Like facts and values, theory and facts also have a closer relationship. As in case of values, facts are the basic raw material of theory. Kant’s famous adage may be rephrased as, ‘fact without theory is blind theory without fact is empty’. In fact, there exists a continuous relationship between facts and theory, popularly known as ‘theory-data-continuum’. If theory is vital to every scientific advancement facts are the building blocks of every science. Both remain in constant interaction. Development in facts leads to development in theory, and vice versa.
In fact, the researcher perceives the concerned or relevant aspects, properties or relations in an event or activity. Fact, as stated earlier, is a purposeful relevant observation. From the observation of similar facts, he goes to the foundation of concepts. A concept is a shorthand representation of a variety of facts. It is an abstraction formed by generalisation from particulars. It is a generalised term for a class of objects. As such, it helps in classification and measurement of facts.
As a set of directions, or abstraction of certain properties or relation, it directs the researcher to pick out a particular kind of experience. After having classification of facts on the basis of concepts, the researcher analyses the various categories and discovers interrelation among them. From analysis, he goes to the stage of generalisation – making a general statement applicable to a large number of facts – both observed and unobserved. A good number of interconnected generalisations make up a theory.
A theory is facts assembled, put in an order, and seen in a relevant relationship. After coming to the stage of generalisation, one takes a jump or makes theoretical thrust and speaks for the similar, but hitherto unobserved, facts and events.
In a scientific venture, facts, concepts, generalisation, and theory should be based on empirical experience. When we go upwards from fact to theory, we move from validity to generality. Both rarely go together. As we go higher towards generality, which means speaking for a larger number of facts, we gradually lose validity or closeness to all actual empirical facts. Quantum of validity in factual statements differs in proportion to closeness to empirical facts. Scientific method keeps us close to observation of political facts. Theoretical movement takes us higher to generality of facts, but away from validity of observation.
Theory simply means the putting up of the relevant facts under the umbrella of some relation, property or abstraction. This is done on the basis of actual observation of some facts which enables the researcher to include other unobserved facts. For this, he uses the tools of concepts and generalisations. However, the whole structure has to stand on the foundation stone of empirical observation or validity of facts.
On the basis of validation or validity, theoretical statements can be put at four levels:
(1) Factual statements:
These are based on hundred per cent empirical evidence. Being observable, they are fully reliable.
(2) Probabilistic statements:
These are based on empirical evidence, but are applied on similar objects or events. They are hypothetically applied to all of them, and are accepted as true till proved false. They lack cent per cent validity, but mostly are regarded as empirical.
(3) Hypothetical statements:
Here we guess about facts. They are based on the interrelation of various variables which become a basis to prove them empirically. They help us in knowing the relationship between the change in one variable and the change in another variable. Lesser the ambiguity in the interrelation of variables, greater the precision. The mutual relationship makes hypothetical statements more fruitful and valid.
(4) Theoretical statements:
This is the highest stage of theoretical movement made on the road to validity. At this level, all facts, probable and hypothetical statements are woven into a widening relationship. The theoretical structure at this level is more general and universal than the lower three. However, each higher level tends to lose more and more validity.
In the diagram below as the scholar rises higher towards the theoretical top, his knowledge about the facts gets more and more generalised. The area of his knowledge enlarges, but validity dilutes. As given therein, at the lowest factual level, if generality is 25°, validity is 100°. At the next higher probabilistic level, generality is increased 50°, but validity goes low to 75°, and so on so forth.
To illustrate, if a vigilant citizen knows all the members of his ward, his knowledge about the ward can be counted valid up to 100 per cent. But his generality at higher level remains limited to a few hundred persons only, and validity about the people of his ward is not cent per cent. His factual knowledge, if applied to members of other wards, would only be probabilistic, with increased generality and reduced validity. If he applies the knowledge of the results of his municipal council to the elections of other local bodies, such an attempt can roughly be called as the use of his hypothetical knowledge.
In that case, generality will further be increased, but validity may go to a lowest ebb. ‘If there is heavy polling in those elections, the opposition will be benefited’ – can be a useful hypothetical statement. If more hypothetical statements are transformed into generalisations after empirical observations, and weared into a set or cluster, the latter will reach the level of a theory. Its validity will further be reduced.
All these levels of statements or knowledge are somehow related to or based on facts. A structure of knowledge originates from simple factual statements and ends in abstract and general statements. All such statements or generation of knowledge presents ‘theory-data-continuum’.
At the highest level of knowledge or theory, one is able to generate many new hypotheses, and predict unobserved but probable and important facts of political life. Without a higher and more abstract set of concepts and generalisations, one cannot know much about political facts and processes. A theorist cannot stand without a collection of empirical facts.
In all situations, knowledge of a political theorist is based on observation of facts, and their analysis in terms of scientific method. One has to constantly shuttle from facts to theory and theory to facts. But one may stop at the level of facts, their observation or analysis only. He is a political scientist, and not a theorist. He may even go a little beyond the facts and make some statements. Even this attempt does not amount to a theory.
A theory emerges in the form of interrelated concepts and generalisations under a certain scheme. A theorist refers to relationship between facts by ordering them in some meaningful way. Each theory has to go beyond facts and events. Thus, a theorist has necessarily to be a scientist, but the two roles can separately be taken up by two sets of scholars.
However, knowledge of facts can tell a lot about their ‘what’, ‘how’, ‘when’, ‘where’ etc., but remains empirically unable to speak on its ‘why’. The understanding of ‘why relates to values. If ultimate values or ideas about them are known or shown, the researcher can scientifically study the lower level or secondary values also. As political facts are deeply involved with facts, a the
orist has to know a lot about meaning and implication of various values also.
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