differentiation and cultural secularisation. There are many problems or challenges which lead to changes in the size and substance of the flow of inputs, and put the system or its structure and culture under stress.

The problems or challenges have been broadly categorised as:

1. The problem of state building:

When the political system fails to ‘pene­trate’ the society, the political elite create new structures and organisation to regulate behaviour and extract resources from the system. It is generally associated with the development of a centralised and effective bureaucracy and other structures. It takes much time and efforts to evolve appropriate state-mechanism and build structures there upon.

2. The problem of nation-building:

When the system lacks adequate development of attitudes of obedience and compliance in the population, the elite redirect socialisation and recruitment processes by which people transfer their devotion and loyalty from smaller tribes, villages, sects, caste, colour, etc., to larger central political system, It may be called as an enveloping we-feeling.

3. The problem of participation:

It arises when there is rapid increase in the volume and intensity of demands for a share in decision-making by various groups and levels in the society. Participation results in the making of political groups and factions, election, and legislative bodies. It calls for understanding these forces, political competence, and responsive attitudes, among the elites.

4. The problem of distribution:

It emerges when there is a sudden increase in the volume and intensity of demands for more distribution of resources or values among various segments of population. The system can face this challenge if it is able to extract more resources from its environment, and regulate the behaviour of demanding individuals and groups. At this juncture, its symbolic and responsive capabilities may come to its help. Distribution-problem subsumes all welfare functions.

A political scientist has to analyse the ways in which the system operates at three kinds of maintenance and adaptation, conversion, and capability to perform their functions. A study of these ways gives out certain patterns of challenges and responses, of political systems. Challenges and responses to them cause political development in political systems. Almond and Powell have studied, analysed, and compared various political systems prevailing from primitive age to modern era, and have prepared a typology of these patterns of political development.

They have done it by relating conversion process to capability functions. Their developmental classifi­cation of political systems leads to ‘a theory of political development’. The basis of various levels of development has been threefold – differentiation, autonomy, and secularisation.

In other words, political development means occurrence of more and more differentiation in structures, their operation in autonomous manner and rationality throughout the system. Almond has made these three variables as the basis of description, explanation, and prediction regarding the behaviour of political systems, and yet he regards his developmental approach as ‘probabilistic’.

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For historical reasons and a long tradition of conservatism, the normative thinkers have dominated the study of politics, pushing it to the domain of philosophy or poetry or literature. Its nomenclature ‘Political Science’ sounds misnomer. There is very little ‘science’ in it.

Rather the suffix ‘science’ unnecessarily compels some scholars to adopt means and methods of natural sciences all the time without caring for the nature of the data, meaning or objectives of political studies. The literature of political studies is replete with many of the ideas, concepts and theories which lag far behind the contemporary world of science and technology, particularly, globalisation and the new economic order.

The dichotomy and separation between two types of methodologies (empirical and trans-empirical) have so far kept them apart, making each other’s findings somewhat baseless, false and even misleading. Both of them have been claiming to accomplish what they should not methodologically claim to do. One cannot see any spiritual and mental phenomena without reference to concrete situations of human living, and empirical realities rarely exist without relation to human mind and spirit.

To make out methodological horizons wider and the discipline more reality-oriented, it would be appropriate if the nomenclature ‘Political Science’ is abandoned in preference to ‘Politicology’ or ‘Polilogy’. The new name may literally mean the same thing but it is likely to provide a new orientation and a wider coverage. The methodology of ‘Politicology’ or ‘Polilogy’ as suggested above would be better able to deal with all type of phenomena in terms of human experience, and make knowledge public, open and ‘inter-subjectively trans­missible’.

At the present level of methodological underdevelopment, it is quite difficult to explain a part of mental and spiritual phenomena relating to politics in empirical terms. The proposed politicological methodology would study reality as it exists. It would not negate,, nullify or distort, but would honestly try to accept their influence on human mind and behaviour. Conscientious researchers should now no more remain one-way recipients of tools, adequate or inadequate, from other disciplines.

The scholars in the past have been accepting and using them without questioning their basics, goals and utility. As such, their discipline has filled its store with a lot of deadwood, waste, rickety salvage, fossils and confusing hangovers during the last several decades. Any venture of research with this material is just groping in dark and leading others toward black holes.

