As there is not one general theory of politics, many formulations or theoretical constructions are claiming to be the prospective modern or scientific political theory. For rapid and proper development of modern political theory, these analytical formulations passing for ‘theory’ should be classified, studied, and analysed. There are several bases of classification of theories.
On the basis of scientificity or scienceness, theories can be scientific or non-scientific. Scientific theories are value-free and use scientific method and techniques. Some theories deal with specific segments of political process. With this view, Stephen Bailey has divided them as (a) descriptive and explanatory theories which deal with ‘what’ and ‘why’ of the problem; and (b) normative or idealistic theories which discuss ‘ought’, ‘good’, ‘good life’, ‘human values’, ‘ideal-society’ etc. There are theories related to anticipated conditions and probabilities – they deal with prior conditions, or make predictions. The instrumental theories bring out ‘how’, ‘when’, and ‘where’ of the problems.
Other criteria of classification are time-order, generality, scope, and structure. Older theories that came up before the emergence of behavioural revolution are usually called as traditional or conventional political theories. Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Mill, Hegel, Marx etc., have contributed to this category. Most of the modern political theories have come up after the Second World War. Prominent among modern political theorists include David Easton, Lasswell, Karl W. Deutsch, Herbert A. Simon, Gabriel A. Almond, Coleman, Powell etc.
W.J.M. Mackenzie has classified all old and new theories on the basis of their generality:
(a) Overarching, grand or meta-theories, such as:
(i) Marxist;
(ii) liberal or radical democratic;
(iii) pertaining to natural law;
(iv) Parson’s structural-functionalism;
(v) David Easton’s systems theory;
(vi) Oakshott’s idealism, and,
(vii) economists’ theory of particularistic interdependence.
Among them, the first three are old ones, and the rest have been developed during modern times. These theories have ample generality, but suffer from lack of validity.
(b) Partial theories which deal with a part or segment of political life, such as,
(i) communication theory,
(ii) game and mathematical theories,
(iii) decision-making theory,
(iv) organisation theory,
(v) power theory etc.
The second category theories try to maintain a balance between generality and validity. Robert K. Merton calls them as ‘middle range’ theories.
From the view point of scope, Easton divides them as:
(i) Empirical generalisations,
(2) Middle-range theory, and
(3) General theory.
Empirical generalisations relate two or more concepts under a generalised statement. If their relationship is supported by observational evidence, the generalisation is accepted as ‘true’ or ‘adequate’. The middle-range theory explains a particular aspect of political process, e.g., theories pertaining to psychology of voting behaviour. Sometimes it becomes difficult to draw out a dividing line between the middle-range and the general theories. General theories deal with the whole structure or process of political reality.
Easton presents such a ‘theory’ (actually a conceptual framework or a theoretical paradigm) useful for the integration of the whole discipline, and analysis of political systems An ideal theoretical structure contains axioms, calculus, and precise definitions. In other words, the set of generalisations therein is well-knit or closely structured. But in actual practice, such high-order relationship among generalisations of an empirical theory is usually not available.
Under that ideal, relationship among generalisations can be of three types:
(i) Functional relationship pertains to association between two or more functions or their variables, for example, increase of education and increase of cognition. When they do not relate to specific structures, their relationship cannot be regarded as structured or stable.
(ii) Causal relationship is usually definite and more structured, but it may not be empirically observed or proved logically. In social sciences, causality in practice becomes association between variables. For example, at a particular level of stagnant economy, excessive increase in population leads to increase in poverty and consequent inequality. Such relationship is established in the form of a rule or generalisation.
(iii) Tendency relationship is often in the form of probabilistic claims. They are regarded as weak forms of generalisations. At the present stage of development, political theory contains mostly this type of generalisations. Factor theory contains such tendency statements. As they do not portray probability in concrete terms or as an empirical phenomenon, one cannot use them in making comparison.
Eugene J. Meehan, adopting explanatory attributes, defines a theory as ‘a set of generalisation, or a set of generalisations, that explains general statements, or explains other theories.’ For him, theory is an explanatory device or apparatus. To be more specific, a theory is an engine for selection of facts, and for their symbolic storage, and for making probable predictions.
An open theory undertakes search for new facts, as well as selection or rejection of old ones, reformulating, even replacing, existing theories. As a scientific theory, it would remain testable or verifiable by empirical evidence. Such explanatory theories can be (a) universal, (b) probabilistic, or (c) in the form of tendency statements.
Apart from the theories mentioned above, others come under the category of ‘quasi-theories’ which lack explanatory power. They can be considered as theoretical structures, but remain deficient in explaining phenomena such as classification-schemes or typologies, dichotomies, or analogies.
Meehan has not considered the under-mentioned theoretical presentations as explanatory theory:
(1) Definitions, even if they are presented as a set of concatenated statements, e.g., as in game theory.
(2) List of factors, if they are not consistent and operational within the framework of a theory, e.g., information provided by census and statistics departments.
(3) Approaches are, in fact, attempts to make a theory, or at the most they can be regarded as partial theories, e.g., power theory or group theory.
(4) Models, usually, are more than classification schemes and represent variables observed in a particular phenomenon or event. However, they do not bring out any generalisation, proposition, or theory, e.g., Anthony Downs’ An Economic Theory of Democracy.
(5) Speculation is Utopian by nature and woven around some abstract, unconfirmed and even impractical notions, e.g., Karl Popper’s The Poverty of Historicism.
Easton, in order to develop a general theory, has classified the various forms of theory:
(1) From the point of view of the discipline’s boundary, a theory can be inside or outside.
(2) On the basis of its scope or subject-matter, it can be ‘micro’ or ‘macro’.
(3) From functional viewpoint, it may be,
(i) static,
(ii) dynamic,
(iii) time-structured,
(iv) processual,
(v) individualistic,
(vi) systemic, and
(vii) pertaining to comparative systems.
(4) On the basis of structural consistency, it can be a well-organised, close-knit and inter-related set of propositions or definitions or otherwise.
(5) Hierarchy or levels can also be the ground of classification, as (i) single generalisations or singular statements, (ii) intermediate, and (iii) broad-gauge or systemic theories. Easton is particularly concerned with the last category which de
als with the whole subject-matter.
It again can be subdivided in the form of two broad approaches: (a) allocative theories, such as, power or decision-making theories, the concept of equilibrium in the group theories of Bentley and Truman, and Lasswell’s distributive approach; and (a) general approaches, again sub-classified as (i) functional analysis, and (ii) systems analysis.