They should widen their horizons and ascertain reality by resorting to intangible methodol­ogies. Transmissibility, reproducibility, verification and scientificity have to come after having substantial attainments. For this, scholars have to abandon their false egoism of calling their discipline as ‘science’ and avoid resorting to blind imitation.

Political Science as a discipline is intermeshed with all the four forms of reality. Study of politics should have means and methods to handle all these four levels of reality. Without applying methods appropriate to data, realistic knowledge cannot be generated. Methods of political studies must be compatible and vary with the nature of data. Lack of appropriate tools and techniques simply displays that the discipline falls short in adequate understanding of its own subject-matter.

Research results or knowledge of politics cannot be better than the methods and techniques by which they have been obtained. Without suitable methodological weaponry, the quest for knowledge may prove an abortive venture. On the road of having appro­priate tools and techniques of research, various forms of political phenomena can be studied in the following manner:

At the first tangible level, like any other social science, it has also a number of empirical methods of study and research. Politics is a worldly activity. It would make use of them. At the second level of invisibles or mental tangibles, there are many sophisticated tools and devices available which enable us to know them, and make that reality understandable. These mostly are borrowed from natural and social sciences.

At the third level of mental and emotional phenomena, there are methods of psychiatry, linguistic and content analysis, experiments, black box techniques and the like. These methods may enable it to comprehend the phenomena of power, authority, legitimacy, nationhood, democracy, participation, deference, autonomy and the like. However, their study in Political Science would be more problematic and heuristic than obtained in other social sciences.

At the fourth and final level, there are abstract phenomena like spirit, faith, feelings, emotions, and other mental categories such as memory, habit, commitment, allegiance and sacrifice. It should be accepted that the means and methods of understanding the spirit and domain of faith would be studied only by experienced scholars and enlightened researchers.

Till the categories of mental and spiritual phenomena remain in air or at mental level, and do not appear in the form of influence, power, organisation or group behaviour, they would be comprehended by scholars through empathy, introspection, analogy and meditation.

Many times, people at large happen to act upon them when these phenomena are spelled out to them even on the basis of individual or divine experience of some highly respected or charismatic personalities. Scholars have to know and commu­nicate all such mental and/or spiritual phenomena in an authentic manner. Till these come down to them in concrete form, they merely remain as potentials of politics.

When the impact of these mental or spiritual categories appears on human mind, behaviour and relationships among men and groups, their study falls within the purview of empirical and socio-psychological methodology. Till these non-tangible materials of politics do not come down to the social scientists in an earthly manner, or become somewhat suscep­tible in some form to their sensory perception, they have the choice of making use of the techniques of hunch, analysis and interpretation. The latter techniques stand in between empirical methodology and devices like empathy and introspection.

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Behaviouralism is something clear and distinct from ‘behaviourism’, which is a concept of a school of psychology originating with J.B. Watson, later vigorously revived by B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) in his Beyond Freedom and Dignity, 1971. Early behaviourists aimed at eliminating all subjective data, such as values, intentions, desires, etc.; from research on human behaviour, and studied on the patterns of Physics and Biology.

They analysed relationship between Stimulus (S) and Response (R) in human organism, which was regarded as a black box. Nothing was known about the black box. Later on, psychologists realised the role of subjective entities and experi­ences, and included Organism (man – O), reforming their paradigm as S-O-R. Skinner reiterates behaviouristic position that all psychological functions can be explained in terms of muscular reactions and glandular secretions, and nothing more.

It is, therefore, the objective study of the stimulus and response aspects of behaviour. Man can ensure a safe future by controlling his behaviour redesigning the environment, for the environment controls man. Skinner has rejected the theory of ‘inner man’ or ‘autono­mous’ man who, in fact, man is a creature of environment, and behaves accordingly. ‘Choice’, ‘dignity’, ‘freedom’, etc., should be considered from the view of controlling environment.

Man can design or control his environment, and develop desirable patterns of behaviour. But Political Science can never neglect the importance of feelings, motivation, reason, choice, etc., and rather gives them the central place. Environment is important, but secondary to ‘essentials’ or essence of human personality. Therefore, behaviouralism, despite some methodological resemblance, remains totally different from behaviourism.

Behaviouralism should also not be equated with empiricism. Empiricism is wider than behaviouralism, and includes evidence of history, prevailing culture and personal inner experience. It is partly scientific, whereas behaviouralism emphasises on per cent, direct or indirect sensory experience, and subjects it to scientific method, and inter-subjective communicability.

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